Essays in development and public economics : savings, information and formalization by Bohne, Albrecht
ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS: SAVINGS, INFORMATION AND
FORMALIZATION
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
Albrecht Bohne
August 2018
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Jochen Streb
Referent: Prof. Dr. Markus Frölich
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Andreas Peichl
Tag der Verteidigung: 07. November 2018
Für Vero & Felix
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my advisors Markus Frölich and Andreas Peichl for their support
and valuable feedback throughout the whole process of writing this thesis. I especially
value Markus Frölich’s exemplary drive for finding solutions to issues affecting the poorest
and most vulnerable individuals on our planet. Explicit thanks go to Andreas Peichl for
supporting my endeavors with the Ecuadorian tax authority from the very beginning and
providing crucial guidance in shaping research questions into academic papers. I extend my
thanks to Katja Kaufmann for numerous discussions about my research papers.
I am indebted to the Ecuadorian tax authority Servicio de Rentas Internas for providing
data access and indirectly to all Ecuadorian taxpayers for the opportunity to study their tax
system in such detail. I especially thank Néstor Villacrese, José Almeida, María Andrade
and the whole team at the Centro de Estudios Fiscales for hosting me during numerous
research stays and providing invaluable help by discussing details of the tax system.
Moreover, I would like to thank my co-authors on the first chapter of this thesis, Markus
Frölich and Alexandra Avdeenko for the opportunity to work on all stages of a randomized
control trial. I will never forget the numerous discussions on how to design the experiment,
organize the fieldwork, lead the budget negotiations, get a shipment of moneyboxes through
Ethiopian customs and of course analyze the data and write the paper.
A very sincere thank you goes to my friend Jan Nimczik for the numerous and stimulating
discussions we had about economic research, our joint paper on taxes in Ecuador (chapter
2) and life in general during the whole PhD program, numerous trips to conferences, and
during our joint research stay in Ecuador.
Additionally, I thank numerous fellow researchers and colleagues at the University of
Mannheim and the graduate school for fruitful and extensive discussions. Special thanks go
to Torben Fischer, Jasper Haller, Sebastian Panthöfer, and Maria Isabel Santana-Penczynski.
Lastly, I would like to thank my whole family, and in particular my parents, Friedgund
and Thomas Bohne, for their continuous support during the very long course of my studies.
Most importantly, I thank my wife Verónica for her immense love, unwavering support and
tolerance for the ups and downs associated with doing a PhD. I am extremely grateful for
the wonderful family we have together with our son Felix Mateo.
v
vi
Contents
Acknowledgements v
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Preface 1
1 Linking Savings Behavior, Confidence and Individual Feedback: A Field Ex-
periment in Ethiopia 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Background and Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Data and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Timeline, Data and Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Savings and Confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Savings Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4.3 Content of Individual Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 Information Frictions and Learning Dynamics: Evidence from Tax Avoidance
in Ecuador 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Data and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
vii
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.1 Individual Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.2 Firm Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3 Harnessing Deductions to Increase Tax Compliance and Formalization 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Deductions Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3 Data Sources and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Research Design and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.1 Aggregate Regional Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.2 Individual Self-Employed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A Appendix to Chapter 1 99
B Appendix to Chapter 2 103
B.1 Institutional Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.2 Subgroup Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.3 Robustness Checks: Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B.3.1 Taxable Income below Kink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B.3.2 Filing Deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C Appendix to Chapter 3 145
Bibliography 151
CV 159
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Savings Behavior Before Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1 Income Distribution in Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Number of Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Bunching Estimates Taxable Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4 Coefficients on experience dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Event Study Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6 Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Peer Learning Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.8 Experts Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Pre-Trends Professional Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Pre-Trends Total Self-Employment Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Pre-Trends Profits Sole Proprietorships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
B.1 Tax Declaration Form F107 for Wage Earners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B.2 Tax Declaration Form for Projecting Decuctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.3 The impact of filing deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B.4 Event Study Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B.5 Bunching Estimates Gross Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.6 Peer Learning Event Study - Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
B.7 Coefficients on experience dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.8 Event Study Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B.9 Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers . . . . . . . . . 125
B.10 Peer Learning Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.11 Experts Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.12 Coefficients on experience dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B.13 Event Study Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
ix
B.14 Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers . . . . . . . . . 141
B.15 Peer Learning Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.16 Experts Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
C.1 Tax Declaration Form F102A for Self-Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
C.2 Tax Declaration Form F102A for Self-Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
x
List of Tables
1.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Balance Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Effect of Recommendations on Savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Intermediate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Direction of Recommendations and Underconfidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 Bunching estimates over time by cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Bunching Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Job Switchers - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4 Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5 Extensive Margin of Firm-level Bunching over time by cohort . . . . . . . 57
2.6 Intensive Margin of Firm-level Bunching over time by firm cohort . . . . . 59
2.7 Information Transmission: Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.8 Information Transmission: Intensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.9 Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.10 Peer Learning - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.11 Experts Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.12 Experts Event Study - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1 Descriptive Statistics Aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Descriptive Statistics Individual Tax Returns — Relative to Mean . . . . . 82
3.3 Descriptive Statistics Individual Tax Returns — Relative to p90 . . . . . . 83
3.4 DD Results Aggregate Effets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Effects Individual Tax Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6 Placebo Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.1 Effect of Moneybox on Savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.2 Alternative Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xi
A.3 Alternative Savings Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.1 Tax Brackets (in US $) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.2 Bunching Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B.3 Job Switchers - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B.4 Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
B.5 Extensive Margin of Firms with Taxable Income below Kink over time by
cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B.6 Intensive Margin of Firms with Taxable Income below Kink over time by
firm cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B.7 Information Transmission: Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
B.8 Information Transmission: Intensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B.9 Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.10 Peer Learning - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.11 Experts Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B.12 Experts Event Study - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.13 Bunching Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.14 Job Switchers - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.15 Job Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.16 Extensive Margin of Firms with Deduction Filers over time by cohort . . . 131
B.17 Intensive Margin of Firms with Deduction Filers over time by firm cohort . 132
B.18 Information Transmission: Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B.19 Information Transmission: Intensive Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.20 Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
B.21 Peer Learning - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
B.22 Experts Event Study - Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
B.23 Experts Event Study - Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
C.1 Comparison Availability of Professions Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
C.2 Effects Individual Tax Returns - Balanced Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
C.3 Placebo Differences - Balanced Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
C.4 Triple Differences Health Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
xii
xiii
xiv
Preface
Improving the livelihoods of all individuals around the globe can be considered as one
of the key aims of modern economic and political endeavors. A crucial challenges is how
to set up structures and frameworks which help individuals in developing countries make
lasting improvements to their economic prospects and overall well-being. These structures
and frameworks need to address a multitude of issues at varying levels such as individual
behavior, interactions between individuals and nation-wide effects governing the structure
of the economy.
This thesis addresses these fundamental issues at various levels and in differing con-
texts. Chapter 1 studies how to provide individuals, in this case smallholder farmers in
Ethiopia, the necessary tools to overcome behavioral biases and economic restrictions due
to extremely seasonal income patterns. Chapters 2 and 3 look into how to efficiently design
tax and transfer systems in developing countries. While chapter 2 deals with information
frictions in the tax system and how these can be alleviated through interactions between
individuals, chapter 3 analyzes how a specific reform can shift business activity from the
informal to the formal economy and thereby change the structure of the economy.
The chapters of this thesis also touch on various aspects of how to analyze and design
effective public policies in general. Chapter 1 is an example of how to leverage behavioral
insights to design innovative policies providing individuals with the tools to improve their
outcomes. Chapter 2 looks at the roll-out of a policy where information frictions prevent
universal take-up and analyzes how these information frictions can be overcome. Finally,
chapter 3 studies how individual policy responses can be harnessed to create spillovers in
a different economic sector with improvements for the whole economy. When designing
effective policies in any setting, all three of these aspects need to be taken into account:
how to make a policy effective at the individual level, how to roll out the policy to the
whole economy, and what its spillover effects are on other sectors of the economy. In many
cases, policy conclusions are reached without giving sufficient consideration to the latter
two issues.
Methodologically, the chapters in this thesis use a range of approaches depending on the
type of question at hand. Chapter 1 implements a randomized control trial and thereby pro-
vides very robust answers to a specific question about individual behavior while abstracting
1
from almost all other confounders. However, this gold standard cannot be applied to an-
swer all questions. Analyzing the questions addressed in chapter 2 about information flows
within a whole society would be extremely costly to address with a randomized control trial.
Therefore, this thesis draws on various sources of novel and extremely rich administrative
data with employer-employee linkages and details on the universe of personal income tax
records. This extensive data provides unique quasi-experimental variation in the information
environment individuals face along various dimensions, providing the basis of the analysis
on information frictions in chapter 2. Chapter 3 exploits plausibly exogenous variation in
the usage of a policy to estimate its spillovers towards a different sector of the economy.
Chapter 1: Savings Behavior Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Markus Frölich and
Alexandra Avdeenko. In this chapter, we analyze behavioral constraints to savings among
smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. These farmers face extremely seasonal income patterns,
with a short harvest season with high income and much lower or no income generation
during the rest of the year. However, expenditures including vital investments must often
be made outside of the harvest season. Even in settings with more regular income patterns,
previous literature has documented positive effects of increased savings on a number of
economic outcomes in areas such as health, education and agricultural investment.
Due to these positive effects, a large literature in development economics focuses on find-
ing innovative ways to increase savings among individuals in low-income economies. Along
with providing individuals with access to savings accounts or savings technologies, many
of these studies focus on overcoming behavioral biases hindering individuals from reach-
ing their full savings potential. Key behavioral biases studied include present-biasedness,
inattention, as well as those arising from non-standard risk preferences. Most interventions
revolve around the provision of commitment devices restricting individual future choice
sets.
This paper proposes a previously unexplored behavioral bias to savings, namely under-
confidence. We find a strong empirical link between confidence levels and savings behavior,
even when controlling for important behavioral traits such as present-biasedness and risk
preferences. Individuals with low confidence levels save significantly less than individu-
als with high confidence levels. Within an intervention enabling individuals to save more
through the provision of moneyboxes as a simple savings technology, we experimentally im-
plement an innovative feedback loop in the form of recommendations to change previously
self-stated saving goals. Individuals receiving the additional feedback save significantly
more than individuals not receiving this feedback, and this effect is especially strong for
underconfident individuals. We rule out a number of alternative explanations due to other
behavioral biases and crowding-out behavior into other forms of saving.
2
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Chapter 2: Information Frictions and Learning Dynamics Chapter 2 is joint work with
Jan Sebastian Nimczik. This chapter analyzes how dynamic learning processes reduce in-
formation frictions hindering individuals from responding optimally to policies. In many
settings, policies and changes in regulation are implemented with the underlying idea that
all economic actors with potential benefits will immediately participate and gain from a
given policy change. We look at a setting in which many individuals, even though they are
potential beneficiaries of a new policy, do not take it up. In our setting, the main obsta-
cle seems to be information frictions and we thoroughly study how these can be overcome
through experience and dynamic learning processes. In particular, we provide causal evi-
dence on the exact mechanisms of information transmission by studying various patterns of
(exogenous) job mobility.
We look at these questions in the context of legal tax avoidance opportunities in a country
with a recent unprecedented growth in the size of its formal economy, Ecuador. By using
generous deduction opportunities in the personal income tax system, taxpayers can signifi-
cantly reduce their tax burden and often completely avoid paying taxes. Drawing on novel
administrative data based on the universe of personal income tax declarations, we document
that individuals are more likely to avoid paying taxes both as they personally gain experience
in the formal economy but also as their firm gains experience in the formal economy. By
studying individuals changing their jobs for exogenous reasons we provide evidence for how
the firm-level information environment causally affects individual tax avoidance behavior.
Moreover, we identify the underlying channels of information transmission by exploiting
further changes in the information environment individuals face through changes in their co-
worker composition and accountant switches. We find peers in the form of new co-workers
joining a firm to be important in affecting the tax avoidance behavior of incumbent workers.
If these new co-workers were previously avoiding tax payments, they increase the likelihood
that the incumbent co-workers also avoid paying taxes. Likewise, experts play an important
role in driving individual tax avoidance behavior. Accountants previously working for a firm
in which employees avoided paying taxes bring this knowledge to a new firm and increase
the probability that employees at their new firm will avoid paying taxes.
Chapter 3: Formalization Chapter 3 studies how individual-level responses to incen-
tives by consumers can be harnessed to improve tax compliance of business owners with
economy-wide implications for the size of the formal sector. Increasing tax compliance
is an especially important goal for developing economies, which are generally plagued by
very large informal sectors (ILO, 2014). Getting all economic actors to participate in the
formal sector economy is often a prerequisite for improving the quantity and quality of pub-
lic spending and for ensuring that the tax and transfer system is perceived as just by all
sectors of the population. However, although a number of recent efforts have been aimed
3
at formalizing developing economies, some sectors of the economy are particularly difficult
to formalize. Among these are self-employed business owners, who also in more developed
economies are very prone to tax avoidance and evasion (Chetty et al., 2011; Bastani and
Selin, 2014). This effect is further exacerbated in the absence of the self-enforcing proper-
ties of the VAT system due to frequent exemptions.
This chapter evaluates a novel reform in Ecuador based on enlisting all individuals paying
personal income tax to create paper trails and third-party information about business activity
in sectors of the economy largely exempt from VAT payments. These taxpayers can deduct
expenses in health, education, housing, clothing and food (up to certain limits) from their
tax liability. Using administrative data based on the universe of self-employed personal
income tax declarations, I estimate the effects of this increased demand for receipts on
reported business profits of self-employed business owners. The main identifying variation
stems from the fact that personal income taxes are levied at relatively high levels in Ecuador
and therefore only a small share of the population uses these deductions. Moreover, there
is substantial regional heterogeneity in the density of these high-income individuals and
therefore business owners in some regions are exposed to a high demand for receipts while
business owners in other regions to a low demand for receipts. I exploit this variation in
a difference-in-differences framework and find large effects of the reform on aggregated
economic activity: Reported regional business profits of self-employed increase by up to
33% per inhabitant living in a given region.
At the individual self-employed level, I exploit an additional source of variation due to
the fact that the deductions only affect certain self-employed based on their professions.
Drawing on data from the civil registry, I identify self-employed particularly affected by
the reform, such as doctors, and those not affected, such journalists and economists. This
second treatment layer allows to conduct triple difference regressions. I corroborate my
previous findings at the aggregate level and estimate a treatment effect of the reform in
which self-employed subject to a high demand for receipts increase their reported profits by
almost 100%.
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Chapter 1
Linking Savings Behavior, Confidence
and Individual Feedback: A Field
Experiment in Ethiopia1
with Markus Frölich and Alexandra Avdeenko
1.1 Introduction
Recent research has highlighted the importance of savings for individuals in develop-
ing countries. People in these countries are often exposed to potentially large idiosyn-
cratic shocks while facing seasonal income patterns and lacking access to social insurance
schemes. Finding ways to increase savings among these households has attracted consid-
erable attention from economists. In fact, a broad literature has shown positive effects of
increased savings on a range of development outcomes in areas ranging from agricultural
investments (Brune et al., 2016) to health (Dupas and Robinson, 2013) and education (Kar-
lan and Linden, 2017).2
In devising strategies to increase savings, previous research has put a strong focus on
overcoming behavioral biases, especially through the use of innovative commitment devices
(Ashraf et al., 2006; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; John, 2017).3 This paper addresses a previ-
1 An earlier version of this chapter was circulated under the name “Underconfidence and the Use of Persua-
sive Messages in the Attainment of Savings Goals". This study obtained IRB approval from the University
of Mannheim “Ethikkommission" on April 22, 2015 and is registered at the AEA RCT Registry under #
AEARCTR-0000613. Special thanks go to Niels Kemper for valuable discussions and inputs during the de-
sign of the intervention.
2 Please refer to Karlan et al. (2014) for a comprehensive overview.
3 The literature has also proposed various other barriers to savings, including transaction costs, information
asymmetries, lack of access to financial services, and social constraints, to name just a few.
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ously unexplored behavioral bias in determining savings behavior, namely confidence. Our
first contribution to the literature is that we establish the link between confidence and savings
behavior drawing on a detailed survey of microfinance clients in rural Ethiopia. We docu-
ment that confidence is an independent predictor for baseline savings behavior, and at least
as important as other behavioral characteristics such as risk-aversion and present-biasedness.
Individuals with low levels of confidence, whom we label as underconfident, exhibit signif-
icantly lower levels of savings even when controlling for a range of socio-demographic and
economically relevant variables. We classify individuals as underconfident if they underes-
timate their ability to find correct answers to a standard World Bank (1998) financial literacy
module.
We further propose and experimentally test an innovative feedback loop enabling indi-
viduals to overcome their underconfidence and reach higher savings outcomes. To do so, we
conduct a randomized controlled trial in 94 rural villages in Northern Ethiopia. Smallholder
farmers in this region provide the ideal study population to analyze savings patterns due to
the high variability in their income reflecting seasonal patterns in agriculture. We distribute
moneyboxes along with individualized, self-set savings plans to around 600 randomly se-
lected farmers during peak income season. Therewith, the farmers receive individual feed-
back on their reported savings goals in the form of two types of recommendations to save
either more or less than their originally stated plan. We find that individuals who receive
this individualized feedback to reflect and reconsider their original savings goal save more
(an increase of 181 Birr or 36 percent), and this effect is especially strong for underconfi-
dent farmers. Even though respondents mostly change their goal in the intended direction
(upwards or downwards), the direction of the recommendation we provided had no impact
on actual savings outcomes. We take this as confirmation that the additional request to re-
consider and revise the original savings goal, disregarding the direction of the revision, is
crucial in helping underconfident individuals reach their full savings potential. We confirm
the robustness of our results by ruling out various other behavioral mechanisms such as risk-
aversion and present-biasedness. Moreover, we do not find any crowding-out behavior with
respect to alternative savings mechanisms.4
Our paper relates to the growing literature on savings, especially in developing countries.
Even though individuals in these countries may be poor, they still have (considerable) scope
in deciding what to spend their money on (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). In settings with-
out access to formal savings mechanisms, people often save in informal mechanisms like
“under-the-mattress”, informal saving groups or investments into livestock (Karlan et al.,
4 We are aware that some of the respondents in our sample may have simultaneous debt at potentially high
interest rates and are therefore unable to make direct statements about the welfare effects of these increases in
savings.
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2014). Numerous studies have shown the importance of savings for a range of development
outcomes for individuals in all income ranges (Brune et al., 2016; Dupas and Robinson,
2013; Karlan and Linden, 2017). Therefore, the literature has focused on identifying a set
of constraints on savings, such as lack of financial knowledge (Perry and Morris, 2005; Berg
and Zia, 2013; Bayer et al., 2009; Karlan et al., 2014), market frictions and reduced access to
financial services (Dupas et al., forthcoming; Karlan et al., 2014). Moreover, numerous be-
havioral frictions have been put forward such as time-inconsistent preferences (Ashraf et al.,
2006; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; John, 2017), inattention problems (Karlan et al., 2016;
Kast et al., 2018), intra-household barriers (Dupas and Robinson, 2013), and procrastination
in financial decision making (Becchetti et al., 2015; Bisin and Hyndman, 2014; Brown and
Previtero, 2014; Duflo et al., 2009; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Linardi and Tanaka, 2013).
We draw special attention to studies highlighting the importance of reminders and feedback
in savings behavior. Karlan et al. (2016) show that reminders to save increased total bank
savings and savings goal attainment by 6%. Kast et al. (2018) show the relevance of feed-
back and follow-up text messages in self-help saving groups. Carvalho et al. (2016) created
bank accounts and had weekly visits by deposit collectors whereby the treatment group had
the chance to make a considered saving decision. They conclude that the treatment led to
a higher accumulation of wealth. Lastly, our paper contributes to the literature showing the
effectiveness of lockboxes as a simple savings technology to increase savings (Dupas and
Robinson, 2013; Shipton et al., 1990).
The second broad literature our paper connects to is one linking confidence and financial
decision making. Overconfident individuals are known to take higher risks in financial mar-
kets (Kirchler and Maciejovsky 2002, Caliendo and Huang 2007, Doerr et al. 2011), trade
too much, too aggressive and earn lower net returns (Barber and Odean 2001, Gervais and
Odean 2001, Barberis and Thaler 2003). More closely related to our argument are the stud-
ies by Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Garrard and Robinson (2015). The authors argue
that overconfident managers over-invest and take lower quality decisions when firms have
abundant internal funds. Further studies have focused on the behavior of consumers and
have shown that overconfident consumers overpay overestimating the benefit of the product
or service (Grubb 2009, Grubb 2015 and Li et al. 2016). However, within the literature
on confidence and financial decision making there are only few studies relating underconfi-
dence to economic outcomes, especially savings behavior. Perhaps closest to this question is
a study in the field of psychology by Tang and Baker (2016), who state that financial actions
might be “intimidating, and short-term failures or distractions can undermine responsible
long-term financial behaviors”. They suggest that self-esteem relates to financial behav-
ior both directly and indirectly through subjective financial knowledge. In the same vein,
Ameriks et al. (2007) find that a group of people with a higher negative difference between
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expected consumption and ideal consumption, the so-called underconsumers, actually ac-
cumulates more wealth being less tempted to consume. Likewise, a range of studies relate
measurable personality traits such as locus of control and perceived control to financial de-
cisions. In fact, high levels of perceived control seem to be key to savings decisions (Rotter
1966, Ajzen 2002, Perry and Morris 2005, Cobb-Clark et al. 2013, Fouarge et al. 2013).
The widely used personality trait locus of control is also relevant, since self-confidence is
one of its defining elements. Cobb-Clark et al. (2013) find that households with internal lo-
cus of control (believing to be in full control of their lives) save more than households with
an external locus of control (believing lives are controlled by external factors). Moreover,
Chatterjee et al. (2011) analyze the relationship between self-efficacy and savings behavior.
They find that individuals with higher self-efficacy accumulate more wealth.
Our study combines both strands of literature by focusing on a behavioral constraint to
savings so far only analyzed for developed countries, namely confidence. In particular, we
contribute by complementing the prior focus on overconfidence and taking a closer look at
underconfident individuals and their saving behavior. We establish a clear link between the
two. Our last contribution is the design and implementation of a targeted encouragement
experiment to overcome this behavioral constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2 we describe the background
and experimental design. Section 1.3 presents our data and analyzes the relationship be-
tween confidence and baseline saving levels. In Section 1.4 we present our results, followed
by robustness checks in Section 1.5 Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background and Experimental Design
The study was conducted in rural Northern Ethiopia (Tigray region). The experiment
took place in December 2014 together with smallholder farmers in 94 rural villages. Partic-
ipants were randomly selected out of lists of current and former microfinance clients.
1.2.1 Background
Economic activity in Northern rural Ethiopia is almost entirely dependent on agriculture.
More than 90% of the households in our study directly engage in agriculture as their main
source of income, and almost all of this is generated through crop production. Agricultural
activity in Northern Ethiopia is heavily dependent on rainfall patterns, creating three sea-
sons that are of relevance to smallholder farmers: Belg (March to June), associated with
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little agricultural activity, Kiremti (July to September), where cultivation and heavy rainfalls
take place, and Kewie (October to February), which is the season in which farmers harvest,
sell or store their goods. Naturally, seasonal patterns in household income and cultural ac-
tivities are a direct consequence of these agricultural seasons. During the harvest period
Kewie (October to February), households typically generate relatively high income streams
due to irregular sales of their goods at local markets, wage work as harvest helpers and a
general uptake in all other economic activities. The subsequent season associated with little
agricultural activities (Belg, March to June) typically entails several religious festivities and
weddings, for which households are socially expected to make non-negligible expenditures.
Agricultural investments, such as fertilizer or seed acquisition, usually tend to take place in
Kiremti (July to September), the planting and cultivation season. Obviously, the lag between
income generation and investment causes difficulties for our study population.
Our partner organization, a local microfinance institution (MFI), has long tried to devise
strategies to increase savings and investment among their client population. Smallholder
farmers in our regions of Tigray usually have access to several savings technologies: cash
savings in their home, savings with the MFI, or savings in informal savings arrangements,
most importantly Equb (savings society) and Iddir (funeral society). Only roughly 5% of
the study population has a formal bank account, and in the subsequent paper we will refer
to “bank savings" as savings in the local MFI. Savings at the local microfinance institution,
however, also incur sizable transaction costs, since clients usually need to travel to the next
larger-sized village. In our sample mean travel time to the next MFI branch is slightly above
60 minutes. Especially during harvest season, it may be difficult for farmers to find this
additional time.
Apart from savings, however, farmers in Northern Ethiopia do have a considerable de-
mand for further microfinance products. Almost 90% of our sample has taken out a loan
from the MFI at some point in time. The most frequent months for these loans are June
and July, right before cultivation begins and agricultural investments need to be made. Due
to this, the MFI has often undergone attempts to promote savings behavior among the lo-
cal population. We chose the introduction of our intervention and provision of savings
technology to coincide with the seasonality patterns of agriculture and income generation.
Therefore, we conducted the intervention in December, the middle of the harvest season
Kewie, where most households are selling crops or otherwise in the middle of their income
generating activities.
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1.2.2 Experimental Design
We visited all sampled households and asked to talk to the household head along with a
further adult household member (generally the spouse). After a few survey questions, we
started with a discussion on the general importance of savings and proceeded to prepare
a detailed and individualized savings plan with the respondents. Our treatment was then
composed of two elements: First, we offered smallholder farmers a new savings technology,
namely moneyboxes with individual savings plans. Secondly, we provided individualized
savings feedbacks.
Moneyboxes with Savings Plans. An emerging consensus in the literature states that
savers have a demand for commitment and that softer commitments may be more effective
in inducing behavioral change with respect to savings than harder commitments (Karlan and
Linden, 2017; John, 2017). Thus, we choose a soft commitment - a moneybox provided to
a subset of randomly chosen farmers - to leverage savings. Moneyboxes induce a certain
amount of commitment since the cash inside the box is earmarked for a certain goal and
using it for something else may induce unease for the owner. However, as opposed to sav-
ings in banks, MFIs, or commitment savings accounts, the money held inside moneyboxes
is available at all times in case of emergency and does not entail any constraints on the indi-
vidual’s future choice sets.5 Moreover, the households in our sample dwell in remote areas.
Traveling to the next microfinance branch is time-consuming and visits in the village by
the branches’ savings officers are infrequent. Using a moneybox allows for saving at high,
even daily, frequencies at virtually no transaction costs. This is especially important for the
detailed saving plans designed together with the participants.
On every moneybox we distributed we also fixed an individualized savings plan. To do
so, we asked respondents to formulate and talk about the most important savings goal they
would like to save for. Examples for these goals include livestock (cows, goats), school
books, and fertilizer. We proceeded by asking respondents how much they want to save for
this goal and in how much time they want to accumulate this amount. In order to guarantee
comparability, we had preset the timeline to be between 8 and 24 week.6 For those house-
holds randomly selected to the pure control group not receiving a moneybox, the savings
discussion ended at this point and was followed by a few more survey questions.7
5 The moneyboxes we employed are round cylindrical plastic boxes with a slit at the top to facilitate the
introduction of cash. The bottom of the moneybox has a hole with a small lock. Two keys were handed out to
each household.
6 If the costs of the goal (say, a cow) exceed the amount an individual believes to be able to save in 24 weeks,
we asked that person to state the amount of money they would like to save during those 24 weeks towards their
goal.
7 We wanted to ensure that also households not receiving the moneybox were given the same general discus-
sion about savings as treatment households. 300 individuals belong to this pure control group.
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Feedback to Reconsider Original Savings Goal. After the respondents stated the ini-
tial goal amount they decided to save for, a subset of farmers was asked to reconsider this
amount. The enumerator read out one of the following recommendations (randomized as-
signment):
I. “Our experience shows that people are more likely to reach their savings goal if they have
higher goal amounts. Do you want to increase the amount of your savings goal to...
[initial goal amount × 1.4]?”
II. “Our experience shows that people are more likely to reach their savings goal if they
have higher goal amounts. Do you want to increase the amount of your savings goal
to... [initial goal amount × 1.2]?”
III. “Our experience shows that people are more likely to reach their savings goal if they
have lower goal amounts. Do you want to decrease the amount of your savings goal
to... [initial goal amount × 0.8]?”
IV. “Our experience shows that people are more likely to reach their savings goal if they
have lower goal amounts. Do you want to decrease the amount of your savings goal
to... [initial goal amount × 0.6]?”
The control group receives a confirmation for their initially stated savings goal. In this
case the interviewers read out the following statement: “Our experience shows that people
are likely to reach their savings goal.”
Following these recommendations, we ask participants whether they would like to revise
their originally stated goal amount and what this new goal amount should be. Given this
possibly revised savings amount, the enumerator calculates the regular (daily or weekly)
savings installment necessary to reach the goal by the self-set deadline.8
At the end of the interview we put 30 Birr into the moneybox.9 We asked participants to
write down the following information on the label of the box: (1) the savings goal (written
or drawn, e.g. cow), (2) the possibly revised goal amount in Birr, (3) the regular savings
installment in Birr, and (4) the savings end date. At the end of the visit, the interviewers let
households know that they would be visited again at an unspecified future date to check on
their progress towards reaching the savings goal.
Sampling and Randomization. We sampled a total of 940 households in 94 village clus-
ters. The village clusters basically represented a census of the zone in which the study was
8 Whether the installments were daily or weekly was also randomized. 9 30 Birr ≈ 1.5 USD. The pure
control group also received the payment.
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conducted. In each village cluster, 10 households were randomly chosen from lists of cur-
rent and former clients at our partner MFI.
The sample of 940 households was split into random subsamples as follows: 640 house-
holds received a moneybox and 300 households belong to the pure control group. Among
the 640 households receiving the moneybox, 128 were randomized to one of the four rec-
ommendation treatments. Randomization was done at the individual household level. 10
For the randomization, we stratified the different blocks according to a range of baseline
characteristics. These included important financial and economic measures, specifically sav-
ings in cash (amount in Birr), current savings with the local MFI (amount in Birr), whether
household is a member of an Iddir, an informal funeral insurance, or Equb, an informal
savings group (both binary indicators), the total land area under cultivation (in hectare), the
total revenues from crop sales (in Birr) and the per-capita consumption expenditures (in
Birr). Furthermore, we considered the demographic composition of the household (mea-
sured by the number of household members between 0-5, 6-11, 11-17, 18-65 and more than
65 years of age), whether the household head is female or married (both binary indicators)
and the years of education of the head. We chose this combination of economic and socio-
demographic variables to reflect those aspects of our baseline data which we believe are
most important in determining savings outcomes and for which we sought balance.
Randomization was conducted in December 2014 before treatment implementation and
after collection of the first baseline survey. Household-level treatment status was randomly
assigned while balancing the Mahalanobis distances in the above-mentioned baseline vari-
ables used for stratification. The 940 households were assigned to either pure control group
or one of the treatment arms. Thereafter the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the base-
line covariates given above was calculated. Mahalanobis distance was calculated pairwise
between any two treatment arms and also for each treatment arm relative to control. The
random assignment was only accepted if the maximum distance to control was smaller than
0.605 and the maximum distance between any of the treatment arms was smaller than 1.322.
These numbers corresponded to the 0.01 percentile of the empirical distribution of these dis-
tances. The treatments in the study were assigned according to the first random assignment
vector that passed the balance thresholds.
10 We also cross-randomized two further treatments with 320 households in each group: the frequency of
the savings installment (daily or weekly) and the transparency of the moneybox. Results are available upon
request.
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1.3 Data and Background
1.3.1 Timeline, Data and Attrition
We use data from three rounds of comprehensive household-level surveys. An extensive
baseline survey was administered in November/December 2013 on all sample households.11
The implementation of the treatments was combined with a short survey to allow for a clean
experimental procedure and to enable gathering further data on key baseline values. This
setup effectively gives us two baseline surveys. For important variables available at both
points in time, we can average them across both waves to create cleaner measures less prone
to measurement error.
We administered the endline survey in January/February 2015 right at the end of the har-
vest season and the beginning of the subsequent season with little agricultural activity for
two main reasons. First, this point marks the end of the high-income period for agricultural
activity and is the ideal timing to measure the stock of savings households were able to ac-
cumulate during this period of relative prosperity. Second, in the design of the experiment,
we asked households to save towards self-set saving goals within the next two to six months.
The unannounced endline survey was at most two months after treatment implementation.
This allows us to check whether households are on track towards reaching their savings goal
right before the first households are scheduled to reach their goal date.
Our baseline and endline surveys encompass a large range of economically and behav-
iorally relevant variables and measures. We put a special focus into gathering comprehen-
sive savings data. Given that savings (especially non-bank savings) are typically difficult
to observe and measure correctly, we exploit the fact that the moneyboxes let us accurately
observe how much cash is inside them at at a given point in time, thereby reducing mea-
surement error compared to conventional survey questions considerably. We consider total
monetary savings, which are savings in the moneybox (opened and directly counted by our
enumerators), plus savings in cash the household head holds during the interview. In most
cases, enumerators also physically counted further cash holdings together with the respon-
dents during the interview.12 Therefore, our measure of monetary savings is based on obser-
vations without measurement error and does not, as is often the case, represent self-reported
11 We timed the savings intervention in December 2014 to coincide with the middle of the harvest season,
when our study population enjoys high levels of income and has the opportunity to save (refer to Section 1.2.1
for details).
12 This was achieved by asking respondents to report the composition of their further cash holdings in bills
and coins, which typically led to enumerators counting the money together with respondents and thereby
considerably reduce measurement error and ensure truthful reporting.
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savings.
Moreover, to assess possible crowing-out behavior, we cover a range of non-monetary
saving measures, including savings at the local MFI (“bank”)13 and contributions to infor-
mal savings arrangements, specifically Iddir (funeral society) and Equb (savings society).
These measures will be introduced and discussed in more detail in Section 1.5 on the ro-
bustness of our results.
A key aspect of our investigation is associated with our measures of confidence. We as-
sess whether individuals are (1) overconfident, (2) underconfident or (3) correctly confident
using the following standard World Bank financial literacy questions:
I. Let’s assume that you deposited 1000 Birr in a bank account at 5 percent annual
interest rate. How much money will you have in your account in 2 years if you do not
withdraw from or add to this account any money?
II. Let’s assume that in 2015 your income is twice as now, and the food prices also grow
twofold. Do you think that in 2015 you will be able to buy more, less, or the same
amount of goods and services as today?
III. Let’s assume that you saw a mobile phone of the same model offered from two differ-
ent sellers. The initial retail price of it was Birr 1000. One seller offered a discount
of Birr 150, while the other one offered a 10 percent discount. Which one is a better
bargain – a discount of Birr 150 or 10 percent?
Every question has three possible answers but only one of them is correct. After individ-
uals answer these questions we ask how many questions they believe they have answered
correctly.14 We classify as underconfident those individuals who believe to answer less of
the financial literacy questions correctly than they actually did. Conversely, an individual
that overestimates the amount of correct answers is classified as overconfident. Individuals
that neither over- nor underestimate their performance are classified as correctly confident.
Moreover, we ask individuals how many questions they believe all other people in their vil-
lage would answer correctly on average.
Sample Size and Attrition The study draws on three waves of extensive surveys with rel-
atively low levels of attrition. In our endline survey, we were able to re-locate all individuals
13 To reduce measurement error, we also ask respondents to show us their MFI savings passbooks so that the
enumerators can copy the last entries.
14 The exact wording of the question is “What do you think: how many of the last 3 questions did you answer
correctly?”
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who received a moneybox and thereby have an attrition rate of 0% between treatment and
the measurement of our results (endline). However, there was a minor amount of attrition
between the first baseline survey and the implementation of the treatment. Out of the 640
households from our baseline randomly assigned to receive a moneybox, we were able to
locate 614 for the treatment implementation, which translates to a modest attrition rate of
about 4%. After deleting households with missing information in key outcome variables,
the final sample throughout our main analysis amounts to 599 households.15
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
This section starts by describing key features of our data with a special focus on com-
paring individuals according to their confidence levels. We continue by presenting detailed
balance statistics for our main experiment.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics (means and standard deviations) on a range of vari-
ables for the full sample, as well as the subsamples classified as underconfident, overcon-
fident and correctly confident (neither over- nor underconfident). Out of 599 individuals in
the full sample, 16 percent are characterized as underconfident (94 individuals), 47 percent
as overconfident (283 individuals) and the remaining 37 percent are correctly confident (222
individuals). The majority of household heads are married (74 percent) and 22 percent of
households are led by women. Household members are on average relatively young, with
the average household having more members below 18 years of age (3.05 individuals on av-
erage) than above 18 years (2.6). The household head has on average 3 years of education.
Comparing the characteristics across the three types of confidence levels, we find that un-
derconfident individuals are as likely to live in a female-headed household as others. Their
household head is also as likely to be married. Yet, at baseline underconfident individuals
do seem to differ to overconfident individuals in a number of characteristics: the household
head has about one year less in education, land size is slightly bigger, debt is considerably
smaller, and revenue from business activities is smaller.
The variation in baseline savings is big. However, this is partly due to possible measure-
ment error in our reported savings variables, which is eliminated in our endline survey due
to our improved measurement process based on direct observations. The baseline average
of cash savings is about 4430 Birr.16 However, our baseline savings measures show striking
15 The complete baseline (considering also individuals without a moneybox) consists of 940 individuals, 905
of which were revisited for the second baseline coupled with treatment implementation. At the endline we
were able to find and interview 899 individuals. Attrition rates are also small in the full sample, below 4%
between first baseline and treatment implementation and less than 0.7% between treatment implementation
and endline. 16 1 USD ≈ 20 Birr.
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differences according to an individual’s confidence level: underconfident individuals save
2816 Birr in cash, while overconfident ones save twice as much (5633 Birr). Bank savings
are at considerably lower overall levels (2290 Birr on average) and are again smaller for
underconfident individuals (1150 Birr) than for overconfident individuals (3175 Birr). Fur-
thermore, underconfident individuals seem to save slightly more in traditional saving groups
(Iddir membership 12 percentage points above sample average). Our baseline measures for
time and risk preferences (present-biasedness and risk-lovingness) show no systematic dif-
ferences between individuals with varying levels of confidence.
Table 1.1 further reports summary statistics of key factors related to the introduction of
the treatments and the simultaneous measurement of our confidence measures. The self-
set savings plans and individual responses to the recommendations strongly differ between
under- and overconfident individuals. Underconfident individuals set lower savings goals
and are more likely to revise them. While the average original goal amount in the sample
is 1976 Birr, the corresponding amount for underconfident individuals is about 19 percent
lower. After being encouraged by interviewers to reconsider their savings goal, undercon-
fident individuals change their goals upwards by 56 Birr on average. This is especially
remarkable considering the fact that respondents received recommendations to increase and
decrease saving goals in equal proportions. Overconfident individuals, on the contrary, de-
creased their saving goals by 23 Birr on average. Most respondents report saving towards
some form of investment goal (73 percent).
Additionally, we collected information on individuals’ beliefs about their ability to save
and their expected obstacles. 66 percent of the underconfident respondents name specific
obstacles in reaching their goals, whereas almost half of the overconfident individuals do
not expect any problems in reaching their goal. Likewise, underconfident individuals report
slightly lower probabilities in reaching their goal (on average 81 percent compared to 83
percent for overconfident individuals). The financial literacy score is the number of cor-
rectly answered questions (out of three) of the World Bank survey module and the expected
financial literacy score are the number of questions respondents believe to answer correctly.
These scores show the drivers behind the classification of individuals into different groups
based on their confidence levels. It is remarkable that while underconfident individuals be-
lieve to have lower financial literacy scores than overconfident respondents, in reality their
scores are higher than those of individuals with high confidence levels.
In our endline survey, we document that moneyboxes have been a useful and frequently
employed savings technology. Only 3 percent of our sample did not possess the box at the
endline survey, mostly because they were given away as presents or were damaged. Nearly
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all individuals used the moneybox for saving purposes, and only 4 percent of the respon-
dents had no money in the box. Every sixth person had taken out money at least once. On
average individuals reported to have taken 462 Birr out of their savings device. Interest-
ingly, underconfident individuals, although their probability of having taken out money is
comparable to overconfident individuals, reported taking out lower amounts (only 184 Birr).
Given the small amount of time respondents had access to this new savings devise, they used
it considerably. The average amount in the moneybox was 239 Birr, with underconfident
respondents having lower amounts (just like with overall savings) than overconfident indi-
viduals.
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics subdivided by treatment group. Column (1) de-
scribes the characteristics of the treatment group while column (2) does the same for the
control group. Column (3) presents the difference and its standard deviation. We present
the variables on which we randomized and our central measure of confidence. All vari-
ables are well balanced with the difference in means being insignificant in all but one case.
Only participation in the traditional savings group Equb manifests a statistically significant
difference at the 10 percent level. Moreover, in a test for joint significance of all baseline
variables (all those reported in Table 1.2 with the expectation of the confidence levels), we
cannot reject the null that these baseline values do not explain treatment status (p-value =
0.8).
While we did not randomize with respect to the individuals confidence levels, we observe
that the share of those who received a recommendation and those who did not is comparable
across both groups. 15 percent of those who received an encouragement were undercon-
fident, while for the group of those who did not receive one the share is 18 percent. The
difference of 2.8 percent is statistically insignificant. Similarly, 46 percent of those who
received a recommendation were overconfident. Among those who did not receive a recom-
mendation, 51 percent were classified as overconfident. The difference between these two
groups is statistically insignificant as well.
1.4 Results
In this section we present the main results of the paper, including the effects of our
recommendation treatments and the behavioral factors driving the results. To estimate the
effects of the treatments on our outcomes of interest, we use standard methods from the
analysis of randomized control trials and estimate OLS regressions with treatment indicators
and baseline controls. Our preferred regression specification is
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Table 1.2 – Balance Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Recommendation No Recommendation Difference
Cash savings 4171.175 5495.923 -1324.748
(11652.667) (5135.869) (1278.609)
Bank savings 2160.774 2821.607 -660.833
(8153.065) (13451.993) (970.735)
Iddir member 0.434 0.462 -0.028
(0.496) (0.501) (0.051)
Equb member 0.280 0.368 -0.087*
(0.450) (0.484) (0.047)
Household members aged 0-5 0.873 0.752 0.121
(0.778) (0.765) (0.080)
Household members aged 6-11 1.089 1.034 0.055
(0.890) (0.830) (0.091)
Household members aged 11-17 1.098 1.214 -0.116
(0.919) (0.954) (0.095)
Household members aged 18-64 2.541 2.573 -0.031
(1.043) (1.037) (0.107)
Household members aged 65+ 0.046 0.060 -0.014
(0.219) (0.238) (0.023)
Female household head 0.216 0.214 0.002
(0.412) (0.412) (0.042)
Married household head 0.730 0.761 -0.030
(0.444) (0.429) (0.045)
Eduaction household head 3.259 3.368 -0.108
(3.765) (3.697) (0.387)
Land size baseline 4.495 4.917 -0.422
(4.970) (7.282) (0.566)
Revenue baseline 4023.166 3655.684 367.482
(14075.977) (6832.953) (1338.638)
Debt baseline 2932.512 3148.718 -216.206
(4448.389) (4530.065) (460.106)
Consumption expenditure baseline 747.178 693.190 53.987
(973.479) (1010.565) (101.082)
Underconfident 0.151 0.179 -0.028
(0.359) (0.385) (0.038)
Overconfident 0.463 0.513 -0.050
(0.499) (0.502) (0.051)
F-Test 0.700
p-value 0.804
Note: N=599. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Columns (1) and (2) denote the aver-
age value of the relevant variable depending on treatment status. Column (3) denotes the
difference between treatment and control, its significance is given as follows: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All variables (except the last two) are measured at baseline
before randomization. Underconfidence and overconfidence are measured as described in
Section 1.3. For a test of joint significance, we estimate a regression with a binary indicator
for treatment status on the left-hand side and all the balance variables used for stratification
during randomization in the table on the right-hand side. The F-statistic and corresponding
p-value for the null of joint zero effects are denoted in the last two rows.
19
Yi = α + βTi + γXi0 + δ1Yi0 + δ2liti + ζIi + it, (1.1)
with Yi being the outcome of interest of household i at time t and Ti the vector of treat-
ment dummies. Xi0 represents the vector of baseline control variables: savings in cash and
at the local MFI, membership in the informal savings societies Iddir and Equb, land area,
revenue from crop sales, per-capita consumption expenditures, number of household mem-
bers by age, gender, marital status and education of the household head (please refer to
Section 1.2.2 for details). We further control for the baseline values of the outcome vari-
ables Yi0 in order to improve precision.17 We explicitly control for liti, an indicator for
above average financial literacy score, in order to rule out any possible mechanical effects
of financial literacy on confidence. Although the enumerators followed a detailed protocol
and received intensive training, we include a vector of enumerator dummies Ii at treatment
to control for any possible enumerator-specific effects in administrating the treatments. it
denotes the remaining error term. Throughout the rest of this section, we will keep this esti-
mation framework and vary the definition of the treatment vector Ti. We will also introduce
several interactions along behavioral dimensions, especially for the individual degrees of
confidence.
In understanding these results, it is crucial to first note that the moneyboxes themselves
are a very effective method to increase savings among smallholder farmers in Northern
Ethiopia. When comparing those (randomly selected) individuals who received a money-
box to those in the pure control group without a moneybox, savings increased substantially.
Cash savings plus savings in the moneybox increased by about 117 Birr (22 percent increase
compared to control group). Even a broader measure of savings, including savings in the
bank (local MFI) plus savings in the informal arrangements Iddir (savings club) and Equb
(funeral society), is larger for individuals who received a moneybox, with a significant in-
crease of about 0.6 log points. These results stem from simple OLS regressions following
our standard estimation approach set out in equation (1.1) and are presented in detail in Table
A.1 in the Appendix. These results are in line with a large literature documenting the ef-
fectiveness of moneyboxes in increasing savings (among others Dupas and Robinson 2013).
The moneyboxes thus helped to initiate larger savings and further permit us to measure cash
savings without measurement error (through direct counting of the money in the box). The
rest of our paper goes beyond this observation and focuses only on the 599 individuals who
received a moneybox and analyzes the effects of the main behavioral treatments among this
17 Our small survey just before treatment implementation effectively provides us with two baseline surveys
on a select number of measures. For these measures we take the average between both pre-treatment values to
reduce volatility and measurement error.
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subsample.
1.4.1 Savings and Confidence
This section provides evidence on the importance of the link between confidence levels
and savings behavior. For our study population, confidence levels are an independent factor
predicting the level of savings individuals generate even before the implementation of any
behavioral treatments.
We construct a comprehensive measure of baseline savings as the sum of cash holdings,
bank savings, and money in informal saving arrangements. To this end, we run a simple
OLS regression with our measure of baseline savings as the outcome and indicators for our
central behavioral measure of underconfident and correctly confident individuals. We con-
trol for important socio-demographic observables and behavioral traits, including whether
a household is female-headed, the years of education of the household head, our score for
financial literacy, and indicators for risk-loving and present-biased individuals. Addition-
ally, we also control for a range of socio-demographic and economically relevant variables:
indicators for the age structure of the household, marital status of the household head, land
ownings, revenues, outstanding debt, per capita consumption expenditures, and lastly enu-
merator indicators. We are interesting in quantifying the relative importance of various
individual characteristics and behavioral traits in explaining savings behavior. Thus, we
compare confidence to other key characteristics introduced above. Figure 1.1 shows the
coefficients from this OLS regression along with 95% confidence intervals comparing con-
fidence to an indicator for female-headed households, the education of the household head,
financial literacy, risk and time preferences18.
The figure clearly depicts the strong association between the importance of confidence
levels and savings behavior. Being underconfident is a statistically significant predictor for
holding less savings at baseline, even when controlling for a range of socio-demographic
and economic variables. Underconfident individuals save more than one third less than over-
confident individuals. Interestingly, the confidence levels are more important in predicting
savings behavior than other behavioral traits frequently associated with financial outcomes
such as risk-lovingness and present-biasedness. The coefficients of the indicator for finan-
cial literacy and our measure for years of education of the household head are positively
associated with saving levels, as would be expected. We interpret these results as under-
lining the importance of confidence measures in being strongly associated with financial
18 Risk and time preferences were incentivized measures we discuss further in Section 1.5
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outcomes and will investigate the effectiveness of our behavioral treatments especially with
respect to our measure of confidence.
Figure 1.1 – Savings Behavior Before Treatment
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Note: N=599. This figure depicts the coefficients from a simple OLS regression with a broad measure
of savings at baseline (cash + bank + informal arrangements) as the dependent variable. Additional
control variables include all baseline variables used for stratification during randomization exclud-
ing savings outcomes (socio-demographics, land and consumption variables) as well as enumerator
indicators. The savings measure is taken before treatment implementation. The variables depicted in
the figure are measured as indicator variables with the exception of education, which is measured in
years of schooling. 95% confidence intervals are depicted around the point estimates.
1.4.2 Savings Recommendations
Recommendations. We start by analyzing the overall effect of providing smallholder
farmers with individually-tailored feedback in the form of recommendations on their self-set
saving goals. To this end we compare those who received a recommendation to reconsider
the originally stated savings goal to those who did not receive such a recommendation.19 Ta-
ble 1.3 reports these main results. The outcome variable measures savings in the moneybox
19 As individuals who received a recommendation we combine all those with the treatments I–IV presented
in Section 1.2.2
22
Chapter 1: Savings Behavior
plus cash savings the household head carries at the time of the interview.20 The estimation
strategy follows the exact setting laid out in equation (1.1). Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that
receiving a recommendation leads to an increase in savings of 181.5 Birr, statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. This corresponds to a sizable increase of 36 percent compared
to the control group (receiving no recommendation).
The sizable increase in savings following a recommendation shows concisely that a sim-
ple message motivating smallholder farmers to reconsider their original savings goal leads
these individuals to save more.21 Even though there could be a multitude of behavioral and
cognitive factors at play, we rationalize this main result as follows: The recommendations
the enumerators give effectively provide instantaneous and individually-tailored feedback
to the respondents. This individualized feedback loop lends importance to the fact that the
original savings plans might benefit from a reassessment. The additional reflection may lead
farmers to take further relevant factors into account when deciding on the amount they wish
to save for and this may in turn increase the likelihood of reaching the goal. The visibility of
the moneybox and the revised goal depicted on it further enforces the updated individualized
savings plan.
Confidence. We observe strong heterogeneity in the positive effect of our recommenda-
tions on individual savings behavior along behavioral characteristics. Motivated by our
results in Section 1.4.1 documenting the general importance of confidence levels in deter-
mining baseline savings behavior, we are especially interested in whether underconfident in-
dividuals, who save less at baseline, may be differentially affected by the recommendations.
Panel B of Table 1.3 introduces the indicator variable underconfidence (refer to Section 1.3
for details on the measurement of behavioral characteristics) and its interaction with the
recommendation treatment. Just as at baseline, underconfidence leads individuals to save
significantly less (on average 440 Birr less). Interestingly, the recommendation treatment
is especially helpful in increasing savings for underconfident individuals. The estimate of
the interaction term between both corresponds to an increase of 409 Birr. We explain this
by noting that underconfident individuals may need additional encouragement to reach their
self-set goals. Our control group also receives a generic feedback in the form of a state-
ment that in general people are likely to reach their savings goal. However, it seems that
the individualized component of the recommendations and the subsequent revision of the
20 As detailed in Section 1.3, this measure is extremely resistant against measurement error since our enumer-
ators open the moneybox to count the money inside and ask respondents to detail their additional cash savings
by naming the exact composition in bills and coins.
21 It is important to note that this happens irrespective of the direction the recommendations take: in some
cases we asked respondents to save more, in other cases we asked them to save less. The paper provides more
details on these directions and mechanisms in further sections.
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Table 1.3 – Effect of Recommendations on Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Recommendation Financial Recommendation Underconfidence
Control Group Literacy × Underconfidence
Panel A: Recommendations
Savings 496.009 181.463** -6.082
(80.733) (76.722)
Panel B: Interaction Underconfidence
Savings 496.009 106.141 23.315 409.802** -440.383***
(92.405) (83.985) (162.633) (138.329)
Note: N=599. The dependent variable savings is calculated as the value of cash savings the household head
carries at the time of the interview plus savings in the moneybox. Panel A reports results ignoring the effect
of underconfidence. Panel B introduces the effect of underconfidence, measured by an indicator equal to
1 for individuals believing to answer fewer questions on financial literacy correctly than they actually do.
We interact underconfidence with the recommendations. Mean refers to the average value of the outcome
variable in the control group (no recommendation). All variables are winsorized at the 95% percentile. Ad-
ditional control variables include all baseline variables used for stratification during randomization (savings
in cash, bank and informal arrangements, socio-demographics, land and consumption variables) as well as
enumerator indicators. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
self-set savings goals matters especially for underconfident individuals. Throughout these
estimations, financial literacy has no independent effect on savings, thereby ruling out any
mechanical effects accruing to the way we measure confidence levels. Interestingly, we
replicate the results using an interaction term for overconfidence and find that the individu-
alized recommendations have no differential impact on savings for these individuals (results
available upon request).
1.4.3 Content of Individual Feedback
Direction and Intensity of Recommendation. The previous analysis has shown a clear
causal increase in savings induced by the recommendations, and this effect is especially
strong for underconfident individuals. In the following we further explore the effects of the
contents of the recommendations. To do so, we look at a set of intermediate outcomes. In
essence the following analysis allows us to test whether the messages were well delivered by
the enumerators, understood by the farmers, and consequently actually triggered a change
in savings goals in the recommended direction.
Table 1.4 presents these intermediate results and addresses whether individuals followed
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Table 1.4 – Intermediate Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revised − Initial Revised − Initial Share of HH Share of HH with
Goal Goal (% of Initial) Changed Goal Recommended Change
Panel A: Direction of Recommendation
Positive recommendation 218.969*** 0.102*** 0.286*** 0.346***
(53.338) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033)
Negative recommendation -220.270** -0.037 0.180*** 0.142***
(100.622) (0.032) (0.038) (0.028)
N 597 597 597 597
Panel B: Intensity of Recommendation
Positive recommendation 248.721*** 0.105*** 0.257*** 0.318***
+ 40% (81.470) (0.029) (0.049) (0.045)
Positive recommendation 195.715*** 0.100** 0.312*** 0.372***
+ 20% (67.020) (0.051) (0.047) (0.042)
Negative recommendation -116.177 -0.006 0.189*** 0.137***
– 20% (129.461) (0.041) (0.049) (0.036)
Negative recommendation -324.837** -0.067** 0.169*** 0.145***
– 40% (144.722) (0.034) (0.044) (0.034)
N 597 597 597 597
Panel C: Underconfident Individuals Only
Positive recommendation 110.735* 0.067** 0.323*** 0.323***
(63.462) (0.028) (0.100) (0.100)
Negative recommendation -71.466 -0.034 0.135 0.135
(75.656) (0.028) (0.112) (0.112)
N 94 94 94 94
Note: This table shows the effect of the recommendations on intermediate outcomes. The outcome variable
in column (1) is the difference between the revised and initial savings goal. In column (2) the outcome is this
difference as a fraction of the initial goal amount, more specifically: (revised − initial goal)/initial goal. The
dependent variable in column (3) is an indicator for changing the goal at all and in column (4) we take an
indicator for changing the goal in the recommended direction. Panel A depicts results for recommendations
grouped by their direction, Panel B disaggregates the recommendations by their intensity and Panel C focuses
on the subsample of underconfident indivinduals. 2 observations are missing: one without data on the initial
goal level, another without data on any goal level. In 24 cases we had missing data on the revised goal and
assumed the revised goal to be equal to the initial goal. Further control variables include all baseline variables
used for stratification in the randomization process (savings in cash, bank and informal arrangements, socio-
demographics, land and consumption variables) as well as enumerator controls. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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the randomly assigned savings recommendations given to them. As outcome variables we
construct various measures of the extent to which individuals revised their self-set goals.22
In column (1) we look at the difference between the revised and initial savings goal. For
example, an individual planned to save 1000 Birr for a cow, but we recommended saving
1400. The respondent could then change the goal in any way and the revised amount was
noted down on the moneybox. Column (2) reports this change as a percentage of the original
amount.23 The outcome in column (3) is an indicator whether an individual has changed the
goal at all and column (4) is an indicator whether an individual has changed the goal in the
recommended direction.
For Panel A of Table 1.4 we group the four different types of recommendations (please
refer to Section 1.2.2 for details) into “positive” and “negative” ones, i.e. messages that
encourage to save more or less, respectively. As we see from the first column of Table
1.4, the direction of the recommendation clearly has an effect on how the goals are revised.
While positive recommendations increase savings goals, negative recommendations induce
respondents to decrease their goals. These differences are statistically significant and the
magnitudes of positive and negative recommendations are almost identical and correspond
to roughly an 11 percent change in the goal amount on average. Columns (2) - (4) support
these findings. Both individuals receiving positive and negative recommendations change
their goals, but it seems that the probability of revising the goal is slightly stronger for rec-
ommendations to save more.
Panel B analyzes the intensity of the recommended change, whereby we distinguish be-
tween recommended revisions of plus/minus 40 percent and plus/minus 20 percent. In gen-
eral, stronger recommendations are accompanied by higher changes in goal amounts. For
example, being recommended to save 40 percent more leads to an upward revision of the
initial savings goal by 249 Birr compared to individuals who did not receive any recom-
mendation. On the other hand, the recommendation to increase the savings goal by only 20
percent results in a slightly lower change of only 196 Birr. We see a similar pattern for the
intensity of the negative recommendations. As before, we find some evidence that positive
recommendations seem to be more effective at influencing the process of savings goal for-
mulation.
Panel C focuses on the subsample of underconfident individuals, as their savings behav-
ior seems to be particularly affected by the recommendations. At the stage of formulating
22 Note, we lose two observations due to missing information on intermediate outcomes in at least one of the
4 regressions. 23 The variable is calculated as (revised amount - initial amount)/ initial amount.
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their savings goals, underconfident individuals also respond to the recommendations in the
suggested directions. Their increase in saving goals following a positive recommendation
is comparable to that of the whole sample in relative terms, as the coefficient of 111 Birr
corresponds to a 7 percent increase in their goal amount.24 However, underconfident indi-
viduals respond significantly more strongly to positive and encouraging recommendations
as compared to negative recommendations. While the effect of positive recommendations is
significant in all specifications, the effect of the negative recommendations is insignificant
throughout. This is in line with our expectation that farmers with low confidence levels set
low goals and might be more likely to revise these upwards when prompted.
Savings Attainment. In this section we have so far described the effects of the content
of the recommendations on the goal setting behavior. In Table 1.5, we now analyze actual
savings achievement. Different to Table 1.3, here we distinguish explicitly between positive
and negative recommendations. Table 1.5 provides similar results as before: the effect of
the recommendations on savings behavior is driven by underconfident individuals. Interest-
ingly, both positive as well as negative recommendations increase savings for this group.
Moreover, the coefficients on both of the interactions between underconfidence and positive
as well as negative recommendations are almost identical. We take this as evidence that
although the recommendations have the intended effect on the formation of the savings goal
(as documented in Table 1.4), the direction of the recommendation becomes irrelevant for
the actual savings behavior. We therefore conclude that the effects of recommendations on
savings are driven mainly through the additional attention individuals receive for their sav-
ings plans. This additional attention comes in the form of individualized feedback together
with the opportunity to reflect and revise the savings goal. We conclude that through this
additional attention, especially underconfident households develop a stronger attachment to
their savings plan and hence were able to achieve higher saving levels.
1.5 Robustness
This section presents a range of robustness checks. A number of behavioral factors are
possibly related to confidence levels and could partly explain some of the observed results.
This section addresses such alternative mechanisms and furthermore rules out crowding-out
behavior of savings into other savings vehicles.
24 Underconfident individuals have lower initial goal amounts.
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Table 1.5 – Direction of Recommendations and Underconfidence
(1)
Savings
Positive Recommendation 98.610
(102.346)
Negative Recommendation 114.151
(102.251)
Positive Recommendation x Underconfident 419.866**
(187.637)
Negative Recommendation x Underconfident 400.443*
(205.225)
Underconfident -440.564***
(138.597)
Financial literacy 23.459
(84.606)
N 599
Mean 496.009
Note: The outcome variable savings is measured as cash savings plus savings in the
moneybox. This table disaggregates the effect of recommendations on savings by
their direction (positive or negative) and interacts these with our measure of under-
confidence. Further control variables include all baseline variables used for stratifica-
tion during randomization (savings in cash, bank and informal arrangements, socio-
demographics, land and consumption variables) as well as enumerator controls. The
last row gives the mean value of the outcome variable in the control group (no rec-
ommendation). Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
Financial Literacy, Perceived Obstacles, and Preferences. Respondents in our sam-
ple might differ in their ability or willingness to anticipate obstacles hindering them from
achieving their savings goal. This may in turn have implications for the effectiveness of our
recommendation treatments and might be an alternative mechanism to general confidence
levels. In our detailed survey data, we ask respondents to explicitly state any problems
they anticipate in reaching their savings goal. About 55 percent of the sample stated one or
several problems, the remaining 45 percent did not see any problem hindering them from
reaching their savings goal. In Panel A of Table A.2 in the Appendix, we include an indica-
tor for expecting at least one problem and interact this with our recommendation treatment.
The recommendations did not work differentially for those individuals. We conclude that
the ability or willingness to anticipate obstacles does not drive the observed results.
In Panel B of Table A.2 we take a closer look at financial literacy. Throughout our re-
gressions we always controlled for financial literacy to eliminate any mechanical effects on
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confidence levels as well as any direct effects on savings behavior. A remaining issue might
be that the ability to properly apply the recommendations also differs by financial literacy.
To test this hypothesis, we interact an indicator for having above average financial literacy
with the recommendation treatment in Panel B. We find no statistically significant effect and
conclude that financial literacy seems not to be an independent driver of our results.
Risk and Time Preferences. A further open question is whether the results are due to risk
and time preferences. These personality traits have been shown to be highly correlated with
financial decisions, including savings behavior.
In our baseline survey we elicit time and risk preferences of household heads. Risk pref-
erences are elicited with a standard incentivized framework going back to Holt and Laury
(2002). We present 7 distinct lotteries to participants, each consisting of two alternatives
which will materialize with a 50% probability. The first lottery has a payout of 3 Birr in
both states of the world. The following lotteries incrementally increase the expected payout
but also the variance. The respondents are asked to choose which of these lotteries they
would like to participate in.
In a further section of the baseline survey, we elicit time preferences. To this end, we
ask participants whether they would like to receive a certain amount of money tomorrow
or within one month.25 In five subsequent questions, the payoff occurring in one month is
incrementally increased. The switching point provides us with a measure for the underlying
discount rate that an individual applies. In a later part of the survey, we repeat the elicita-
tion with questions comparing payoffs in one year to those in one year and one month. If
an individuals discounts values faster in the present than in one year, they are classified as
present-biased.
Individuals were informed at the beginning of the survey that one of the questions would
be randomly chosen and the payouts provided. Future payouts were provided through the
branch office of the local MFI.
Panels C and D of Table A.2 show that in our setting present-biasedness and risk-lovingness
cannot explain differences in the reaction to our feedback mechanism.
25 By setting the time for receiving the first payment to the day after the survey instead of the day of the
survey, we guarantee that individuals make the decision purely based on their time preferences and are not
affected by other considerations like the perceived credibility of actually receiving the payment.
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Crowding-Out Effects. We have shown that the recommendations increase savings, in
particular for underconfident individuals. In doing so, we have measured savings as the
sum of savings in the moneybox and cash savings. A key concern is crowding out of other
forms of savings. If budget constraints are binding, an increase in one form of savings
should lead to a reduction in other saving vehicles.26 Table A.3 in the Appendix shows
that we observe no crowding-out behavior. Column (1) shows the effects on bank savings
(at the local MFI), column (2) and (3) holdings in the informal savings arrangements Equb
(savings group) and Iddir (funeral society). In column (4) we use a “wide” definition of
savings, defined as the sum of our previous measure (cash + moneybox) plus bank savings,
Equb and Iddir holdings. Our recommendation treatment has no effect on all four alternative
saving measures. Significant coefficients are mostly related to the baseline values of these
saving measures. We conclude that we find no evidence for any crowding-out into alternative
savings vehicles.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the link between confidence and saving behavior. Controlling for
a set of key individual- and household-level characteristics we find that in particular under-
confidence is strongly associated with lower savings. In fact, the relationship is stronger
than for other important and well-studied determinants. This finding in itself is innovative
and contributes to a growing literature that attempts to understand behavioral constraints to
savings.
We analyze a large-scale randomized control trial in rural Ethiopia. In our experiment,
we first encourage savings in a moneybox with individualized savings plans. We expected to
nudge higher savings and initiate a habit formation. In fact, we are able to put forward addi-
tional supportive evidence for a well-established finding in the literature: Soft commitment
devices with individualized savings plans increase savings by 22 percent compared to the
control group without moneyboxes and savings plans. Taking a closer look at intermediate
outcomes, we show that our soft commitment devices were frequently used and well-kept
by our targeted population. Additionally, farmers were on track with their personal savings
plans that recorded and even visualized the individualized savings goals on the boxes (over-
all final savings amount and goal targeted).
Originally hypothesizing that underconfident individuals might need an additional level
of encouragement, we test a further set of hypotheses. We encourage a randomly selected
26 Note, however, that Brune et al. (2016) observe the opposite: an increase in one type of saving increases
the demand for other forms of savings.
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subset of our individuals to save more than they originally planned. We mirror this approach
by proposing a further random group of individuals to set lower, more realistic saving goals.
Additionally, we vary the intensity of our encouraging and discouraging messages. Our ap-
proach seems to have convinced the farmers: The more encouraging our treatment message
was, the higher the deviation from the original savings plan. The same is true for the dis-
couraging messages. As expected, the individuals we classified as underconfident reacted
in particular to the encouraging messages. The revised savings goal was noted down on the
moneybox.
Revisiting the farmers a few months later, we make an interesting and rather unexpected
observation: First, with the feedback mechanism we employed in our experiment, we suc-
cessfully increase savings by 36 percent. This effect is especially strong among undercon-
fident individuals, almost nullifying their behavioral constraint. Surprisingly, however, we
find that the underconfident farmers reacted as strongly to the messages that encouraged to
save more as to the messages that encouraged to opt for lower, but easier to achieve savings
amounts. Thus, we believe that the observed change in saving behavior is a reaction to the
additional attention and reflection upon the original savings goal. In essence, our treatment
boils down to not only underlining the importance of savings, but also taking individual
needs and wishes explicitly into account.
As such our results have immediate policy implications: Given the importance of savings
for a range of development outcomes, it is important to provide households with the oppor-
tunity to save more. The feedback mechanism employed in our experiment is a cost-efficient
and simple procedure, capable of doing so, without crowding out other forms of savings.
Moreover, following up on the observations we made in this study, we believe it would
be worthwhile adjusting savings plans to the confidence levels of the savers. We conclude
so given the robust descriptive evidence of differences in savings behavior. In contrast to the
prior literature which mainly focuses on overconfident individuals, we believe that the group
of underconfident savers is at least as important. Further research could explore the exact
behavioral processes involved in the savings processes, which were not within the scope of
this paper. In particular, could further personalization of saving messages in general trigger
even greater savings? Or is an even greater feedback and reflection of original savings goals
helpful? Finally, how can savers with varying confidence levels develop and reach their full
savings potential?
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Chapter 2
Information Frictions and Learning
Dynamics: Evidence from Tax Avoidance
in Ecuador1
with Jan Sebastian Nimczik
2.1 Introduction
Formalization of developing economies is a key policy goal. Informal employment elud-
ing government control represents a large portion of economies in low and middle income
countries, estimated to be almost 50 percent in Latin America (ILO, 2014). A primary
barrier to formalization is the lack of information about the functioning of government pro-
grams according to survey evidence from the World Bank (Perry et al., 2007). While a
growing literature looks into the determinants of formalization and its impact on key eco-
nomic areas (Gerard and Gonzaga, 2016; Naritomi, 2016; Jensen, 2016; Pomeranz, 2015),
little is known about the dynamic processes shaping the responses of economic agents that
adapt to the formal system and try to learn about its incentives. This is particularly relevant
in the context of behavioral responses to – often complicated – tax incentives. Previous work
has extensively explored the role of adjustment frictions in constraining responses to the tax
system (Chetty et al., 2011).2 We are the first to thoroughly study the role of information
frictions and how dynamic learning processes remove these obstacles. A number of studies
have explored general spillovers between taxpayers (Chetty et al., 2013; Paetzold and Win-
ner, 2016), but there is no clear consensus on how information frictions can be overcome.
1 An earlier version of this chapter was circulated under the name “Learning Dynamics in Tax Bunching at
the Kink: Evidence from Ecuador"
2 Moreover, an emerging literature highlights the influence of behavioral biases on responses to tax incentives
(Bhargava and Manoli, 2015; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, forthcoming; Benzarti, 2017).
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While a specific intervention teaching the tax code to EITC recipients in the US has proven
to be rather ineffective (Chetty and Saez, 2013), we show that dynamic adjustments and
learning processes lead to substantial changes in reported taxable income. Worker mobility
is the most important driver of information transmission. We identify co-workers and ac-
countants as specific channels of information transmission and show that information about
tax adjustment opportunities spreads through top-down learning processes induced by job
switches of managers and accountants.
We draw on novel administrative data on personal income tax (PIT) returns in Ecuador to
assess how workers and firms learn about tax avoidance opportunities in a developing coun-
try. Ecuador’s rapidly formalizing economy with a steady inflow of new workers and firms
to the tax system provides a unique setting to study dynamic information flows between
taxpayers. We make four main contributions: First, we document dynamic developments of
individual tax avoidance. With increasing tenure in the formal sector, individuals are more
likely to avoid paying taxes. Second, we exploit exogenous job mobility to show that the
increase in tax avoidance is causally affected by changes in the information environment
individuals face. Third, we show that knowledge about tax avoidance opportunities spreads
across firms and document that firms with more experience in the formal sector are more
likely to have employees who avoid tax payments. Fourth, we identify specific channels of
information transmission: peers (co-workers) and experts (accountants). In particular, we
show that the learning process within firms is driven by top-down information transmission.
Incoming co-workers in the top decile of a firm’s wage distribution have a lasting effect on
the tax avoidance behavior of their new co-workers. Likewise, introducing a knowledgeable
accountant into a firm increases the tax adjustment behavior of the firm’s employees.
Tax avoidance in Ecuador is mostly achieved by filing deductions for personal expenses
in housing, health, nutrition, education, and clothing. Generous deduction possibilities are
one of the government’s main policies to induce an increase in formalization stimulating the
demand for formal receipts. Strikingly, however, many individuals do not capitalize on the
deduction possibilities. Among those workers who could use the deductions to completely
avoid paying taxes, 60 percent still pay some taxes (this share is decreasing over time and
reaches just above 50 percent in 2015). 65 percent of those remaining taxpayers earn gross
income in a range where they could even avoid paying taxes without actually having to hand
in any receipts to the tax authority.3 This low usage of easily accessible tax adjustment
opportunities speaks to the presence of information frictions.
Our main measure of tax avoidance is the extent to which workers use deductions to lower
their reported taxable income just below the income tax exemption threshold (“bunching").
We find a large and pronounced spike in the distribution of taxable income at the tax exemp-
3 Only if the value of deductions exceeds a certain reporting threshold are taxpayers obliged to hand in the
receipts to the tax authority. More details in Section 2.2.
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tion threshold while the distribution of gross income (before using deductions) is smooth
around all discontinuities in the marginal tax schedule. In extensive robustness analyses, we
replicate all our results for alternative measures of tax avoidance without substantial change
in the results.4
To document dynamic adjustments and learning processes, we begin by focusing on in-
dividual taxpayers’ adaptation to the incentives of the formal sector. We estimate the preva-
lence of tax avoidance among cohorts of taxpayers by their year of entry into the formal
sector. We find clear evidence of individual-level learning: across all cohorts, tax avoid-
ance becomes stronger as individuals gain experience in the formal sector. We approximate
the effect of experience through flexible polynomials and find strong initial increases in tax
avoidance which level off after about five years in the formal system. We conclude that, with
tenure in the formal sector, workers in Ecuador learn how to avoid paying taxes. The cor-
relation between experience and avoidance remains strong and unchanged when controlling
for a broad range of observable characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity.
However, it is unclear exactly how workers learn about the tax system. We provide
causal evidence on how the information environment in firms drives individual learning
processes. Exploiting the matched employer-employee component of our data, we identify
asymmetric responses to exogenous changes in an individual’s knowledge environment due
to job transitions. Individuals moving into a firm with high levels of tax avoidance are
more likely to avoid paying taxes themselves while individuals moving into a firm with
low levels are just as likely to avoid paying taxes as before. These findings are robust
to several identification strategies and can be interpreted as causal evidence that confirms
the hypothesis of learning and memory in the literature (Chetty et al., 2013; Paetzold and
Winner, 2016).
The importance of the firm environment in shaping individual learning processes moti-
vates our interest in the firm-level dynamics of expanding the formal sector. We show that
firms themselves are more likely to employ workers who avoid tax payments as they gain
experience in the formal economy. When looking at firm cohorts by their year of entry into
the formal sector, we document a strong rise in the prevalence of tax avoidance. However,
once a firm engages in tax avoidance the level of tax avoidance within the firm remains rela-
tively stable over time. We conclude that for firms information about tax avoidance practices
is either available or it is not.
What are the determinants of a firm’s information environment? We identify and quantify
two specific information transmission mechanisms between firms: Peers and experts. To
characterize the peers channel, we study co-workers coming into a firm and the knowledge
4 The first alternative measure tracks taxpayers lowering their taxable income to any value below the income
tax exemption threshold while having gross income above the threshold, and the second measure indicates
taxpayers using deductions at any position in the income distribution. Please refer to the supplemental online
Appendix B.3 for replications of our whole analysis.
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they bring about tax avoidance due to their behavior in the previous job. The experts channel
is characterized by knowledgeable accountants who were previously working for a firm that
was employing tax avoiders. We identify these effects through changes in the co-worker
composition and switches of accountants. Both the peers and experts channels are sizeable,
leading to average increases in firm-level avoidance by 21 and 13 percent respectively. We
corroborate our findings in an alternative identification strategy based on event studies in
subsamples with plausible control groups for both channels. Incumbent employees in firms
with new co-workers that were previously avoiding are significantly more likely to avoid tax
payments than incumbents among firms with new workers that were previously not avoiding.
Likewise, firms with new accountants previously at a firm with no tax avoidance activity are
less likely to avoid than those with new accountants with tax avoidance at their previous
firm.
Our findings are highly policy relevant since they give indications for tax authorities
in designing audit strategies and deciding who should be targeted. Moreover, in settings
where a policy instrument is only partially used by economic agents, slow adjustments can
have distributional implications. In our setting, the usage of the deduction opportunities is
strongly related to advantaged demographic characteristics and firms in particular sectors.
This increases inequality compared to a scenario with full adoption. A flexible labor market
mitigates these information frictions by enhancing information transmission through job
mobility.
Literature Our main contribution is towards the small but growing literature on knowl-
edge diffusion and spillover effects in taxation (Chetty et al., 2013; Paetzold and Winner,
2016). These papers analyze the effects of moving into high or low information environ-
ments (regions and firms) and emphasize the role of learning. In contrast to these papers,
however, we provide extensive evidence that the effects are not driven by selection into spe-
cific knowledge environments but are indeed causal. We establish causality of the knowl-
edge environment by exploiting exogenous job mobility through firm closures, controlling
for a broad range of observed and unobserved confounders, and additionally creating a bal-
anced control group by matching on observables. Moreover, we extend this literature by ex-
ploring the dynamic learning processes and by identifying specific channels of information
transmission. In a recent contribution, Aghion et al. (2017) show that sluggish adjustments
to newly introduced tax regimes are also present in a developed country, France.
Our results are embedded in a broader literature that has established the importance of
job mobility for the transmission of information and innovation, and, hence, for firm per-
formance. Using worker transitions from particularly productive firms, a number of recent
studies show that mobility substantially contributes to the diffusion of human capital and
helps increase productivity (Song et al., 2003; Balsvik, 2011; Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012;
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Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012; Poole, 2013; Serafinelli, forthcoming). In particular, mobil-
ity of managers plays a crucial role for firm productivity, confirming parallel results in our
paper (Mion and Opromolla, 2014; Bender et al., 2016).
The paper further contributes to the literature on bunching at kinks and notches in the
tax schedule started by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011). The method was refined and
expanded to estimate further behavioral parameters influencing bunching behavior like fric-
tions, fixed adjustment costs, and reference dependencies (Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Gel-
ber et al., 2017; Seibold, 2017).5 We provide novel evidence on the dynamics of bunching by
tracking economic agents over time. We exploit changes in the bunching estimate for work-
ers with different exposure to the formal system to quantify the learning process. Moreover,
bunching in personal income taxes has been mostly found in developed countries and for
subgroups with easy adjustment opportunities such as self-employed workers (Chetty et al.,
2011; Bastani and Selin, 2014).6 We look at bunching among wage earners in a development
setting and find strong reactions to a very small kink.7
Moreover, we contribute towards a growing literature on the determinants of formaliza-
tion of developing economies (Gerard and Gonzaga, 2016; Naritomi, 2016; Pomeranz, 2015;
Brockmeyer et al., 2018). We provide detailed evidence on the dynamics of individual and
firm-level adjustments to the formal sector. Most importantly, we document the importance
of experience and tenure in the formal economy for explaining the use of tax avoidance
opportunities.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on taxation and development. The rele-
vance of our study is underscored by recent work showing the rising importance of personal
income taxes as countries develop (Besley and Persson, 2013; Jensen, 2016). A number of
studies have shown how tax systems in low enforcement settings can differ to those in more
developed economies (Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al., 2015; Keen and Slemrod, 2017).
Corporate taxation and firm behavior in a development context (Asatryan and Peichl, 2017;
Bachas and Soto, 2017) and in Ecuador in particular (Carrillo et al., 2012, 2017) have been
studied extensively. The role of firms in driving tax avoidance and evasion opportunities has
been put forward recently (Best, 2014; Kumler et al., 2015; Kleven et al., 2016). We specif-
ically investigate the dynamics and determinants of the information environment at the firm
level.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the role of accountants and tax preparers in fa-
5 For a comprehensive review, please refer to Kleven (2016).
6 A notable exception is Kleven and Waseem (2013) who look at bunching of wage earners at notch points in
Pakistan.
7 The first kink (income tax exemption threshold) in the Ecuadorian tax schedule is very salient. The change
in marginal tax rates from zero to five percent, however, is very small in international comparison. In line
with the literature on the role of deduction opportunities in personal income taxation (Doerrenberg et al.,
2017; Matikka, forthcoming), strong bunching responses at this first kink are driven by reporting effects using
deductions and not real labor supply responses.
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cilitating tax avoidance behavior (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches, 2007; Chetty and Saez, 2013;
Mahon and Zwick, 2017). We provide evidence of the importance of a firm’s accountant in
driving tax avoidance behavior not of the firm itself but of its employees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides information on
the institutional background in Ecuador and describes the PIT system in detail. Section 2.3
gives detailed information on the various data sources employed in our study. In Section 2.4
we present the results on the drivers of individual and firm dynamics. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
Ecuador is a middle-income country with a large but shrinking informal sector.8 In the
past years the government has implemented a range of economic and political reforms aimed
at expanding social programs and public service delivery. While a surge in oil revenues
facilitated some of this increased spending, the tax administration has also pushed wide-
ranging reforms of the tax system and tax collection policies. As a result, tax revenue as
well as the tax base have grown substantially over the past years. Between 2006 and 2015,
central government tax revenues have increased from about 10% to almost 14% of GDP and
have more than doubled in real terms. Taxation in Ecuador can be broadly categorized into
personal income taxes (PIT), a value-added tax (VAT) of 12 % (food and some other goods
are exempt), corporate taxes (22% of profits since 2013), a tax on foreign money transfers,
and special consumption taxes. One of the main reasons for higher tax revenue is an increase
in formalization of the economy induced by the tax administration’s wide-ranging efforts to
increase tax compliance.
The most relevant policy is the introduction of extensive deduction possibilities in income
tax, substantially increasing the demand for formal receipts.9 The receipts handed in to the
authorities are used to cross-check the sales of businesses and fight tax fraud, especially with
respect to VAT reporting behavior. From a firm’s perspective, emitting receipts is not only
linked to paying more VAT but also to taking part in other aspects of the formal economy
such as withholding income tax and social security contributions for employees.
Apart from a general hike in tax revenue, these formalization efforts induced a strong
increase in the number of taxpayers subject to personal income taxation. Between 2006 and
8 According to a survey in 2006, about 70 percent of the labor force was employed in the informal sector
(Canelas, 2015).
9 Sellers of goods and services are obliged to offer two different types of receipts. The standard receipt
(“nota de venta") includes information on goods and prices, while the enhanced version (“factura") contains
additional information about the client’s name and unique identification number. Only these detailed receipts
issued to the taxpayer or his/her dependents can be presented to the tax authority. This policy guarantees a
paper trail and impedes illegal sale of receipts. Further policies to increase tax compliance include improved
information sharing between government agencies.
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2015, the total number of tax declarations submitted for private sector employees increased
from 1 million to about 2.5 million.
Personal Income Taxes (PIT) Ecuador has a unified PIT schedule which is levied on al-
most all regular sources of wage and self-employed income.10 Tax liability in Ecuador is
individually determined (i.e., no family taxation).11 The PIT liability is calculated progres-
sively with numerous small jumps in the marginal tax rate, starting at 5% and going up to
35%. The cutoff income levels change yearly according to inflation.12
PIT in Ecuador starts being levied only at relatively high levels. In 2013, the exemption
threshold was set such that income tax was not charged on annual income below 10,180
USD.13 For the same year, the monthly minimum wage was set at 318 USD, corresponding
to yearly taxable income of 3,816 USD, well below the exemption threshold. The minimum
wage is estimated to be slightly above the median wage and slightly below the average
wage in Ecuador for 2008 to 2012 (Canelas, 2014). Therefore, PIT is only applicable to
individuals in the top 10 % of the distribution of formal sector income.
The Ecuadorian tax system is unique in its generous deduction allowances for personal
expenses in education, health, food, clothing and housing introduced in 2008 (Villacreses,
2014). The total deductible amount of personal expenses is limited to the smaller of 50%
of individual income or 1.3 times the exemption threshold (in 2013 this was 1.3 × 10,180
= 13,234 USD).14 Ecuadorian taxpayers are legally obliged to keep the receipts of all of
their deductions. However, only if individuals claim deductions above a specific reporting
threshold (50% of the tax free amount, or 5090 USD, in 201315), must they submit the
receipts of all of the claimed deductions to the tax authority via an online annex.
The mechanism by which tax declarations and deductions are submitted in Ecuador de-
serves some special attention and is key to understanding the findings in our analysis. PIT
is primarily filed on a firm-reported tax form (F107, see figure B.1 in the Appendix). This
form can only be submitted to the tax authority by the employer and includes the level of
deductions in personal expenses. In March of each year, wage earners fill out a form with
10 Notable exceptions include all forms of payments from the social security system (pension payments, edu-
cational stipends, disability benefits, etc.), severance payments, interest on savings accounts, occasional capital
gains, returns from investment funds or long-term deposits as well as certain additional wage benefits manda-
tory under labor market regulations.
11 Additional to PIT, employees in the private sector pay 9.45% of their wage income in social security con-
tributions and the employer pays 11.15%. Paying these social security contributions entitles people to a range
of benefits including pensions, health insurance, disability insurance and unemployment benefits.
12 The rate used for inflation adjustments is the yearly change in consumer price index for urban areas pub-
lished by Ecuador’s National Statistics Institute INEC on November 30 of a given year. Exact nominal values
since 2006 are displayed in Table B.1 in the appendix. In 2008, the government enacted a series of tax system
reforms, including increasing the top marginal tax rate from 25% to 35%.
13 The Ecuadorian economy was completely dollarized in 2000 following extreme hyperinflation.
14 Each category is individually capped at 0.325 times the exemption threshold, except for health expenditures,
which have an upper limit of 1.3 times the exemption threshold.15 Until 2010 this limit was set at 7500 USD.
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their projected expenses in health, education, food, clothing and housing for that whole year
and submit it to their employer. Based on these figures, the employer computes the level of
the withholding tax for the following year. Workers are given the opportunity to update their
information on deductions in October. While the ultimate responsibility for the overall cor-
rectness of these deductions lies solely with the employee, this system induces a weak form
of third-party reporting of deductions. Recent literature shows that third-party information
reporting by firms is a key driver for sustaining high levels of taxation (Kleven et al., 2016).
For the vast majority of employees (87% of our observations), taxes and personal deduc-
tions are only reported by the employer. The remaining 13% of all observations additionally
submit a self-reported tax declaration (form F102). The primary purpose of this self-reported
tax declaration form is to report self-employment income. However, individuals can also use
it to update the employer-reported information.
2.3 Data and Descriptives
Our data combines several administrative datasets in Ecuador administered by the Ecuado-
rian tax authority Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI). The core data consist of the universe of
firm-reported PIT returns of regular employees (tax form F107) for the years 2006-2015.
We augment these tax records by three additional datasets. First, we use unique individ-
ual identifiers to merge the data to the Ecuadorian civil registry (Registro Civil). This register
data provides a range of socio-demographic variables, including the year of birth, highest
level of education, and gender. Second, we merge the tax returns to the central firm registry
in Ecuador (Catastro de RUC). This registry contains firm-level data on industry affiliation,
sector (public or private), time of formation of the firm, and place of registry. Lastly, for the
subset of corporate firms we draw on their corporate tax declarations to identify the accoun-
tant working at the firm.16 We end up with detailed matched employer-employee data that
allows us to track taxpayers, firms, and co-workers over time.
A significant fraction of wage earners has various employers throughout a given calender
year and therefore multiple tax declarations. We sum up the different income values to
compute a unified measure of yearly individual income. Moreover, we consider the spell
with the highest earnings as the main employer. We deflate all earnings to real 2013 USD
values using the same consumer price index that is employed by the SRI to adjust the tax
brackets annually (cf. footnote 12). Thereby the tax brackets, even though they change
yearly in nominal values, remain unchanged in real terms.
16 Firms are obliged to file a corporate tax declaration if their annual gross income exceeds 100,000 USD.
Firms can have several corporate tax declarations and accountants per year. Here we take all accountants given
in any of a firm’s corporate tax declarations as being at the firm in a given year. Likewise, some accountants
work for several firms in a given year. This is exactly the source of variation we are exploiting in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 2.1 – Income Distribution in Ecuador
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This figure shows binned scatterplots of the distribution of gross income (upper panel) and taxable
income (lower panel) in Ecuador. We restrict the sample to individuals who earn at least 12 times
the monthly minimum wage and at most 30,000 USD. The income distribution is contrasted with the
marginal tax schedule (right y-axis) and vertical lines mark the location of kink points in the marginal
tax rate.
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Throughout our analysis, we exclude all individuals employed in the public sector and
only focus on private sector employees. About one quarter of the formal sector employees
are in the public sector.17
Figure 2.1 displays the reported income distribution in Ecuador pooling all observations
in our sample from 2006 to 2015. We concentrate on workers who earn at least twelve times
the monthly Ecuadorian minimum wage (yearly earnings of 12× 318 = 3,816 USD in 2013)
and those who earn less than 30,000 USD. The individual data is compressed into bins of 50
USD and plotted as bin frequencies for each bin. In general, the distribution of gross income
in the upper panel is downward sloping, with the most frequent points around the minimum
wage. The graph contrasts the income distribution with the marginal tax schedule, as given
by the step function with values on the right vertical axis. The gross income distribution
is smooth around all kink points of the marginal tax schedule depicted in the figure. The
distribution of taxable income (gross income minus any deductions) in the lower panel,
however, looks different. There is a pronounced spike in the distribution just before the
exemption threshold. The difference between gross and taxable income indicates that tax
avoidance is driven by reporting effects rather than real labor supply responses.
Our main measure of tax avoidance is the amount of individuals adjusting their income
such that they locate just below the tax exemption threshold (“bunching"). In online Ap-
pendix B.3, we conduct our entire analyses using two alternative measures of tax avoidance,
the amount of individuals reducing their taxable income to any value below the first kink
and the amount of individuals with deductions with very similar results.
While bunching is strong at the exemption threshold, we do not observe any bunching
at subsequent kink points of the marginal tax schedule. The exemption threshold, even
though it is associated with a very modest increase in the marginal tax rate of only 5%,
is arguably the most salient aspect of the tax schedule. Behavioral biases may make the
disutility associated with the first dollar of tax payments discretely higher than any other
subsequent increases in the tax liability. Moreover, individuals may perceive a discontinuity
in audit probabilities at the exemption threshold and prefer to stay under the radar of the tax
authority. Lastly, the marginal returns to filing more deductions vanish once taxpayers have
successfully reduced their taxable income below the exemption threshold.
17 We exclude public sector employees for three main reasons. First, public sector employees face different
incentives than private sector employees, and their pay is often regulated by predetermined government pay
scales. Second, the main drive in formalization of the past years was being carried out in the private sector
as the public sector was already formal by definition. Third, private sector employees might have better
opportunities to adjust their taxable income by bargaining with their employer about wages, and employers in
the private sector might provide more support in filing the deductions.
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Figure 2.2 – Number of Employees
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This figure displays the number of tax declaration of employees with gross and taxable income
above the tax exemption threshold over time. The green squares indicate the share of individuals
with taxable income above the kink among those with gross income above the kink (right y-axis).
The relevance of dynamic aspects in driving tax adjustment behavior becomes especially
pronounced when tracking the number of taxpayers over time. Figure 2.2 indicates a strong
2.5-fold increase in the number of private sector employees with tax-liable gross income be-
tween 2006 and 2015 (blue triangles).18 After the introduction of generous deduction pos-
sibilities in 2008, however, a substantial and increasing share of employees reduced their
reported taxable income below the exemption threshold (red dots). The growing wedge
between gross income and taxable income results in a decreasing share of individuals that
actually pay taxes (green squares on right hand axis) and reflects the growth in tax avoid-
ance over time. The main part of our analysis examines the learning processes driving this
dynamic increase in tax avoidance.
18 The increase in the overall number of private sector employees is proportional but about an order of mag-
nitude larger: The number increases from about 1 million to 2.5 million.
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2.4 Results
In this section we present empirical results from our analysis of learning dynamics about
avoidance opportunities in personal income taxes. The first part explores the dynamics of
individual learning and exploits a sample of job switchers to identify firms as the driving
environment for individual learning. The second part documents firm-level dynamics in
tax adjustment behavior and identifies peers and experts as the main drivers of information
transmission on tax avoidance opportunities. Throughout this section, our measure of tax
avoidance is bunching just below the income tax exemption threshold. All of our results,
however, are robust to using two alternative measures for tax avoidance: reducing taxable
income to any value below the exemption threshold and an indicator for using deductions.
Please refer to online Appendix B.3 for all graphs and tables using these alternative defini-
tions.
Figure 2.3 – Bunching Estimates Taxable Income
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This figure shows the actual distribution of taxable income around the tax exempt threshold as a
binned scatterplot with 50 USD bin width. The red line shows a polynomial fit (of degree 5) to the
distribution leaving out bins in a window around the kink (1000 USD to the left and 100 USD to the
right). The vertical line indicates the location of the kink point.
To quantify the amount of bunching at the exemption threshold, we draw on the methods
laid out in Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011). Using binned income data (50 USD bin size)
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and leaving out a window around the kink (1000 USD to the left and 50 USD to the right),
we estimate a counterfactual density (polynomial of degree 5) around the kink that would
prevail in its absence. The difference between the observed density and the counterfactual
is used to compute the excess mass as multiples of the counterfactual.19 Figure 2.3 displays
the distribution of taxable income around the kink. The empirical density is represented by
the blue dots and the estimated counterfactual is represented by the red line. The estimate
for the excess mass is highly significant and very large, indicating that more than four times
as many individuals are located around the kink compared to the expected mass under the
counterfactual of no kink.20
2.4.1 Individual Dynamics
In this section we explore the dynamics in the usage of tax adjustment opportunities
among individual workers. First, we document strong increases in tax avoidance as indi-
viduals gain experience in the formal sector. Second, we provide causal evidence for the
influence of the firm information environment on individual learning processes.
Individual Learning
The massive expansion in the number of taxpayers in Ecuador allows us to follow cohorts
of individuals who entered the formal sector at various points in time. Hence, we compare
bunching levels among the same set of individuals depending on their tenure in the formal
system. To hold the sample composition constant within cohorts, we restrict the sample to
individuals that are observed without interruption once they entered the formal economy.
Table 2.1 displays bunching estimates over time for different cohorts. Each row corre-
sponds to one of the cohorts that entered the formal sector between 2007 and 2014. The
columns indicate how the level of bunching changes over time for these cohorts. For each
cohort, there is a clear increase in the amount of bunching in taxable income as experience
in the formal sector increases. Moreover, the estimates become more precise over time, in-
dicating less heterogeneity within cohorts over years. Individuals entering the formal econ-
omy in 2010 for instance had a modest (and insignificant) excess mass of 0.62 in their first
year which increased to 5.56 in 2015. We observe this steep increase throughout all cohorts.
19 Standard errors are obtained using a non-parametric bootstrap procedure. Our results are robust to sensitiv-
ity checks varying the bin width, the parametric form of the polynomial and the bunching window left out in
the estimation of the counterfactual density (available on request).
20 When using these estimates to calculate elasticities we find extremely large values. However, we do not
believe these to be very informative about the underlying labor supply elasticity or elasticity of taxable income
for a variety of reasons (see also Blomquist and Newey (2017)). First, as discussed in Section 2.3, there are
number of factors exacerbating bunching at this first kink. Second, recent research has shown that in the pres-
ence of deduction possibilities it becomes difficult to structurally interpret inferred elasticities (Doerrenberg
et al., 2017).
45
Table
2.1
–
B
unching
estim
ates
overtim
e
by
cohort
C
ohort
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
O
bservations
A
.Taxable
Incom
e
2007
2.59*
2.95***
2.89***
3.08***
4.25***
4.98***
4.31***
4.93***
6.65***
48,570
(1.50)
(1.08)
(1.08)
(0.77)
(0.74)
(0.70)
(0.58)
(0.60)
(0.65)
2008
3.44**
-0.57
2.90***
2.64***
4.78***
3.08***
4.72***
3.83***
79,785
(1.59)
(0.92)
(0.75)
(0.65)
(0.68)
(0.56)
(0.51)
(0.52)
2009
0.26
0.75
2.26**
5.74***
4.34***
5.67***
5.61***
59,427
(0.66)
(1.60)
(1.02)
(1.02)
(1.03)
(0.70)
(0.79)
2010
0.62
2.16
3.94***
4.75***
5.45***
5.56***
67,024
(0.98)
(1.74)
(1.21)
(1.19)
(1.00)
(0.82)
2011
1.18
3.72*
6.05***
6.15***
7.19***
108,496
(0.97)
(2.15)
(1.61)
(1.15)
(1.04)
2012
2.91
4.64*
5.69***
5.49***
140,777
(3.23)
(2.57)
(1.35)
(0.96)
2013
5.21
4.08*
6.25***
168,952
(3.43)
(2.19)
(1.38)
2014
3.73
7.38***
219,543
(3.07)
(1.78)
B
.G
rossIncom
e
2007
2.56*
1.68
1.15
1.81*
1.59**
0.72
0.64
0.15
0.58
48,570
(1.50)
(1.11)
(1.14)
(0.94)
(0.86)
(0.80)
(0.77)
(0.71)
(0.79)
2008
1.85
-2.24**
1.06
0.98
1.50**
0.04
0.63
-0.46
79,785
(1.68)
(1.03)
(0.79)
(0.76)
(0.76)
(0.63)
(0.64)
(0.61)
2009
1.25
-1.54
-0.73
2.30**
0.05
0.55
-0.02
59,427
(3.67)
(1.57)
(1.09)
(1.04)
(1.14)
(0.83)
(0.87)
2010
1.28
-1.06
1.27
0.47
0.43
0.18
67,024
(3.43)
(1.75)
(1.30)
(1.27)
(1.08)
(0.94)
2011
0.20
-1.19
-0.87
-0.08
0.41
108,496
(3.33)
(2.19)
(1.69)
(1.30)
(1.10)
2012
-2.05
-0.78
-0.46
-1.06
140,777
(3.28)
(2.65)
(1.52)
(1.13)
2013
-2.57
-2.39
-0.89
168,952
(3.36)
(2.36)
(1.35)
2014
-3.72
-1.18
219,543
(3.10)
(1.91)
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ote:
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table
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by
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y.T
he
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atesare
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binned
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e
data
(50$
bin
size)
and
a
counterfactualdensity
using
a
polynom
ialof
degree
5.
B
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standard
errors
reported
in
parentheses,significance
levels
are
given
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*
<
0.1,**
<
0.05,and
***
<
0.01.
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Learning did not only occur within cohorts but also across cohorts as individuals entering
the formal economy in later years tend to start at higher degrees of bunching.21 Bunching in
gross income (Panel B of Table 2.1), in contrast, stays relatively low and does not increase
as individuals gain experience in the formal system.
One major concern in comparing bunching estimates according to tenure and experience
in the formal system is that workers might sort into firm environments where it is more
common to bunch. Hence, factors like wage growth and selection on (un)observables may
confound our results. These factors are already mitigated to a large extent by the fact that
the bunching estimator is a local estimator measuring the excess mass for a given subsam-
ple and in the vicinity of the kink. Moreover, by holding constant the individuals within a
cohort, we abstract from a range of selection effects. To address any remaining selection
issues, we regress an indicator whether a worker bunches on flexible functions of experi-
ence in the formal sector while controlling for a broad range of observable characteristics
and unobserved heterogeneity.22 Table 2.2 presents results from various specifications of a
simple linear probability model. The first three columns show regression results for a linear,
quadratic, and cubic polynomial in years of experience. In all specifications, we include
year fixed effects to control for general time trends. The estimates show strong initial in-
creases in the probability to bunch which level off after 4 to 5 years. In Column (4), we
add individual-level control variables such as an age polynomial, gender, education, mari-
tal status, nationality and the number of jobs a worker holds in the given year, but do not
observe any change in the impact of experience on bunching. Women and married indi-
viduals are more likely to bunch and tax avoidance increases with age. Higher education
levels tend to increase the likelihood of bunching. Having multiple jobs within a year makes
it more difficult to adjust income and deductions and therefore reduces the probability of
bunching. In order to take care of income dynamics as potential confounders, Column (5)
additionally controls for (log) gross income and income growth. The coefficients on expe-
rience are slightly smaller in magnitude but still strongly significant and indicate the same
pattern of diminishing effects as in previous specifications. In Column (6) we add firm-
level characteristics such as firm age, firm size, an indicator for corporate firm status, and
industry (14 broad categories) and region (24 provinces) fixed effects with no change in the
main effects. The identifying variation hence derives from differences in experience within
industry and within region cells, holding fixed observable characteristics and general time
21 Notable exceptions to this are the 2007 and 2008 cohorts, which start at relatively high levels. The 2007
cohort has the same amount of (not very significant) bunching in gross income levels in 2007, indicating other
mechanisms at work than the tax avoidance mechanisms studied in this paper. The 2008 cohort might be
inherently different to the other cohorts as these are the very first individuals affected by the government’s
drive to formalize the economy.
22 We define bunching as having taxable income within the range of 1000 USD to the left of the exemption
threshold and restrict the sample to individuals in the years 2006-2015 with gross income above the exemption
threshold but still within the relevant range for bunching using the deduction possibilities.
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trends. Finally, incorporating worker fixed effects in Columns (7) indicates that the relation
between experience and bunching behavior remains stable when the effects are identified by
within-individual variation in experience.
Table 2.2 – Bunching Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0.0066*** 0.040*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.048***
(0.00058) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0065)
Experience2 -0.0038*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.0077***
(0.00012) (0.00078) (0.00079) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Experience3 0.00083*** 0.00089*** 0.00065*** 0.00062*** 0.00041***
(0.000056) (0.000056) (0.000083) (0.000081) (0.000089)
Married 0.0055*** 0.0038*** 0.0025*
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Age 0.0049*** 0.0033*** 0.0029***
(0.00049) (0.00061) (0.00056)
Age2 -0.000043*** -0.000026*** -0.000028***
(0.0000061) (0.0000072) (0.0000067)
Female 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.011***
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Secondary Education 0.033** 0.022 0.015
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Tertiary Education 0.032** 0.015 0.0042
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign -0.0040 -0.011* -0.015***
(0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0053)
Number of Jobs -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.027***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Log Gross Income 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.060***
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0021)
Gross Income Growth 0.0062*** 0.0048*** -0.0016
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Corporate Firm -0.0077** 0.011***
(0.0039) (0.0040)
Firm Age -0.00012 -0.00018**
(0.000097) (0.000070)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.028 0.021 0.027 0.280
Observations 618,356 618,356 618,356 618,356 508,417 508,417 508,417
The table shows results from linear regressions with a binary indicator for bunching individuals as dependent
variable. The sample is restricted to potential bunchers in 2008 to 2015. Further (unreported) control variables
include firmsize, firm age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Overall, the learning process can be described well by a polynomial in years of experi-
ence. We find strong initial increases in bunching activity: Between the first and the second
year in the formal sector, experience leads to an increase in the bunching probability of 3 to
6 percentage points. The increase becomes less steep over time and levels off completely
after four to five years of experience. The development of the effects is clearly presented
in Figure 2.4 which displays coefficients in a specification that controls for worker fixed
effects as Column (7) but includes separate dummy variables for each year of experience in
the formal sector.23
Figure 2.4 – Coefficients on experience dummies
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This figure depicts estimated coefficients from a linear regression of a bunching indicator on dummy
variables for each year of experience in the formal sector. We control for individual fixed effects,
income dynamics and a broad range of firm characteristics.
The evidence presented in this subsection strongly supports the hypothesis of individual
learning dynamics in tax bunching. We provide robust evidence of individuals increasing
their bunching activity as they gain experience in the formal sector – even when controlling
for income dynamics and other potential confounding factors. The next subsection turns to
the question of how learning takes place and investigates how individuals react to changes
in their information environment.
23 The estimates are interpreted relative to the first year in the formal sector (with no previous experience).
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Job Switchers
To gain insights into the impacts of the firm environment on tax avoidance behavior, we
draw on a sample of job switchers and exploit variation in the information environment indi-
viduals face. Following Chetty et al. (2013), we compare tax avoidance behavior of workers
moving into a high-avoidance environment to those moving into a low-avoidance environ-
ment. In contrast to that paper, however, we examine job-to-job transitions between firms
directly (instead of regional mobility). Due to several identification strategies addressing
possible strategic job mobility patterns, we are able to make statements about the causal
effect of information environments on individual tax avoidance behavior.
We draw on the universe of formal sector job transitions in Ecuador. To keep sample
composition fixed across years, we only consider job transitions where we observe at least
two consecutive years before and after the job switch. Moreover, we only consider job
switches of the main employer24 and only an individual’s first job transition.25 Hence, we
end up with a sample of 152,617 job transitions that occurred between 2010 and 2014.
We characterize the job switchers’ information environments by assigning their origin
and destination firms to quintiles based on the share of co-workers who are bunching.26
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for our sample of job switchers. We concentrate on
workers who work in the medium quintile and move to the bottom, medium, or high quin-
tile. Average characteristics of these workers are displayed in Column (1). Demographic
characteristics as well as income before and after the job transition differ substantially be-
tween workers with different destination quintiles. Column (2) reports characteristics for
switchers to the bottom quintile and Column (3) indicates significant differences to workers
who switch to another firm in the medium quintile. Similarly, Columns (5) reports character-
istics for those switching to the high quintile and Column (6) provides significant differences
to those switching to the mid quintile. We therefore employ a broad range of identification
strategies that address the potential selection of workers into specific knowledge environ-
ments. The main challenge is that transitions into higher knowledge quintiles are also asso-
ciated with higher wage increases. We first provide graphical evidence of bunching shares
around the job transition based on raw data before we address selection using event study
regressions with (1) a broad range of control variables including wage growth and unobserv-
able worker heterogeneity, (2) a matched control group with excellent balancing properties,
and (3) the subsample of workers who switch their job due to exogenous job displacement.
24 The main employer is the one with the highest annual earnings. Job switches are by definition to a firm the
individual has not worked at before.
25 In unreported robustness checks we consider the subsample of individuals who switched jobs only once
with no change in the results.
26 For every year, we compute the distribution of the share of co-workers who bunch and split the sample into
quintiles. As before, we define bunching as reporting taxable income of 1000 USD to the left of the exemption
threshold. To abstract from individuals too far away from the exemption threshold, we draw on the full sample
of private sector employees with gross earnings between 5000 and 25000 USD.
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Graphical Evidence Using an event study graph, we observe the dynamic adjustment
process of individuals depending on the quintile they are moving towards. Figure 2.5 plots
the share of bunchers among workers starting from a firm in the mid-quintile of the bunching
distribution. The horizontal axis indicates the year relative to the move with year zero being
the first year at the destination firm. The data show an asymmetric pattern of adjustment.
The share of bunchers among workers switching to a high-bunching firm sharply increases
after the transition, resulting in the bunching share more than doubling its pre-switch level
after three years. In contrast, even though we observe a moderate overall upward trend,
bunching probabilities remain relatively unchanged for job transitions into a mid- or low-
bunching environment.27
Figure 2.5 – Event Study Job Switchers
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This figure shows an event study with bunching shares of job switchers around the time of the job
transition. The vertical line indicates the time of the transition. We observe bunching among individ-
uals who come from a firm in the medium quintile of the distribution of co-worker bunching shares
and differentiate between those who switch to a firm in the bottom, medium, and top quintile.
27 Table B.4 in the appendix depicts the same event-study graph for individuals starting in the low or high
quintile of the bunching distribution. In both alternative samples we also find a much stronger increase in the
share of bunchers among individuals transitioning to the top quintile than among those moving to the mid or
low quintile.
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Figure 2.5 indicates parallel and stable pre-switch trends between individuals moving
to firms in different parts of the bunching share distribution. While this lends credibility to
standard parallel trends assumptions, the descriptive analysis has shown selection in terms of
income dynamics between these groups of taxpayers. To address potential selection effects,
we employ a range of identification strategies that control for unobserved heterogeneity and
observed characteristics such as earnings and wage growth before and after the job switch.
Controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity In our first strategy, we esti-
mate several regression-based versions of the event study design that control for a broad
range of observable worker and firm characteristics and allow for unobserved heterogeneity
across workers by incorporating individual worker fixed effects. Hence, the effect of the
job switch on bunching is identified by the time variation within individuals. We run the
following regression on the subsample of individuals starting in the medium quintile of the
bunching distribution:
Yit = β0 + δpostit × quintilei + θXit + αi + λt +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkD
k
it + it. (2.1)
The dependent variable Yit measures tax avoidance as an indicator for individual i having
taxable income within a 1000 USD window to the left of the exemption threshold in year t.
The indicator variable postit takes on the value of one in the years after the job switch and
quintilei indicates if an individual moved to the high quintile. Accordingly, δ is our main
coefficient of interest measuring the overall effect of moving to a high- or low-avoidance
firm. We control for time-varying individual and firm characteristics Xit including gross
income, wage growth, age squared, firm size, industry classification (18 broad industries),
firm location (24 provinces), and corporate firm status. Last, we account for various sources
of unobserved heterogeneity by including individual fixed effects (αi), year fixed effects (λt)
and fixed effects in event time (γk). We run a parallel analysis for individuals switching from
a firm in the mid to the low quintile with quintilei being an indicator for the low quintile.
The estimates are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.4. Columns (1) and (5) are without
and columns (2) and (6) with the controls Xit. The results confirm the importance of the
firm environment in driving individual tax adjustment behavior: moving to a high quintile
firm increases bunching by about 3 percentage points while moving to the low quintile has
no significant effect.28
28 In various sensitivity checks, we estimate this same regression without individual fixed effects but instead
a wide range of individual specific demographic controls (age, gender, education) and find no substantial
difference in the results. We furthermore estimate the same regression without the fixed effects in event time
Dkit and find no substantial change in the results.
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E
ventyear-2
0.005
-0.002
-0.010
0.006
0.001
-0.006
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.017)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.045)
E
ventyear
-0.000
0.005
0.012
0.026***
0.022***
0.059
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.013)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.040)
E
ventyear+
1
0.015***
0.016*
0.030
0.071***
0.059***
0.151*
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.025)
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.077)
C
ontrols
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
25,048
25,048
2,403
23,947
23,947
1,479
T
he
panels
ofthis
table
denote
the
results
from
regression
equations
(2.1),(2.2)and
(2.3)respectively.Standard
errors
(in
parentheses)are
clustered
atthe
destination
firm
by
yearlevel.Significance
levels
are
given
by
*
<
0.1,**
<
0.05,and
***
<
0.01.
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Explicitly looking at the timing of the effects, we modify the regression equation
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−2
δkD
k
it × quintilei + θXit + αi + λt +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkD
k
it + it (2.2)
to include the coefficients δk measuring the anticipatory and post treatment effects sepa-
rately for each year reported in Panel B of Table 2.4.29 We find no evidence of anticipatory
effects before the event. Switching into a high quintile firm leads to a persistent increase in
bunching strongest in the second year after the move. In contrast, job transitions to a low
avoidance environment are not associated with significant effects.
In a third specification, we restrict the sample to those individuals who switched to a high
or low bunching environment and identify the effects only through the timing of the move.
Specifically, we estimate
Yit = β0 +
k=2∑
k=−1
γkD
k
it + θXit + αi + λt + it (2.3)
with the variables as defined above.30 Our coefficients of interest γk are reported in Panel
C of Table 2.4. We find very similar results to before, emphasizing the robustness of our
findings.
Matched control group In a second identification strategy, we define the comparison
group for movers into a low and high knowledge environment by matching workers from
the mid to mid group based on similar propensities to switch to the same environment.
The matching algorithm is based on exact matches with regard to the industry and region
in the period before the job switch and estimates propensity scores by a probit regression
controlling for age, marital status, gender, education, and gross income in the years before
and after the job transition. For each worker with a destination firm in the high (or low)
quintile, we then select the comparison worker with the closest propensity score among
those switching to a firm in the medium quintile. Columns (4) and (7) of Table 2.3 show
that worker characteristics are now nicely balanced between the groups of analysis, even
for characteristics that were not part of the matching algorithm, such as taxable income and
bunching status in the pre-switch period.
Columns (3) and (7) of Table 2.4 indicate that estimating equations (2.1) and (2.2) on the
matched sample does not change the results. While moving to a low-bunching environment
still does not result in a reduction of bunching, the point estimates for moving to a high-
29 As is standard in the literature, we compare all effects to the year before the event.
30 In order to rule out any compositional effects, we furthermore restrict the sample in this regression to only
include observations from the two years before and after the move for which we have a perfectly balanced
panel.
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bunching environment are remarkable stable. Exposure to a high-bunching firm still leads
to significant increases in tax avoidance by about 3 percentage points.
Figure 2.6 – Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers
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This figure shows an event study with bunching shares of job switchers around the time of the job
transition in the subsample of workers who exogenously loose their job due to a firm closure.
Sample of displaced workers In our final identification strategy, we rule out strategic
job mobility by restricting the sample to the subset of workers that switch their job due to
a firm closure. In the spirit of Jacobson et al. (1993), this extracts the exogenous part of
job mobility through job displacement. The event study graph in the sample of displaced
workers (with a remaining 23,988 job transitions) is shown in Figure 2.6. It looks very
similar to the full sample of job switchers. Intuitively, however, the effect is slightly delayed
since displaced workers need longer to find new employment. Columns (4) and (8) of Table
2.4 report results for the same regressions as in the full sample of job switchers. Despite the
much smaller sample size, results for the subsample of exogenously displaced workers are
remarkably similar to the full sample, indicating that strategic mobility to specific bunching
environments does not play a major role.
Our results provide robust evidence for asymmetric adjustment patterns consistent with
learning and memory as have been found among self-employed in the US (Chetty et al.,
2013) and commuters in Austria (Paetzold and Winner, 2016). The firm environment is
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crucial in driving individual learning on bunching opportunities. Consistent results using
various different identification strategies lead us to the conclusion that there is a causal
relationship between the firm-level knowledge environment and individual tax avoidance.
In the following section, we therefore examine dynamic learning processes on the firm level.
2.4.2 Firm Dynamics
The importance of the firm environment for individual tax avoidance behavior as well
as the institutional setting in which firms directly submit tax declarations on behalf of their
employees motivate a detailed study of firm dynamics. We document a strong increase in the
likelihood to have bunchers in the workforce as firms gain experience in the formal sector
(Section 2.4.2). Moreover, we identify two key mechanisms of information transmission
between and within firms: peers and experts (Section 2.4.2).
Table 2.5 – Extensive Margin of Firm-level Bunching over time by cohort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Obs
Cohort
2008 0.20 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.67 489
(0.40) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47)
2009 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.61 528
(0.42) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
2010 0.21 0.31 0.43 0.51 0.56 0.54 555
(0.41) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
2011 0.26 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.55 1100
(0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
2012 0.31 0.41 0.50 0.49 1657
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
2013 0.37 0.46 0.48 2203
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
2014 0.38 0.44 3280
(0.48) (0.50)
2015 0.36 4847
(0.48)
Note: Share of firms in given cohort with at least one buncher. Cohorts conditioned
on the firm’s year of entry into the formal sector. Further conditioned on employing
potential bunchers in all subsequent years. Standard deviations given in parentheses.
Cohort Analysis
This subsection analyzes bunching behavior through the lens of the firm by focusing on
firms’ experience in the formal sector. We document a strong impact of the availability of
information on tax avoidance at the firm level.
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We measure firm-level information on tax adjustment opportunities by looking at the
number of employees bunching at a given firm. To do so, we define potential bunchers as
individuals with gross earnings in a range allowing them to lower their taxable income be-
low the exemption threshold by using deductions. In 2013 real USD, this is gross earnings
between 10180 and 20360 USD. Analogously to the individual level cohort analysis in sec-
tion 2.4.1, we follow cohorts of firms after they first appeared in the formal sector.31 Table
2.5 reports the share of firms with at least one buncher among the potential bunchers for
each year and cohort. Evidently, there is a strong increase in the share of firms that employ
bunchers over time for each of the cohorts. Moreover, new cohorts start at higher bunching
levels than previous cohorts. Lastly, within a given year, firms which entered the formal
sector earlier exhibit higher bunching levels. We interpret this as evidence that the increase
in bunching activity at the firm level is driven by experience and knowledge acquired in the
formal sector and is not just a result of the general increase in bunching activity over time.
Table 2.6 focuses on the share of bunchers within a firm conditional on the firm having at
least one buncher. This share is calculated as the number of bunchers relative to the number
of potential bunchers.32 As before, we group these firms by cohorts of entry into the formal
sector. In general, the share of bunchers conditional on any bunching at the firm lies between
25 and 35 %. Notably, this share does not increase considerably with experience.
In summary, the increase in overall bunching levels is primarily driven by new firms
entering the set of bunching firms. Experience of the firm in the formal sector leads to a
higher probability to engage in bunching at the firm level. Given that a firm has taken the
decision to allow for bunching, a relatively stable fraction of workers (around 30 percent)
makes use of tax avoidance opportunities. In order to gain a more detailed understanding
into what drives these firm-level decisions to start bunching, the following section analyzes
how information spreads between and within firms.
Channels of Information Transmission
In this section, we characterize the channels of information transmission underlying the
information flows between workers and firms. We focus on two specific channels we can
identify in the data: Peers and experts. The peers channel, specifically information trans-
mission from new co-workers towards incumbent workers, represents an important aspect
of changes in the information environment at a given firm. We hypothesize that co-workers
who were bunching in their previous firm induce their new colleagues to engage in bunching
themselves. The experts channel focuses on the role of accountants. Here we hypothesize
31 We restrict our sample to firms that employed potential bunchers throughout all years since their first ap-
pearance in the formal sector.
32 We restrict the analysis to firms with at least five potential bunchers such that the share is not driven by a
large number of firms with very few potential bunchers.
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Table 2.6 – Intensive Margin of Firm-level Bunching over time by firm cohort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cohort
2008 Share 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.33
SD (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Obs 21 58 86 100 142 165 195 187
2009 Share 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27
SD (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Obs 32 66 92 107 126 154 147
2010 Share 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.32
SD (0.14) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24)
Obs 23 60 74 109 134 127
2011 Share 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.34
SD (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)
Obs 45 100 149 196 208
2012 Share 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.31
SD (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24)
Obs 60 124 209 224
2013 Share 0.34 0.34 0.37
SD (0.26) (0.25) (0.27)
Obs 71 170 194
2014 Share 0.38 0.36
SD (0.27) (0.27)
Obs 99 165
2015 Share 0.36
SD (0.26)
Note: Share of bunchers among potential bunchers in given cohort, conditional on firms em-
ploying at least one buncher. Cohorts conditioned on the firm’s year of entry into formal sector
and having potential bunchers in all subsequent years. Further conditioned on firms employing
at least 5 potential bunchers in given year. The number of observations varies between year
of observation since the conditioning on having at least one buncher leads to yearly changing
compositions of the cohort. Standard deviations given in parentheses.
that accountants previously working for a firm with bunching activity might bring knowl-
edge about tax avoidance opportunities to their new firm. We identify the effect of these
channels through changes in the co-worker environment and accountant switches. More-
over, we shed light on the anatomy of information flows within a firm by differentiating
incoming co-workers according to their relative position within their destination firm’s dis-
tribution of wages.
We draw on the same panel of firms used in the cohort analysis in Section 2.4.2. How-
ever, we restrict ourselves to the subsample for which we have data on the corporate tax
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declarations and thereby an identifier for the accountant.33 We quantify the effect of the
information transmission channels by estimating various linear probability models where
we regress our measure of tax avoidance at the firm level on indicators whether the firm
employs knowledgeable co-workers and/or accountants. In particular, we estimate variants
of the following regression equation:
Yjt = β0 + β1co-worker bunchjt + β2co-worker bunch× above p90jt
+ β3accountant bunchjt + γXjt + αj + λt + jt (2.4)
The outcome variable Yjt is an indicator for firm j capturing whether one or more of
its employees is bunching at time t. The variable co-worker bunchjt is an indicator for
a firm having an employee who was bunching at the previous employer.34 The incoming
buncher variable is interacted with an indicator, above p90jt, that is equal to one in case
the incoming worker earns a wage in the 90th percentile of the destination firm’s wages
distribution. The indicator variable accountant bunchjt takes on the value of one whenever
a firm’s accountant was working for a different firm with bunching activity in the periods
prior to the current one.35
Throughout these regressions, we include year fixed effects (λt) and control for a range of
time-varying firm level variables Xit. These include demographic employee characteristics
like average age, share of married employees, share of female workers and share of workers
with tertiary education. We also control for average gross income levels at a firm, indicators
for fixed groups of firm size, industry and region (province) indicators, and an indicator for
whether a given firm has employed bunchers in previous years.
Table 2.7 reports the results on the information transmission channels. Columns (1)
through (3) quantify the effects of information transmission through peers and columns (4)
and (5) consider information transmission through accountants. The remaining five columns
represent the same specifications, but additionally include firm fixed effects (αj), thereby
controlling for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. In these specifications the identifying
variation derives from changes in the peer composition and switches in the accountants of a
given firm.
Having an incoming employee who was bunching previously is associated to an increase
33 About one fifth of the firms used in this panel do not need to file corporate tax declarations and thereby
do not have official accountants. These are generally smaller firms for which it would in any case be more
difficult to have enough variation to identify the channels of information transmission.
34 We only consider incoming co-workers who were bunching in the year before joining their current firm and
had gross income in the range for potential bunchers. Moreover, the co-worker bunchjt indicator is equal to
one in all periods in which this incoming buncher remains at the destination firm.
35 Note that, as explained in Section 2.3, accountants can work for several firms at the same time. In this case
even a single accountant at a given firm can differ over time in terms of his knowledge about bunching.
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in the probability that any of a firm’s employees bunch by about 9 percentage points. With
on average 42.9 percent of the firms in this sample employing bunchers, this is a strong
effect corresponding to an increase in bunching activity by about 21 percent. Most of this
effect is driven by employees taking up jobs relatively high in the destination firm’s wage
distribution. When including an indicator for incoming bunchers above the 90th percentile,
the overall effect of incoming bunchers is strongly diminished and becomes insignificant,
but the interaction with high-wage earning incomers is strong and significant. Bunchers
joining their new firm between the 50th and the 90th percentile also have a positive impact
on their coworker’s bunching behavior, however, this effect is weaker than for incoming
bunchers in the 90th percentile. This lets us conclude that the spread of information within
a firm can be characterized through a “top-down" learning process.
Top-down learning also determines the effects of the experts in charge of accounting
at a firm. Periods in which a firm has a knowledgeable accountant are associated with
increases in bunching of about 5.4 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase in
firm-level bunching by about 13 percent. The effects remain virtually unchanged when
including both types of knowledge flows (peers and experts) simultaneously in columns (5)
and (10) indicating that these are two separate mechanisms.
In order to get a grasp of what types of firms help their employees bunch, we draw on
our rich firm-registry data to characterize bunching firms according to observables. The first
five columns of Table 2.7 show the effects of time-varying and time-invariant observables
at the firm level on bunching behavior. Firms with younger and more female workers are
more likely to engage in bunching. Larger firms’ employees are also more likely to bunch.
Industry affiliation seems to play an important role in determining a firm’s bunching activity.
It is remarkable that the strongest positive coefficient belongs to firms in the financial sector,
as we expect their employees to be most knowledgeable about tax adjustment opportunities.
Table 2.8 shows results from a similar set of regression using the subset of firms with
at least one buncher. As outcome variable we now use the share of bunchers among poten-
tial bunchers. This outcome is thereby conditional on bunching already happening at the
firm and is our previously introduced measure of the firm-level intensive margin bunching
behavior.36 Especially in our robust specifications including firm fixed effects, almost all
of our estimates of the channels are very small and insignificant. We take this as evidence
that neither peers nor experts have an effect on the intensive margin bunching level condi-
tional on a firm already employing bunchers. This is in line with our results in Section 2.4.2
showing that the strong overall increases in bunching can be attributed to firms joining the
group of bunching firms and not to an increase in the intensity of bunching at firms already
employing some bunchers.
36 Akin to the sample restrictions in Table 2.6, we focus on firms with at least 5 potential bunchers in order to
abstract from very small firms with high variability in bunching shares conditional on bunching.
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To summarize, peers and experts play a crucial role in transmitting information between
firms and are a key factor in explaining the rise in firm-level extensive margin bunching
shares. Moreover, anatomy of information flows within firms shows that information is
passed by managers and accountants in a “top-down" manner.
Peers This section causally identifies the peers channel by looking at individuals with
recent changes to their co-worker composition. We compare a treatment group of firms with
incoming bunchers to a suitable control group and analyze how knowledgeable co-workers
affect the behavior at their new firm. We find strong spillover effects of new co-workers on
the probability that incumbent co-workers will bunch.
Specifically, we construct a sample of firms with incoming employees who were poten-
tial bunchers due to their gross income in the year before joining the new firm. We only
consider firms hiring new workers once in the years 2010-2014 and in which we can ob-
serve at least two years before and two years after the event. These restrictions provide a
sample balanced in event time and allow us to abstract from various treatments happening
sequentially. Among the firms with incoming potential bunchers, we divide the new em-
ployees into those that reduced their taxable income to just below the exemption threshold
(“bunchers")37 and those that did not in the year before joining the new firm. We use this
distinction to classify firms into “treatment" (receiving bunchers) and “control" (receiving
non-bunchers) groups.
Table 2.9 provides descriptive statistics for the workers in this sample of firms. Along
key demographic variables, the full sample (all firms receiving incoming co-workers) is
very similar to the treated group. However, as shown in Column (3), there are significant
differences between the treatment and control group in terms of gross and taxable income
both before and after the incoming event. To account for these differences, we create a
matched control group, to which the differences disappear (Column 4).38
Using a similar event study methodology as in Section 2.4.1, we plot the share of firms
with bunchers among their incumbent workers in both treatment and control group relative
to the year of hiring the new co-worker. By focusing only on the incumbent workers, we
effectively calculate the “leave-out" version of our previous firm-level probability to bunch.
This indicator disregards the incoming co-worker and focuses only on the employees al-
ready working at a given firm. The results in Figure 2.7 suggest that incoming workers
have a strong effect on the tax adjustment behavior of their co-workers. Firms in the treat-
37 We again take an interval of 1000 USD to the left of the first kink.
38 The matching algorithm employed here is a mirrored version of the one employed in Section 2.4.1 but at
the firm level. The algorithm uses exact matches regarding industry by region cells in the year before the event
and estimates propensity scores for being in the treatment group based on the non-outcome variables average
age, share married, share female, share tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate status of the firm and average
gross income pre and post event. Balance is excellent.
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Table 2.9 – Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.02 36.21 0.21 -0.01
(6.03) (5.54) (0.35) (0.44)
Share Married 0.52 0.53 0.01 -0.00
(0.24) (0.22) (0.01) (0.02)
Share Female 0.37 0.40 0.03 -0.02
(0.27) (0.27) (0.02) (0.02)
Share Tertiary Education 0.32 0.33 0.01 0.02
(0.26) (0.26) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 50.74 51.24 0.57 1.20
(120.13) (108.95) (6.90) (7.86)
Corporate Firm 0.85 0.88 0.04 -0.01
(0.36) (0.32) (0.02) (0.02)
Avg Gross Income 6903.01 7748.11 956.12 302.87
(4052.51) (4918.06) (232.12) (383.09)
Avg Taxable Income 6231.00 6902.77 760.02 197.43
(3177.46) (3722.10) (181.98) (300.44)
Share with Bunchers 0.21 0.25 0.04 0.03
(0.41) (0.43) (0.02) (0.03)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 7761.76 8330.30 643.22 338.10
(3949.91) (4244.95) (226.58) (336.69)
Avg Taxable Income 6925.06 7258.80 377.58 96.83
(3073.59) (3032.26) (176.42) (253.22)
Share with Bunchers 0.28 0.35 0.07 0.08
(0.45) (0.48) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 2,954 343
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the peer learning channel. The sample consists of all firms receiving one incoming
employee between 2010 and 2014 and for which it is possible to observe at least two consec-
utive years before and after the event. Treated refers to firms receiving incoming potential
bunchers that bunched prior to joining their new firm. Column (3) displays the difference
between treated and control and column (4) this same difference for the matched sample.
Matching was done on average age, share married, female and tertiary educated, firmsize,
corporate status of firm and average gross income pre and post event. Pre-event refers to the
year before the arrival of new co-workers and post-event to the first year after the arrival of
the new coworkers.
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ment group are much more likely to have bunchers among their incumbent employees after
receiving a new co-worker.
Figure 2.7 – Peer Learning Event Study
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Le
av
e-
ou
t S
ha
re
 o
f F
irm
s 
w
ith
 B
un
ch
er
s
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Year Relative to Incoming Event
Treatment Control
This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the share of firms employing bunchers around
the hiring of a new co-worker (leaving out the new worker from the calculation). The vertical line
denotes the arrival of the new worker. The treatment group is formed by firms that receive a new
co-worker who was bunching in her previous firm while the control group is formed by firms with
a new co-worker who was not bunching (despite being a potential buncher with gross income in the
range above the kink).
Table 2.10 provides regression results for the previous graphic evidence. With the aim of
addressing possible selection issues and quantifying the magnitude of the effects, we mirror
the identification strategies employed in Section 2.4.1. Specifically, we estimate
Yjt = β0 + δpostjt × treatj + θXij + αj + λt +
k=2∑
k=−2
γkD
k
jt + jt. (2.5)
where Yjt is an indicator for whether there is bunching activity among incumbent work-
ers, postjt is an indicator for observations after the new co-worker joined the firm, treatj is
an indicator for a firm receiving an incoming buncher. We include fixed effects at the firm
(αj), time (λt) and event-time (Dkjt) level and in Xjt we control for firm-level characteris-
tics (firmsize, average gross income, corporate status, and industry and province dummies)
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as well as employee characteristics (average income, share tertiary educated, average age,
share married, and share female).
Table 2.10 – Peer Learning - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.052** 0.047** 0.069**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 0.010 0.012 0.003
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.035 0.031 0.039
(0.028) (0.028) (0.037)
Event year + 1 0.072** 0.067** 0.105***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040)
Event year + 2 0.065* 0.061 0.063
(0.039) (0.039) (0.051)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 15,913 15,913 3,696
Notes: The table reports results from the event-study regression equa-
tions (2.5) and (??) at the firm level. Outcome variable is the leave-out
firm bunching decision and event year refers to the year of incoming em-
ployees. Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as the base category. Firm
and year fixed effects are included throughout. Columns (1) and (2) refer
to the full sample, and column (3) uses matching on observables. We
control for average gross income, average age, share married, share fe-
male, share tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate status of firm, as well as
industry and province dummies and dummies for the year of the incom-
ing event. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.
Significance levels are given by * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, and *** < 0.01.
The results are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.10. Parallel to the analysis in Section
2.4.1, we examine effects separately for each year relative to the job transition in Panel B.
Even when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and a rich set of observables, the peer
learning channel is strong and pronounced (Column 2). Moreover, when using the matched
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control group, we find even stronger effects (Column 3). An incoming buncher increases the
probability that at least one of the incumbent co-workers bunches by about 5 to 7 percent.
The effects are strongest in the second year after the incoming event, consistent with the idea
that it takes some time for incoming co-workers to spread the information to the new firm
environment.39 In the appendix we conduct a heterogeneity analysis by firm size. Figure
B.6 depicts the same event study separately for small, medium and large firms. Intuitively,
we find the effect of co-workers on their peers to be largest for small firms and to become
smaller for larger firms.
Experts We now focus our attention on the accountant channel. In a similar event study
design exploiting variation in the knowledge of accountants, we find causal evidence for the
effect of accountants on firm-level bunching behavior.
We assess whether firm-level bunching behavior changes after firms receive new accoun-
tants. Like a new co-worker, a new accountant changes the information environment at
a firm. Firms that receive a knowledgeable accountant who was previously working at a
firm with bunchers constitute the treatment group. Firms in the control group also receive a
new accountant, but this new accountant was previously working for firms without bunchers
even though those firms had employees with gross income in the relevant range for bunching
(potential bunchers).
We extract the universe of accountant switches observed in the corporate tax declarations.
We then analyze how accountant switches have an impact on whether a firm engages in
bunching activity.40 Table 2.11 shows descriptive statistics for the firms in the experts event
study. Treatment and control firms are similar along key demographic variables but show
significant differences in income variables before and after the accountant switch. Using our
matched algorithm, however, we achieve nearly perfect balance.41
Figure 2.8 graphically depicts the experts event study. The vertical axis denotes the
average firm-level bunching share among treatment and control group respectively. The
horizontal axis denotes event time relative to the year of the incoming accountant (year
0). We observe stable pre-trends between treatment and control group before the new ac-
countant enters the firm. In the first year after the accountant switch we observe a clear
39 In unreported results we additionally identify the peer channel within the sample of treated firms purely
through the timing of the effect akin to the regression strategy in equation (2.3) and find very similar results.
40 Much like in our previous event study analyses, we make a number of restrictions to guarantee tractabil-
ity and credibility of the results. We exclude cases were firms simultaneously received knowledgeable and
non-knowledgeable accountants. We further restrict our analysis to firms where we can observe at least two
consecutive years before and after the accountant switch. Moreover, we focus on switches happening in 2010
or later so that in both years before the switch bunching was a viable option. This leaves us with a sample of
16,389 accountant switches.
41 The matching algorithm in the experts event study is exactly like in the peer learning event study: ex-
act matching on industry and region cells, with ensuing propensity score matching using average age, share
married, share female, share tertiary educated, firmsize, and average gross income pre and post event.
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Table 2.11 – Experts Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.00 36.03 -0.07 0.19
(7.40) (7.25) (0.16) (0.20)
Share Married 0.47 0.47 -0.01 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Female 0.41 0.41 0.00 -0.01
(0.30) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Tertiary Education 0.28 0.28 -0.00 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 43.99 53.73 13.25 9.28
(178.40) (248.55) (3.91) (5.76)
Avg Gross Income 5217.38 5932.17 894.75 -9.81
(4529.22) (5038.55) (100.07) (144.85)
Avg Taxable Income 4766.13 5316.95 683.17 -23.41
(3671.01) (4066.28) (81.31) (117.07)
Share with Bunchers 0.13 0.18 0.06 0.02
(0.34) (0.38) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 5227.81 6026.00 1025.94 29.23
(4668.04) (5393.24) (91.34) (146.31)
Avg Taxable Income 4770.90 5370.95 773.96 6.58
(3837.20) (4298.05) (75.20) (117.86)
Share with Bunchers 0.14 0.20 0.08 0.05
(0.35) (0.40) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16,389 3,337
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the experts channel. The sample is based on the universe of accountant switches
between 2010 and 2014 for which it is possible to observe at least two consecutive years before
and after the event and the firms employ potential bunchers throughout. Cases in which firms
simultaneously received knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable accountants were excluded.
Treated refers to firms receiving new accountants previously working at a firm with bunching
employees. Columns (3) displays the difference to a control group consisting of firms receiv-
ing an accountant previously working at a firm with potential bunchers but with zero bunching
employees. Column (4) displays the difference to the matched sample. Matching was done on
average age, share married, female and tertiary educated, firmsize, and average gross income
pre and post event. Pre-event refers to the year before the arrival of the new accountants and
post-event to the first year after the arrival of the new accountants.
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difference between treatment and control firms. Control firms seem to have a significantly
lower propensity to employ bunchers. However, in the second and third year at the new firm
this effect is harder to distinguish.
Figure 2.8 – Experts Event Study
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This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the average share of bunchers around the
entry of a new accountant into the firm. The vertical line denotes the arrival of the new accountant.
The treatment group is formed by firms that receive an accountant who was previously working for
a firm with bunchers while the control group is formed by firms with a new accountant who was
working for a firm without any bunchers.
Table 2.12 denotes regression results from event-study type regressions analogous to
those in the previous section. The notable exception is that the outcome variable is now
the firm-level bunching decision and the treatment indicator treatj indicates firm j receiv-
ing a knowledgeable accountant. Switching towards a knowledgeable accountant is clearly
associated to a strong increase in the amount of bunching at a firm. Receiving a knowledge-
able accountant increases firm-level bunching by about 2.5 percent, even when including
extensive control variables and using the matched control group.
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Table 2.12 – Experts Event Study - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.103*** 0.024*** 0.025*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 -0.018** -0.010 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.069*** 0.021** 0.028*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Event year + 1 0.115*** 0.024** 0.023
(0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
Event year + 2 0.133*** 0.013 0.023
(0.012) (0.013) (0.022)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 60,483 60,483 22,485
Notes: The table reports results from the event study regressions quantify-
ing the experts channel detailed in Section (2.4.2). Outcome variable is the
firm bunching decision and event year refers to the year of the incoming ac-
countant. Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as the base category. Firm
and year fixed effects are included throughout. Columns (1) and (2) refer to
the full sample, and column (3) uses matching on observables. We control
for average gross income, average age, share married, share female, share
tertiary educated, firmsize, as well as industry and province dummies and
dummies for the year of the accountant switch. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are given by * <
0.1, ** < 0.05, and *** < 0.01.
2.5 Conclusion
We analyze tax avoidance behavior using new administrative data on personal income
taxes from Ecuador. Learning plays an important role in determining individual tax ad-
justments: as taxpayers gain experience in the formal sector, they are more likely to avoid
paying taxes. Tax avoidance is driven through reporting behavior based on generous de-
duction possibilities. By exploiting matched employer-employee data and a research design
based on exogenous job mobility we find the firm information environment to have a causal
effect on individual learning processes about tax avoidance opportunities.
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Furthermore, this paper exploits the strong rise in the size of the Ecuadorian formal sector
to provide evidence for the importance of firm-level dynamics in tax avoidance behavior. We
show that the knowledge environment at the firm-level can be characterized by a binary pat-
tern: either a firm has knowledge about bunching opportunities or it does not. Conditional
on tax avoidance at the firm level, the share of employees avoiding taxes remains relatively
stable over time. The paper identifies and quantifies two specific channels of information
transmission that explain the rise in firm-level knowledge on tax avoidance activity. We
quantify the effects of peers and experts by exploiting changes in the co-worker composi-
tion of firms and accountant switches. Furthermore, we provide evidence for “top-down"
information flows within firms.
From a policy perspective, these findings on how taxpayers in a low-enforcement setting
learn about tax adjustment and avoidance opportunities are highly relevant. A range of de-
veloping and middle-income countries have recently undergone numerous reforms aiming
towards the formalization of the economy. While designing these reforms it is important
to take into account how and when they will translate into actual behavior, especially in a
dynamically growing setting. Due to partial usage only by individuals in an advantageous
knowledge environment, such reforms can also (at least in the short and medium run) in-
crease inequality. Moreover, our analysis has shown the importance of firms and firm-level
environments in driving the usage of tax avoidance opportunities. This observation is im-
portant when designing strategies to combat tax avoidance and setting up auditing targets.
A flexible labor market with worker and job mobility is crucial for the spread of information
and helps to reduce information frictions.
In future research on behavioral responses to public policies, we think it is important to
focus more strongly on dynamic aspects. Especially in settings with a growing number of
affected parties or beneficiaries, these economic agents do not respond to incentives imme-
diately and take time to understand and learn about the system. Moreover, identifying the
channels of information transmission underlying learning processes can be informative for
the design of optimal policies and to guide policymakers in improving existing ones.
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Chapter 3
Harnessing Deductions to Increase Tax
Compliance and Formalization
3.1 Introduction
Increasing tax compliance and ensuring that an economy operates in the formal system
is vital towards guaranteeing a well-functioning tax and transfer system. For many devel-
oping economies with large informal sectors (ILO, 2014), key policy goals often center on
getting economic actors to participate in the formal economy. Increasing formality and tax
compliance is important not only for revenue generation to finance crucial public expendi-
tures, but also to guarantee a just and equitable tax and transfer system implementing the
socially decided levels of redistribution. However, it is often unclear exactly how to im-
prove tax compliance. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of generating paper
trails and automatic third party reporting as driving factors behind high levels of tax com-
pliance (Kleven et al., 2016). Especially in developing countries, efforts to increase and
improve paper trails in VAT have been crucial in recent formalization efforts (Pomeranz,
2015; Naritomi, 2016). However, due to frequent exemptions based on firm size or industry,
substantial parts of economies often operate outside of the VAT system. It is especially un-
clear how to put in place incentives inducing third party reporting and paper trail generation
for these sectors of the economy.
This paper evaluates a unique reform aimed at radically increasing the demand for re-
ceipts by final consumers, thereby creating paper trails for sectors of the economy previously
marred by tax avoidance and evasion. This demand for receipts is stimulated through exten-
sive deduction possibilities in personal income tax (PIT), particularly in sectors exempt from
VAT. Drawing on detailed administrative data from Ecuador and exploiting heterogeneity in
the effectiveness of the reform both between regions and sectors, I estimate its impact on
the size of the formal sector economy. According to a simple difference-in-differences esti-
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mate, reported self-employment professional profits aggregated at the regional level increase
between 18 and 33% per inhabitant. In triple difference regressions at the individual self-
employed level additionally differentiating between professionals affected and unaffected
by the reform, I estimate the reform to increase reported profits by almost 100%.
Ecuador has recently experienced a large increase in formalization as documented by a
strong increase in the number of taxpayers (Bohne and Nimczik, 2018) and an increase in
the tax-to-gdp ratio from 10 to 21% between 2000 and 2015 (Modica et al., 2018). One of
the key drivers are extensive deduction opportunities from personal income tax (PIT) imple-
mented in 2008. These allow taxpayers to deduct expenses1 in health, education, housing,
food and clothing, almost all of which (except the latter) are mostly exempt from VAT pay-
ments.2 However, PIT is levied at relatively high levels above 10,000 USD. To estimate
the effect of this policy on formalization, I exploit substantial regional variation in the den-
sity of high-income individuals and the actual amount of deductions claimed within 219
administrative regions within Ecuador.
In this paper, I draw on a unique combination of several administrative data sources based
primarily on the universe of personal income tax records of self-employed business owners.
For an estimate of the overall economic impacts of this reform, I aggregate the outcome
variables at the regional level and consider per-capita (inhabitant) values. My main outcome
variable is the total amount of professional profits reported within an administrative region
per inhabitant. I define treated regions as those exhibiting a demand for receipts above the
mean or above the 90th percentile. To validate the identifying assumption in the difference-
in-differences framework, I plot two years of remarkably parallel and extremely low pre-
trends. Trends in both treatment and control regions increase greatly after the reform, but
the increase is much stronger in regions with a high demand for receipts. The difference-in-
differences estimator corresponds to increases of 45 to 82 USD reported professional profits
per inhabitant of a given region, or 18 to 33%. Remarkably, this effect is not existent when
looking at profits of formalized medium to large businesses arguably less affected by the
reform (sole proprietorships above certain size thresholds).
Having established the importance of the reform for aggregated regional outcomes, I find
comparable and sizeable results in similar difference-in-differences regressions at the indi-
vidual level while controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, com-
bining the tax returns with data on registered professions from the civil registry provides an
additional level of heterogeneity depending on whether or not the services of an individual
profession are included in the deduction categories and hence face increased demand for
1 Limits apply. Please refer to Section 3.2 for details.
2 In housing, only rental payments are exempt from VAT. Likewise, in the food category, only basic food
items are exempt from VAT.
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receipts. This further treatment layer allows to conduct triple difference regressions con-
trolling for possible changes in the underlying trends between treatment and control regions
arising from potential time-varying region-specific shocks. As a result, the changes in re-
ported profits between doctors (strongly affected) and other professionals are about 5,000
USD higher in regions with a strong demand for receipts than those same changes in regions
with a low demand for receipts. In placebo triple-difference regressions, I find no effects
for evidently unaffected professions such as veterinary physicians, economists, business ad-
ministrators or journalists.3
The findings of this paper are highly policy relevant in terms of uncovering innovative
ways to increase tax compliance and formalization, both for developing and more developed
economies. The very extensive and generous deduction policy was instrumental in getting
a whole sector — professional services not subject to VAT — to participate in the formal
economy. In this setting, since the self-employed themselves use the same deductions to
lower their taxable income, it is unclear whether this reform actually leads to professional
service providers paying more taxes. However, getting them to participate in the formal
economy and creating paper trails of their business activities has additional long-term ad-
vantageous. Lastly, these deductions arguably have strong spillovers on the reporting of
VAT and VAT revenue. For a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the reform (foregone
PIT due to deductions versus increased revenue), the impact on VAT revenue would need to
be factored in and this is outside the scope of this study.
This paper contributes towards several strands of the literature. In general, it is embedded
into a growing literature on taxation and development. Key parts of this literature focus
on explaining how and why tax systems in developing countries differ to those of more
developed economies (Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al., 2015; Keen and Slemrod, 2017).
Recently, a number of papers have highlighted the rising importance of both PIT (Besley and
Persson, 2013; Jensen, 2016) and VAT (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2010; Pomeranz, 2015;
Waseem, 2018) for developing countries. Likewise, many papers have focused on corporate
taxation and firm behavior in explaining tax avoidance and evasion in developing countries
(Best, 2014; Carrillo et al., 2017; Asatryan and Peichl, 2017; Bachas and Soto, 2017). I
combine these two research areas by focusing on the smallest firms, namely self-employed
individuals, and looking at their behavior with respect to PIT liability.
More specifically, this paper fits to recent work looking into formalization of develop-
ing economies (Pomeranz, 2015; Gerard and Gonzaga, 2016; Naritomi, 2016; Brockmeyer
et al., 2018; Rocha et al., 2018). For more developed economies, there is a consensus on
the importance of third party information in sustaining high levels of taxation (Kleven et al.,
3 I address general income and demand effects for health services by looking at a broader definition of health
professionals excluding doctors who face different incentives mainly due to the fact that their clients may not
be final consumers. For this group of professionals, I do not find an effect of the reform.
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2011, 2016). This paper fits into a small group of studies recently attempting to increase
the quantity and quality of third-party information in developing economies (Kumler et al.,
2015; Pomeranz, 2015). A number of countries, including Brazil, China, Italy, and Taiwan,
have recently implemented policies aimed specifically at getting consumers to report busi-
ness revenues and submit receipts. The benefit to consumers usually comes in the form of
lottery ticket reward policies. Fabbri (2015) looks at these from a theoretical point of view
and Marchese (2009) evaluates a specific reform in China. Most closely related is the study
by Naritomi (2016), evaluating a program also giving monetary rewards to consumers for
demanding receipts and quantifying the compliance effects for firms. However, the mone-
tary rewards for consumers were mostly a direct function of the VAT liability of firms. In
contrast, in this paper consumers are specifically given monetary rewards for transactions
largely exempt from VAT payments. And while the above papers focus on either region-
ally confined policies or monetary rewards through lottery schemes, this paper evaluates a
nation-wide reform with strong monetary rewards for everyone paying PIT. In general, most
of the above formalization efforts focus on improving VAT compliance and paper trails,
whereas this reform specifically targets economic sectors exempt from VAT.
Additionally, this paper contributes to a small literature studying deductions within the
personal income tax system (Doerrenberg et al., 2017; Matikka, forthcoming). Especially
Hamilton (2018) looks at the optimal level of deductions in personal income taxes by de-
composing observed bunching behavior into a gross income and a deductions response. In
his setting, however, deductions do not have any effect on the formalization of the economy.
More generally, this paper relates to the general literature on tax compliance and evasion
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 2007; Kleven et al., 2011; Dwenger et al., 2016).
Withing this literature, we focus on the subgroup of self-employed individuals who usually
make strong adjustments to their reported income even in high-enforcement environments
(Chetty et al., 2011; Bastani and Selin, 2014; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). On an even
broader level, I contribute to a number of recent studies looking into general equilibrium or
macro effects of micro-oriented tax policies. Saez et al. (2017) look into the effects of a tax
rebate on aggregate employment rates and Alstadsaeter et al. (2017) look into the impacts
of tax evasion on global inequality. The policy studied in this paper analyzes how individual
incentives can be harnessed to drive formalization of a whole sector of the economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
the specific deductions policy and provides information on the taxation of self-employed in
Ecuador. Section 3.3 introduces the data sources and provides descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 3.4 provides details on the research design and discusses the results at the aggregated
regional and individual self-employed level. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Deductions Policy
Ecuador, as many countries in Latin America, has recently put a large focus on reducing
tax evasion and increasing formality. Most of the Ecuadorian reforms were carried out in
2008 along with a series of policies aimed at expanding social programs, improving public
service delivery, and making vital infrastructure investments. These policies were largely
unchanged up to 2014 due to a long period of political stability, sustained economic growth
and high oil revenues. The fiscal results can be clearly seen in terms of overall government
tax revenue, which increased from 10.3% of GDP in 2000 to 21.1% in 2015 (Modica et al.,
2018). Tax revenue in Ecuador can be broadly categorized into a value-added tax (VAT) of
12%, personal income taxes (PIT) levied on wage and self-employment income, corporate
taxes (22% of profits), and a number of special taxes ranging from certain consumption
goods to transferring money abroad.
Deductions Policy One of the strongest policies to formalize the economy are extensive
deduction policies within the personal income tax (PIT) system. The PIT exemption thresh-
old is relatively high at 10,180 USD in 20134, leading to a relatively small fraction of the
population with income above this threshold (refer to Section 3.3 for descriptive statistics).
Individuals liable to pay PIT can deduct expenses in health, education, food, clothing and
housing for themselves or their dependents and thereby reduce their taxable income (Vil-
lacreses, 2014). The total deductible amount is limited to either 50% of gross income or
1.3 times the exemption threshold, whichever is smaller. Additionally, the limit of 0.35
times the exemption threshold applies to each specific deductions category, except health
expenses, which are only capped in case the overall limit is reached. In order for taxpay-
ers to claim these deductions, they are legally obliged to gather and keep the receipts used.
The receipts can only be used in case they include information on the name and personal
identification number of the taxpayer or his/her dependents.5 While taxpayers are legally
obliged to keep all receipts, they only need to actively present them to the tax authority in
case the overall value of their deductions exceeds a reporting threshold set at 0.5 times the
exemption threshold (corresponding to 5,090 USD in 2013).6
4 The exemption threshold is adjusted to inflation in every year according to the yearly change in consumer
price index in urban areas published by the national statistical agency INEC on every November 30. Through-
out this paper, all nominal values are deflated according to this index and the exemption threshold thereby
remains constant in real terms.
5 In practice, sellers ask whether clients need a standard receipt (“nota de venta") without their name and id
number or the enhanced version necessary to present to the tax authority (“factura"). 6 In the years up to and
including 2010, this reporting threshold was set at the fixed amount of 7,500 USD.
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Taxation of Self-Employed In general, all sources of individual income in Ecuador are
subject to a unified personal income tax (PIT) scheme.7 This includes regular wage income
as well as profits from self-employed business activities. The tax scheme is progressive,
with numerous tax brackets, ranging from 5% marginal tax rate for income immediately
above the exemption threshold and increasing up to 35% for top incomes above 103,810
USD.
Micro-businesses in Ecuador benefit from a simplified tax regime (RISE - Régimen Im-
positivo Simplificado) replacing both personal income taxes and VAT payments through
monthly lump-sum transfers depending on the reported yearly income and industry. The
policy objective is to reduce compliance costs and facilitate formalization for very small en-
terprises. This is possible if overall yearly business income does not exceed 60,000 USD and
a range of other restrictions apply. Most importantly for this analysis, all sorts of business
activities arising from professional services in need of a university degree (doctors, lawyers,
journalists, etc.) are excluded from using this simplified tax regime.
All individuals with self-employed business activities not using this simplified tax regime
are obliged to pay PIT on their full business profits. In order to assess their tax liability, they
must submit a self-employed tax declaration form. These forms include information on the
different types of income and their immediate deductibles generated by the relevant business
activity. Immediate deductibles are expenses made to obtain the relevant income, e.g. the
costs of maintaining a doctor’s practice can be deducted from the revenue a doctor gener-
ates. Throughout this paper, I look at profits generated by self-employed as the difference
between income and deductible costs. The income categories reported on the tax form in-
clude business profits, professional income, rental income, agricultural income, dividends,
financial returns, foreign income sources as well as income from the banana sector and the
exploitation of natural resources. Crucial for this analysis will be the professional income
category,8 which contains income from all professional service providers like self-employed
doctors, journalists, lawyers, etc. Additionally, the incomes and deductible costs in each of
these fields are aggregated and reported as total self-employment profits generated by an
individual.
The exact tax declaration form self-employed fill in depends on the size of their business
activities. The extensive tax declaration form F102 is the default and contains comprehen-
sive accounting information underlying the first subcategory “business profits" referred to
above. The accounting information corresponds to a whole set of accounting figures includ-
7 Important exceptions include payments from the social security system (pensions, stipends, disability bene-
fits, etc.) severance payments, certain mandatory end-of-year wage benefits, and a range of very specific capital
income including interests on certain saving accounts, occasional capital gains and returns from investment
funds or long-term deposits (conditions apply).
8 On the tax form, there are actually two relevant categories: Income from “libre ejercicio profesional" and
income from “ocupación liberal". Since their boundaries can be unclear in some cases, for the purposes of this
study, I aggregate the two income fields as “professional profits".
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ing a revenue and expense statement according to Ecuadorian accounting rules. Addition-
ally, this form needs to be co-signed by an official accountant. However, self-employed with
capital below 60,000 USD and annual income below 100,000 USD can fill in the simpler
tax declaration form F102A. This form effectively summarizes the full accounting informa-
tion with one field named “business profits" and taxpayers are not required to provide full
accounting books nor need a signature from an official accountant. The other types of self-
employment income introduced above (importantly also the professional income category)
remain unchanged in this simpler form F102A. Figure C.1 in the Appendix depicts the full
form 102A and Figure C.2 zooms in on the relevant income and profit variables.
Apart from paying PIT, business owners in Ecuador are obliged to remit value-added tax
(VAT) at a rate of 12% on all products and services they sell. As standard in a VAT system,
the VAT they paid on their inputs serves as a credit towards the VAT they need to remit,
effectively only charging VAT on the value-added by their enterprise. However, a number of
exemptions to VAT apply. First, businesses operating under the simplified tax regime RISE
introduced above (revenue below 60,000 USD) make a lump-sum payment liberating them
from any PIT and VAT obligations — and effectively forfeiting their VAT credit. Second,
a number of goods and services are completely exempt from VAT payments. This includes
basic food items, rental payments, and importantly for the context of this study, any health
and education services. Even though in terms of overall tax revenue VAT is much more
important for Ecuador than PIT, these exemptions effectively exclude a large part of the
economy from the self-enforcing paper trail mechanisms of VAT (Kopczuk and Slemrod,
2006). The deductions policy is an attempt to create a paper trail and improve compliance
for this important part of the economy.
3.3 Data Sources and Descriptives
The data used in this paper is a combination of various sources of detailed adminis-
trative data from Ecuador. The core data consists of the universe of personal income tax
declarations by self-employed individuals in the years 2006-2015. These self-employment
tax records are merged to extensive firm-registry data (Catastro de RUC), where all self-
employed are obliged to provide basic information on their business activities, including
among other things the location within administrative districts. The relevant administrative
region I focus on in this paper is the cantón, of which there are 221 in Ecuador.9
A central source of data used in this analysis is on registered professions. In Ecuador,
the civil registry holds data on the registered professions of all citizens. This information
9 In this paper, I focus solely on cantón as the relevant administrative district. The smaller administrative
division of parroquia is also available in the firm-registry data, however, population and socio-demographic
indicators are not differentiated by parroquia in urban areas. Moreover, throughout the analysis I use data on
219 cantones due to data availability issues for the remaining two.
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is for example displayed on the official id card. Whenever an individual graduates from
an educational institution or changes occupation, they are asked to provide this information
to the civil registry. In case of professions demanding a degree from a tertiary educational
institution (e.g. doctors, accountants, lawyers), this is only possible after providing docu-
mentary evidence of graduating and of the institution’s accreditation. Obviously, while this
process provides security against false statements of the professions, it does not guaran-
tee that this information is continuously updated for all citizens. At birth, every individual
is registered as a student (estudiante) which stays unchanged until they change their sta-
tus (thereby this is the most frequent category). In many cases, the classification of the
profession is quite fuzzy and includes terms like “employee" (empleado), “private-sector
employee" (empleado privado) or “day laborer" (jornalero). I have coded these profession
into overarching categories which are self-contained and which permit a clear mapping into
effects of the deductions policy, making up about 35% of all self-employed individuals.10
The sample of individual self-employment records used in this paper focuses on this subset
of individuals. Table C.1 in the Appendix compares these individuals with clear profes-
sion categories to all other self-employed individuals. In general, the two groups are quite
balanced, especially in terms of self-employment profits (8,193 versus 8,045 USD) and de-
mographic characteristics. There are, however, significant mechanical differences in terms
of educational achievement: Individuals belonging to these clearly specified professions
are much more likely to have finished tertiary-level education (75% versus 27%). Since
most of these clearly specified professions need an official degree, obviously the share of
tertiary-educated individuals in this subset is larger. The resulting dataset includes a strongly
increasing number of self-employed individuals over time, ranging from 142,190 in 2007 to
211,184 in 2015.
There are additional sources of data used for gaining information about the administrative
regions (cantón) used in this paper. A key element stems from the universe of personal
income tax declarations of wage earners. This data is used to aggregate information on key
individual income and deduction indicators at the regional level. Specifically, I calculate
the number of individuals with income above the income tax exemption threshold and the
dollar amount of claimed deductions by taxpayers. Additionally, I take aggregate data from
the Ecuadorian Census11 to gain population figures by cantón. Throughout this analysis, all
dollar values are expressed in 2013 real USD. This ensures that the income tax exemption
10 In total, the Ecuadorian civil registry lists almost 2600 different professional categories. Many of them
are, however, extremely specific (“pediatrician") or very unspecific, as mentioned above. The profession I
focus on make up about 35% of the overall sample and include the categories of doctors, dentists, other
health professionals (see details in Table C.4), lawyers, architects, engineers, drivers, economist, accountants,
teaching industry professionals, tailors/shoemakers, business administrators, journalists, and food industry
professionals. While there are numerous very infrequent categories, another 32% of the sample is made up of
the three extremely unspecific professions categories “student", “private sector employee" and “employee".
11 Full population-wide Census from 2010, administered by INEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Cen-
sos).
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics Aggregates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above Mean Below Mean Above p90 Below p90
Population 151,643 34,114 312,459 39,614
(416,957) (41,359) (6710,595) (52,525)
2007
Total Deductions per capita 0.0005 0.0005 0.0014 0.0004
(0.0028) (0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0056)
Share Population w/ High Income 0.0129 0.0019 0.0235 0.0029
(0.0172) (0.0017) (0.0250) (0.0033)
2009
Total Deductions per capita 66.85 5.99 129.00 10.78
(84.00) (5.28) (117.85) (11.28)
Share Population w/ High Income 0.0175 0.0027 0.0318 0.0040
(0.0197) (0.0020) (0.0272) (0.0040)
2012
Total Deductions per capita 82.50 14.43 149.56 20.38
(89.76) (11.88) (124.22) (18.03)
Share Population w/ High Income 0.0217 0.0044 0.0388 0.0059
(0.0234) (0.0032) (0.0325) (0.0048)
2015
Total Deductions per capita 117.02 28.74 211.73 35.64
(130.02) (29.98) (175.78) (35.82)
Share Population w/ High Income 0.0273 0.0064 0.0489 0.0081
(0.0335) (0.0056) (0.0476) (0.0078)
Observations 59 160 21 198
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics at the regional (cantón) level. The 119 regions studied (two
cantones drop out due to data restrcitions) are divided by treatment status according to their position relative
to mean receipt demand (columns (1) and (2)) and relative to the 90th percentile of receipt demand (columns
(3) and (4)). Reported are mean values in the subgroup with standard deviations in parantheses.
threshold is always at the same level (refer to Section 3.2 for details) and that estimates
are comparable over the years. Moreover, all outcome variables are winsorized at the 99th
percentile to reduce the effect outliers have on the estimation.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics at the aggregate regional level. The 119 regions
(cantones)12 used are separated according to the level of demand for receipts they face.
Column (1) depicts regions with above mean demand for receipts, column (2) regions with
below mean demand receipts (for details on how this is calculated, please refer to the fol-
lowing Section 3.4). In columns (3) and (4), the same regions are divided according to the
stronger treatment indicator of having demand for receipts above or below the 90th per-
centile of the distribution of claimed deductions. It is apparent that regions with larger
12 In total, there are 221 cantones in Ecuador, however, two drop out of the sample due to insufficient obser-
vations.
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demand for receipts are more populous. Moreover, by construction, the total deductions
per capita and the share of population with high income (defined as above the exemption
threshold) are significantly higher in regions with a large demand for receipts. This table
also provides evidence for the fact that over time, the usage of deductions and income have
greatly increased over time. The usage of deductions was basically zero in 2007 (before
their introduction) and increased up to 117 USD per capita (inhabitant, not taxpayer) in the
59 regions with above mean usage. Likewise, the small share of individuals with income
above the exemption threshold (about 10,000 USD) goes up from 1.29% in 2007 to 2.73%
in 2015.
The corresponding descriptive statistics for the sample of individuals with data on re-
ported professions presented above are presented in Table 3.2. Columns (1) to (3) present
self-employed in regions with above mean demand for receipts, columns (4) to (6) regions
with below mean demand for receipts. The individuals among these regions are separated
into doctors, further health professionals, and all other professions. In terms of demograph-
ics, the two groups of individuals are relatively balanced, with the notable exception of a
higher share of women in the further health professionals. The income variables are depicted
for various years and it becomes apparent that reported self-employment income increases
strongly over time. By far the largest jump, however, occurs between 2007 (before the de-
ductions policy) and the following years. This jump is stronger in regions with high demand
for receipts (columns (1)-(3)) than in regions with low demand for receipts (columns (4) -
(6)). Lastly, the overall number of individuals submitting self-employment tax declarations
also increases over time. This table is replicated in Table 3.3 with treatment indicated by re-
gions above the 90th percentile of the deduction usage distribution. The qualitative findings
are extremely similar.
3.4 Research Design and Results
In this section, I estimate the effect of the deductions policy on economic activity, in
particular the behavior of self-employed individuals. The analysis begins by showing the
importance of the reform for aggregate levels of reported self-employment profits and con-
tinues to use individual tax return data to refine the estimation strategy and rule out a number
of alternative explanations.
The core idea behind the identification strategies presented in this paper relies on the fact
that the deductions in personal income tax are only useful to individuals with sufficiently
high income. As described in Section 3.2, personal income tax (PIT) is levied at the rela-
tively high level of about 10,000 USD annual income.13 Moreover, there is strong regional
variation in the number of high-income individuals and hence in the usage of the deduction
13 This exemption threshold changes yearly according to inflation, its value ranges from 7850 USD in 2008 to
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Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics Individual Tax Returns — Relative to Mean
Above mean canton Below mean canton
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Doc Health Other Doc Health Other
Age 41.52 39.68 43.21 41.79 37.94 43.05
(12.15) (11.00) (12.53) (11.72) (10.38) (11.95)
Female 0.44 0.78 0.33 0.38 0.79 0.28
(0.50) (0.41) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41) (0.45)
Tertiary Education 1.00 0.95 0.70 1.00 0.93 0.54
(0.06) (0.23) (0.46) (0.06) (0.25) (0.50)
Married 0.65 0.56 0.68 0.65 0.53 0.65
(0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48)
Observations 32,343 19,476 239,424 4,802 3,434 61,708
2007
Self-Employment Inc 720.86 860.87 712.66 978.26 887.51 816.11
(2,627.05) (2,572.49) (2,820.88) (2,962.18) (2,608.54) (3,046.54)
Log Self-Employment Inc 1.01 1.49 0.87 1.33 1.39 0.96
(2.71) (3.13) (2.57) (3.06) (3.09) (2.69)
Observations 14,930 6,036 96,896 1,899 905 21,518
2009
Self-Employment Inc 10,708.88 4,999.19 9,365.57 6,054.70 4,039.01 8,158.89
(16,193.38) (9,036.62) (15,132.16) (8,986.24) (6,669.90) (12,890.89)
Log Self-Employment Inc 6.80 5.27 6.09 6.01 4.88 6.11
(3.86) (4.11) (4.20) (3.95) (4.15) (4.12)
Observations 18,368 8,305 115,877 2,503 1,256 26,456
2012
Self-Employment Inc 10,076.95 4,091.08 8,394.56 5,167.81 2,899.50 7,209.15
(17,673.12) (8,847.57) (15,225.44) (9,067.55) (6,304.89) (12,317.52)
Log Self-Employment Inc 5.99 4.45 5.58 5.18 3.85 5.64
(4.20) (4.16) (4.30) (4.13) (4.07) (4.20)
Observations 24,516 12,618 147,983 3,636 2,197 35,757
2015
Self-Employment Inc 11,215.56 4,021.44 8,514.55 5,779.97 2,995.12 7,368.90
(18,437.22) (8,933.05) (15,439.61) (10,075.26) (7,094.74) (12,216.59)
Log Self-Employment Inc 6.25 4.28 5.64 5.45 3.89 5.86
(4.16) (4.13) (4.27) (4.10) (4.01) (4.14)
Observations 23,299 11,879 136,405 3,427 2,163 33,998
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of individuals with self-employment tax returns. Columns (1)-(3)
refer to self-employed working in regions with above mean usage of per capita tax deductions, columns (4)-(6) to those in regions
with per capita usage of tax deductions below mean. The self employed are further disaggregated by their reported professions:
columns (1) and (4) report self employed registered as doctors or dentists, columns (2) and (5) those registered as other health
professionals (including nurses, medical technicians, psychologists, pharmacists, midwifes, physical therapists, optometrists, and
nutritionists), and columns (3) and (6) refer to all remaining self-employed. Reported are means, standard deviations given in
parentheses.
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Table 3.3 – Descriptive Statistics Individual Tax Returns — Relative to p90
Above p90 canton Below p90 canton
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Doc Health Other Doc Health Other
Age 41.90 40.15 43.38 40.60 37.76 42.87
(12.25) (11.07) (12.67) (11.61) (10.39) (12.02)
Female 0.44 0.78 0.33 0.40 0.79 0.30
(0.50) (0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.41) (0.46)
Tertiary Education 1.00 0.95 0.73 1.00 0.94 0.56
(0.06) (0.22) (0.44) (0.06) (0.24) (0.50)
Married 0.65 0.56 0.68 0.65 0.55 0.67
(0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47)
Observations 27,186 15,902 181,005 9,959 7,008 120,127
2007
Self-Employment Inc 710.63 895.43 705.68 874.82 787.99 774.02
(2,630.94) (2,655.04) (2,800.88) (2,779.75) (2,373.50) (2,963.44)
Log Self-Employment Inc 0.98 1.51 0.87 1.26 1.39 0.92
(2.68) (3.16) (2.56) (2.97) (3.05) (2.64)
Observations 12,804 4,933 73,738 4,025 2,008 44,676
2009
Self-Employment Inc 11,603.64 5,422.03 9,871.91 5,795.57 3,550.82 7,922.14
(17,011.75) (9,576.43) (15,777.07) (8,810.24) (6,221.05) (12,758.44)
Log Self-Employment Inc 6.98 5.44 6.14 5.90 4.70 6.02
(3.81) (4.11) (4.22) (3.96) (4.10) (4.13)
Observations 15,650 6,756 88,997 5,221 2,805 53,336
2012
Self-Employment Inc 11,027.41 4,443.68 8,986.19 5,071.08 2,740.83 6,868.89
(18,667.72) (9,368.33) (16,083.73) (9,221.78) (6,119.31) (12,132.14)
Log Self-Employment Inc 6.17 4.61 5.63 5.10 3.83 5.53
(4.19) (4.18) (4.33) (4.13) (4.04) (4.21)
Observations 20,663 10,210 112,379 7,489 4,605 71,361
2015
Self-Employment Inc 12,136.59 4,306.81 9,090.65 6,102.09 2,924.24 7,049.12
(19,370.97) (9,384.97) (16,315.52) (10,734.16) (6,873.84) (12,186.71)
Log Self-Employment Inc 6.39 4.34 5.68 5.50 3.96 5.69
(4.16) (4.16) (4.30) (4.09) (4.00) (4.16)
Observations 19,560 9,538 103,238 7,166 4,504 67,165
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of individuals with self-employment tax returns. Columns (1)-(3)
refer to self-employed working in regions with the value of per capita tax deductions above the 90th percentile, columns (4)-(6) to
those in regions with per capita usage of tax deductions below the 90th percentile. The self employed are further disaggregated by
their reported professions: columns (1) and (4) report self employed registered as doctors or dentists, columns (2) and (5) those
registered as other health professionals (including nurses, medical technicians, psychologists, pharmacists, midwifes, physical
therapists, optometrists, and nutritionists), and columns (3) and (6) refer to all remaining self-employed. Reported are means,
standard deviations given in parentheses.
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possibilities and the accompanying demand for receipts. This section estimates a series of
double and triple difference estimators where the main treatment indicator at the regional
level is determined by the actual usage of deductions within a given administrative region.
I calculate the total value of claimed deductions of all taxpayers in a region relative to the
size of the population. Treatment is determined by a region’s position in the distribution
of the per-capita usage of deductions in 2009. This allows some time for the reform to be-
come effective and is the most direct measure of the actual demand for receipts possible.14
I propose two alternative treatment indicators: Being in a region with above average per
capita deductions in 2009 and being in a region with per capita deductions above the 90th
percentile of the regional deductions distribution.
3.4.1 Aggregate Regional Data
This section examines the effect the deduction opportunities have on reported economic
activity aggregated at the regional level. While taking an aggregate view rules out some
more robust identification strategies presented in the next subsection, it allows for a better
analysis of the economic relevance of the reform. The measure of economic activity I focus
on is reported profit of self-employed individuals. Using the universe of self-employed
tax declarations, I aggregate various measures of reported self-employment profits at the
regional level. To relate these aggregates to the size of the economy, I calculate the per-
capita versions based on regional population figures from the Ecuadorian national census.
My analysis focuses on three measures of reported regional per-capita self-employment
business activity. The first is reported professional profits, defined as profits claimed by
self-employed exercising their profession. Examples of professional income that fall in this
category includes freelance doctors, dentists, lawyers, journalists and accountants. Profits
in terms of the tax declaration is income minus deductions of expenses necessary for that
particular income generation — an example are costs of maintaining a doctors practice. The
second measure I use in the analysis is per-capita reported total self-employment profits. As
detailed in Section 3.2, this includes further income sources such as certain capital gains
and dividends, rental income, and agricultural income. The third measure I focus on is
reported business profits of sole proprietorships. Sole proprietorships are businesses owned
by individuals subject to personal income taxation, but which due to their size15 are obliged
to report not just revenue and deductible costs, but comprehensive accounting information.
10800 USD in 2015. As all monetary values are deflated to 2013 USD, I use the exemption threshold of 2013
(10180 USD) throughout this analysis.
14 As shown by Bohne and Nimczik (2018), the usage of the deduction possibilities depends on the availability
of information, which spreads sluggishly. The results remain unchanged if I use the deductions distribution of
other years or if I use the alternative concept of number of high income individuals living in a given region
(results available upon request).
15 These self-employed business owners have capital exceeding 60,000 USD or annual revenue in excess of
100,000 USD. See Section 3.2 for details.
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These are effectively medium to large formal sector businesses mostly already formalized
before the reform and owned by individuals subject to personal income taxation.
I measure the effect of the reform using a difference-in-differences estimation frame-
work. As discussed above, the identifying variation stems from regional heterogeneity in
the demand for receipts. Specifically, I estimate the following regression equation:
Yjt = γj + λt + βTreatj × Postt + jt (3.1)
with Yjt being one of the outcome variables described above for region j at time t. Region
(γj) and year (λt) fixed effects are included throughout and control for any unobserved level
differences between regions and over time. Treatj is an indicator function equal to one in
case a region is subject to a high demand for receipts — either above the mean or above the
90th percentile of the distribution of claimed deductions. Postt is equal to one in all periods
after the introduction of the reform in 2008. The coefficient of interest β is the difference-
in-differences estimator measuring the additional change in outcome occurring in regions
with a high demand for receipts compared to the change in outcomes in regions with a low
demand for receipts. Under the assumption of parallel trends in outcomes in absence of the
reform, this parameter measures the treatment effect of the deductions policy.
Figure 3.1 depicts the trends in reported professional profit, differentiating between re-
gions with a high demand for receipts (“treatment") and regions with a low demand for
receipts (“control"). Among both groups of regions, reported professional profits increased
significantly after the introduction of the reform. The pre-reform levels of below 10 USD
reported professional profits per inhabitant living in the region lead to believe that self-
employed professionals were basically reporting none of their income before the introduc-
tion of the reform. The increase in reported profits, however, differs greatly depending on
treatment status: regions with a high demand for receipts had a much higher per-capita in-
crease in reported professional profits than regions with a low demand for receipts. The
difference is even larger in Panel (b) of Figure 3.1, in which I take treatment as the stronger
version with claimed deductions above the 90th percentile. Most importantly for my iden-
tification strategy, pre-trends seem to be very parallel (and close to zero) between the two
groups. Moreover, with the introduction of the reform, reported profits seem to jump to
sizeable levels of up to more than 100 USD per inhabitant (for regions with the largest de-
mand for receipts) and stay relatively stable over time. This apparent stable treatment effect
further motivates my use of the difference-in-differences estimator with just one coefficient
measuring the overall before/after effect.
The two following Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show trends for the two remaining outcome vari-
ables: Total per-capita self-employment income and profits of sole proprietorships. The
pre-trends of total self-employment profits are just as parallel as in the previous figure.
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Figure 3.1 – Pre-Trends Professional Profits
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This figure depicts the trends in outcomes depending on the treatment status of a given region, with
treatment being defined as demand for receipts above mean (Panel (a)) or above the 90th percentile
(Panel (b)). Observation is at the region (cantón) level. The outcome variable in this figure is aggre-
gated per-capita professional profits, defined as the sum of all professional profits reported in a given
region, divided by the number of inhabitants.
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Figure 3.2 – Pre-Trends Total Self-Employment Profits
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This figure depicts the trends in outcomes depending on the treatment status of a given region, with
treatment being defined as demand for receipts above mean (Panel (a)) or above the 90th percentile
(Panel (b)). Observation is at the region (cantón) level. The outcome variable here is aggregated
per-capita total self-employment profits, defined as the sum of all self-employment profits reported
in a given region, divided by the number of inhabitants.
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Figure 3.3 – Pre-Trends Profits Sole Proprietorships
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This figure depicts the trends in outcomes depending on the treatment status of a given region, with
treatment being defined as demand for receipts above mean (Panel (a)) or above the 90th percentile
(Panel (b)). Observation is at the region (cantón) level. The outcome variable of interest is aggregated
per-capita profits of sole proprietorships, defined as the sum of all profits of sole proprietorships
reported in a given region, divided by the number of inhabitants.
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However, since this measure includes other sources of income, the overall per-capita values
are substantially higher in Figure 3.2 than in the previous one. For this aggregated variable,
the time trend after the jump in 2008 is clearly positive, evidence for the fact that, in contrast
to the professional profits, the other variables making up overall self-employment profits are
actually increasing over time. In the last set of trends in Figure 3.3, the overall picture is
quite different. First, pre-trends do not seem very parallel between the two sets of regions.
Likewise, even at this descriptive level there is not a clear effect of the reform. This points to
the conclusion that for sole proprietorships, which are medium to large formal sector busi-
nesses, the introduction of the deduction opportunities did not seem to have a large impact
on reported profits.
These descriptive effects are confirmed in the regression results in Table 3.4. Following
the estimation framework laid out in regression equation 3.1, Panel A estimates the effect
of the reform on professional profits. The reform led to a positive and robust increase of
reported professional profits at the regional level. The effects are sizeable and statistically
significant in absolute (45 to 82 USD per capita) as well as relative terms (17% to 33%).
In Panel B, I present results for the effect on total overall per-capita self-employment profit.
These effects are large and significant in levels, but become very small an insignificant in
logs. Lastly, Panel C presents results for the per-capita profits of sole proprietorships and
finds, in line with the descriptive trends, no or even a negative effect of the reform on this
aggregated measure.
To summarize, this section provides evidence for a strong impact of the reform on re-
ported profits of self-employed individuals aggregated at the regional level. The effect is
very strong and robust for professional profits, becomes smaller for overall self-employment
profits and vanishes completely for profits by sole proprietorships. The pre-trends are re-
markably parallel in the first two cases. The very strong increases in reported profits for
professionals from about zero to substantial levels show that this reform was instrumen-
tal in getting a segment of the economy to participate and report their revenue and profits
in the formal economy. It is noteworthy that in this setting, the self-employed increased
their actual profits - in this case revenue minus costs. In the setting of corporate taxation in
Ecuador, Carrillo et al. (2017) recently showed that when faced with increased enforcement,
firms increase their reported revenue but offset this by increasing reported costs, resulting in
a null effect for the tax authority. One possible explanation for this is that while these self-
employed increased their reported profits, this does not necessarily imply paying (higher)
taxes. After their profits are calculated, self-employed, just like salaried workers, have the
same possibility to themselves make use of the extensive deduction possibilities and reduce
their tax liability. However, this setting can still be beneficial from a policy perspective as it
gets self-employed to report their profits in the first place and thereby increases paper trails
and information the tax authority can use to collect other revenue sources, also in the future.
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Table 3.4 – DD Results Aggregate Effets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Professional Profits
Per-capita Log Per-capita
Professional Profits Professional Profits
DD (mean × post) 45.21*** 0.175*
(9.884) (0.0932)
DD (p90 × post) 81.79*** 0.334**
(22.20) (0.151)
Observations 2,190 2,190 2,157 2,157
R2 0.3887 0.4222 0.8215 0.8221
Panel B: Total Self-Employment Profits
Per-capita Log Per-capita
Total Self-employment Profits Total Self-employment Profits
DD (mean × post) 129.8*** -0.0882
(27.44) (0.0703)
DD (p90 × post) 230.1*** 0.00152
(57.11) (0.0935)
Observations 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
R2 0.6309 0.6527 0.9444 0.9443
Panel C: Profits Sole Proprietorships
Per-capita Log Per-capita
Profits Sole Proprietorships Profits Sole Proprietorships
DD (mean × post) 0.429 -0.137**
(2.439) (0.0557)
DD (p90 × post) 5.069 -0.139*
(3.786) (0.0785)
Observations 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
R2 0.2636 0.2650 0.2642 0.2627
Notes: This table presents results from the difference-in-differences regression presented in equa-
tion 3.1. The level of observation is at the region (cantón) level. The outcome in Panel A, column
(1) and (2) is the sum of all professional profits reported in a given region, divided by the number
of inhabitants. Columns (3) and (4) of the same Panel report the log of this variable, that is log ag-
gregated professional profits, divided by the number of inhabitants. Panel B reports results for total
self-employment profits, including additional sources such as dividends and rental income. Panel
C depicts results with the outcome variable profits for sole proprietorships, i.e. businesses already
formalized and above certain size thresholds. In each panel, the interaction term from equation 3.1
is reported with treatment given either by the above mean or above p90 indicator function. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the cantón level, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.4.2 Individual Self-Employed Data
This section studies the responses of individual taxpayers to the increased demand for
deductions. Using the sub-sample of self-employed tax records with data on registered
professions (please refer to Section 3.3 for a detailed sample description), I replicate the
findings at the aggregate level with micro-level data while controlling for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. The additional data on registered professions allow me to exploit the
fact that the increased demand for receipts affects varying professions to different degrees.
In triple difference regressions, I show that doctors react significantly stronger to the reform
than other professionals.
The previous section documented how the demand for receipts led to increases in re-
gional aggregates of reported professional profits. However, as described in Section 3.2,
total self-employment profits also include other sources of income such as dividends, rental
income, and profits from sole proprietorships, which may be subject to considerable income
shifting among themselves. At the regional level, the results for these broader measures of
self-employment business activity were not as clear-cut. In the following analysis, I estimate
the effect of an increase in demand for receipts on individual self-employed individuals. To
circumvent any issues regarding the shifting of income between categories, I only consider
individual total self-employment profits aggregated over all income categories as the out-
come variable of interest.16
I start by replicating, at the individual level, the same difference-in-differences estimation
strategy as used in Section 3.4.1. In particular, I run the follow regression:
Yit = αi + λt + βTreati × Postt + it (3.2)
where Yit are total self-employment profits of individual i at time t. Treati is an indicator
for whether the self-employed individual i is active in a region (canton) with above average
(above 90th percentile) level of deductions, as measured by total claimed deductions per
capita. Postt is an indicator for an observation in the years after the introduction of the
reform, and β provides the difference-in-differences estimator. In this specification I control
for general time trends through λt and individual unobserved heterogeneity through the
inclusion of individual fixed effects (αi).
The results of these double difference regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 3.5.
Individual self-employed in regions with above-average demand for receipts increased their
reported self-employment profits by about 2400 USD more in the years after the reform
than individuals in areas with below average demand for receipts. This effect is statistically
highly significant and becomes even stronger (about 3700 USD) for self-employed residing
16 In robustness analyses, I find the same or stronger effects when restricting the outcome variable to purely
professional profits.
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in regions in the 90th percentile of the distribution of claimed deductions. The magnitude of
these effects becomes clear when looking at log reported business profits17 as the outcome:
The reform led to a hike in reported profits by about 30% for self-employed exposed to
above average demand for receipt and almost 50% for those in the 90th percentile of the
deductions distribution.
Table 3.5 – Effects Individual Tax Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Double Differences
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DD (mean × post) 2402.8*** 0.295***
(90.84) (0.0254)
DD (p90 × post) 3716.0*** 0.481***
(77.91) (0.0201)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549
R2 0.1178 0.1202 0.2840 0.2843
Panel B: Triple Differences
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × doc) 5268.6*** 0.978***
(293.9) (0.0935)
DDD (p90 × post × doc) 5337.9*** 0.987***
(251.9) (0.0689)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549
R2 0.1190 0.1215 0.2846 0.2850
Notes: This table depicts results using the sample of individual self-employed tax return data. Outcome
variables are total self-employment profits and log(self-employment profits + 1). Panel A depicts the
results from the interaction term in the double difference regression equation (3.1). Panel B depicts the
results for the triple interaction term in regression equation (3.3). The second treatment layer is given
by an indicator for a self-employed individual with registered profession of either medical doctor or
dentist. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
The identifying assumption for this difference-in-differences analysis is that self-employed
in areas with high demand for receipts face the same underlying trends as self-employed
in areas with low demand for receipts. One major reason why this assumption may not
17 Defined as log(self-employment profits +1) in order to account for some individuals claiming zero profits.
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hold is that the regions differ in their underlying economic trends. Positive regional eco-
nomic growth could lead to both an increase in the demand for receipts and higher true
profits of self-employed individuals. The remarkably parallel pre-trends in aggregated self-
employment profits between the different regions presented in Section 3.4.1 speak a different
language. However, self-employed in treated regions could still be affected by underlying
factors increasing their true earnings in the absence of the deductions policy. To circum-
vent these difficulties, I apply a triple difference methodology exploiting additional data
on the reported professions of individuals and the fact that only certain goods and services
can be deducted (see Section 3.2 for details). This identification strategy additionally com-
pares self-employed individuals particularly affected by the reform to self-employed not so
affected within a given region. Intuitively, this controls for changes in overall economic
trends between the regions. One subset of professions particularly affected by the reform
are doctors and dentists, since health expenses are one of the most salient deduction cate-
gories and health services have previously typically faced low levels of paper trails since
they are exempt from VAT payments (SRI, 2018).
The regression setup for the triple difference regression takes on the following form:
Yit = αi+λt+β1Treati×Postt+β2Doci×Postt+ δTreati×Postt×Doci+ it (3.3)
with Yit, αi and λt defined as before. The two differing layers of treatment are represented
by the indicator functions Treati for regions with a high demand for receipts (above mean
or above the 90th percentile) and the indicator function Doci, which takes on the value one
if an individual is either a doctor or a dentist. This setup requires the full set of interactions
between the treatment indicators and the dummy Postt and the coefficient δ measures the
triple difference estimate we are interested in. Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the results from
this regression. Doctors in regions with high demand for receipts increase their reported
profits significantly more than other professionals in the same regions, already taking into
account the general increase in reported profits due to being in a region with a high demand
for receipts. This effect of more than 5000 USD higher profits is not only large in absolute
terms, but also particularly large in relative terms: Reported profits increase by almost one
log point.
In placebo tests, I replicate the triple difference equation (3.3) for various groups of
self-employed whose services are unaffected by the deductions policy. Table 3.6 presents
the results of triple difference regressions with the second treatment layer being veterinary
physicians (Panel A) and a pooled group of further unaffected professions consisting of
economists, business administrators, and journalists (Panel B). The services of all of these
professionals do not fit into any of the five deduction categories provided by the government.
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Moreover, the latter group of professionals typically do not provide services to consumers
subject to personal income taxation. The results in Table 3.6 are clear: The triple differ-
ence estimator for these groups of unaffected professions is generally close to zero and not
statistically significant. In case of (marginal) statistical significance, the estimator is even
negative, implying that the additional effect of the reform by being a member of one of these
professions even reduces reported profits. These placebo differences, along with stable pre-
trends, lend credibility to the double and triple differences estimation strategy applied in this
paper.
Table 3.6 – Placebo Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Vet
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × vet) -1227.8 0.141
(781.7) (0.205)
DDD (p90 × post × vet) -1522.0** 0.0125
(759.4) (0.187)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549
R2 0.1178 0.1202 0.2840 0.2843
Panel B: Unaffected Professionals
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × unaffected) 447.4 0.170
(425.2) (0.119)
DDD (p90 × post × unaffected) -627.7* 0.0143
(351.1) (0.0882)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549
R2 0.1178 0.1202 0.2840 0.2844
Notes: This Table presents the results of triple difference regressions as in equation (3.3) for two sets of placebo
professional groups: Veterinary physicians (Panel A) and a further group of unaffected professionals (Panel
B) consisting of economists, business administrators and journalists. Reported coefficients correspond to the
triple interaction between being in an above mean (p90) region, belonging to the specific group of professionals
and the observations being in a time period after the introduction of the reform. Outcome variable is individual
total overall self-employment profit in columns (1)-(2) and log(self-employment profit + 1) in columns (3)-(4).
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
One further threat to identification in the triple difference setting could be shocks to
the relevant subgroup of professionals that differ according to the demand for receipts in a
given region. While it is unclear why this might be the case from economic fundamentals,
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this could happen due to a side effect of the reform: The deductions policy could increase
true demand for certain products and services, for example doctors consultations. However,
there are a number of factors speaking against this observation. First, as the deduction cat-
egories include expenses in health, housing, nutrition, clothing and education, they likely
affect almost all expenses a typical household faces. Therefore, relative prices of expen-
ditures should stay unchanged. However, there might still be an income effect. To this
end, Table C.4 in the Appendix replicates the triple difference estimator for a broader group
of health professionals including nurses, medical technicians, psychologists, pharmacists,
midwifes, physical therapists, optometrists and nutritionists (but excluding doctors and den-
tists). These professionals should also be affected from a general increase in the demand
for health services, however, their incentives in the tax system are not as clear-cut as those
faced by doctors or dentists. Many of these professionals might work in corporations, have
customers who are not final consumers paying income taxes, or be completely active in the
informal economy. The results of this triple difference estimator show that for this subgroup
of professionals in the health industry, the reform had no or even a negative effect on their
reported profits.
Having established the robustness of the presented estimates, it is still unclear whether
this overall effect is driven by self-employed switching from the informal to the formal sec-
tor or by self-employed increasing the intensity of their (reported) formal sector business
activities. One way to look at this is to focus on the subset of firms that were economi-
cally active before the introduction of the reform. In the Appendix, Table C.2 replicates
the results for the subset of self-employed already filing tax declarations before the reform
and throughout the whole sample period. The results are very similar and if anything, the
magnitude of the effects is larger. This shows that increases in the intensive margin are an
important driver of the observed overall effects of the reform.18
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes an innovative reform drawn up to improve tax compliance and in-
crease participation in the formal economy. The target population is mostly self-employed
business owners operating outside of the VAT system. Formalization is achieved by incen-
tivizing individual taxpayers to ask for receipts, which they can use to reduce their personal
income tax liability. Due to a relatively high threshold for personal income tax liability in
Ecuador, only a small portion of the population is affected by these incentives and these
individuals are distributed unevenly between regions. Exploiting this regional heterogeneity
in the density of high income individuals allows to estimate the effect of the reform using
18 The placebo tests also look very similar for this subset of balanced observations (see Table C.3 in the
Appendix).
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a difference-in-differences framework comparing regions with a high demand for receipts
to regions with a low demand for receipts. Merging the individual tax return records of
self-employed business owners with their reported professions from the civil registry pro-
vides an additional layer of variation arising from the fact that the deductions are limited to
certain categories such as health expenditures. This additional heterogeneity allows to esti-
mate a triple-difference regression which, on top of controlling for level differences between
regions, additionally controls for potential time-changing shocks affecting regions differen-
tially according to their demand for receipts. In both double and triple difference regres-
sions, I find very strong effects on reported business profits by self-employed individuals,
especially in a subcategory measuring profits by professional service providers particularly
affected by the reform.
The policy implications of the findings are very clear: This reform proved to be an effec-
tive measure in driving formalization of a sector of the economy previously mostly eluding
government control due to lacking third party reports or paper trails of transactions. In fact,
the reform led a sector of the economy previously almost completely operating in the infor-
mal sector to become formalized. It needs to be pointed out that while these findings are
from a developing country context, reported business activities of self-employed individuals
is an area also subject to high amounts of tax avoidance and evasion in many developed
countries.
Yet while this reform was very successful in formalizing self-employed business activi-
ties, I cannot make statements about the cost-effectiveness of this reform. The reform addi-
tionally has strong spillover effects for the VAT system, mostly due to the fact that affected
businesses are also likely to remit more VAT. However, this paper focuses on the effects on
reported self-employed business activities and a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis (fore-
gone PIT vs revenue increases due to formalization) would additionally need to take into
account the spillover effects on VAT revenue. Moreover, the effects in this paper are overall
effects driven by both the intensive margin (already formalized businesses reporting more
revenue) and the extensive margin (new businesses joining the set of formal businesses).
While this paper provides evidence that the intensive margin is an important component of
this overall effect,19 future work could go into the direction of better disentangling these two
effects.
19 Tables C.2 and C.3 provide evidence for this effect among a subsample of firms with completely balanced
observations, that is firms which were already formalized before the reform and continue to operate after the
reform.
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Table A.1 – Effect of Moneybox on Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings Log(Savings) Savings Wide Log(Savings Wide)
Person received a moneybox 117.643* 1.755*** 226.708 0.599***
(61.370) (0.191) (224.239) (0.153)
N 881 881 881 881
Mean Control Group 527.596 3.587 2861.914 6.508
Note: This table reports results from an OLS regression comparing individuals who received
a moneybox to those who did not receive a moneybox. Savings measures cash plus money
held in the moneybox (0 for respondents without moneybox), Savings Wide gives the sum of
our previous savings narrow indicator plus savings in bank, Iddir (funeral society) and Equb
(informal savings club). All variables are winsorized at the 95% percentile. Control variables
include all baseline variables used during randomization (savings in cash, bank and informal
arrangements, socio-demographics, land and consumption variables) as well as enumerator
indicators and our measure of financial literacy. The last row gives the mean value of the
outcome variable in the control group (no moneybox). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2 – Alternative Mechanisms
Panel A: Recommendations and Expected Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Recommendation Financial Recommendation × Problems
Control Group Literacy Problems
Savings 496.009 211.147* -12.491 -39.020 -40.156
(124.178) (76.610) (160.883) (141.636)
Panel B: Recommendations and Financial Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Recommendation Financial Recommendation ×
Control Group Literacy Financial Literacy
Savings 496.009 150.271 -52.161 56.946
(107.137) (146.091) (158.793)
Panel C: Recommendations and Present-Biasedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Recommendation Financial Recommendation × Present-Biased
Control Group Literacy Present-Biasedness
Savings 496.009 245.207** -5.671 -216.725 147.703
(97.593) (76.619) (176.381) (157.771)
Panel D: Recommendations and Risk-Lovingness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Recommendation Financial Recommendation × Risk-loving
Control Group Literacy Risk-loving
Savings 496.009 168.343 -6.832 27.819 1.683
(112.288) (76.997) (163.991) (141.168)
Note: N=599. The dependent variable Savings is calculated as the value of cash savings the household
head carries at the time of the interview plus savings in the moneybox. Column (1) refers to average
savings in the control group (no recommendation). Columns (2) through (5) give the coefficients for re-
ceiving a recommendation, being financially literate and a range of alternative mechanisms as well as their
interactions with recommendation. Further control variables include all variables used for stratification at
baseline plus enumerator controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
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Table A.3 – Alternative Savings Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank Savings Equb Iddir Savings Wide
Recommendation 50.238 -40.957 13.746 180.118
(157.002) (221.486) (26.793) (319.324)
Bank savings baseline 0.793***
(0.128)
Equb baseline 0.619***
(0.170)
Iddir baseline 0.008
(0.042)
Savings wide baseline 0.530***
(0.069)
Cash savings baseline 0.004 0.040** 0.001 -0.017
(0.014) (0.020) (0.002) (0.033)
Bank savings baseline 0.012 -0.049** 0.001 0.006
(0.019) (0.023) (0.003) (0.037)
Iddir member baseline -131.006 -521.967*** 31.356 -790.720**
(148.064) (201.869) (32.617) (312.881)
Eqqub member baseline 112.983 452.568 -0.492 373.047
(156.867) (306.414) (27.122) (387.682)
Female household head 193.417 308.512 -6.078 537.178
(226.224) (321.876) (35.926) (442.044)
Married household head 2.734 504.476* -16.094 647.517*
(205.511) (272.963) (34.768) (391.651)
Education household head 40.809** 23.758 4.106 43.424
(19.945) (26.692) (3.358) (39.499)
Land size baseline -18.385** -1.105 0.360 -33.688
(9.315) (23.012) (2.128) (27.495)
Revenue baseline 0.010* 0.015*** 0.000 0.026***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.009)
Debt baseline 0.017 -0.013 -0.002 0.016
(0.019) (0.023) (0.003) (0.034)
Consumption expenditure baseline 0.016 0.129 0.024* 0.177
(0.072) (0.147) (0.014) (0.182)
Financial literacy 61.484 7.299 -19.288 -55.359
(158.480) (207.573) (24.363) (296.418)
N 599 599 599 599
Mean 1188.416 1172.650 136.778 2993.852
Note: Bank savings is the self-reported current balance of an individual’s savings accounts
(column (1)). Equb gives the amount of money people currently hold with Equb, an informal
savings arrangement (column (2)). Iddir is the amount of money that a person would receive
from the funeral society Iddir in case of death (column (3)). Savings wide gives is the sum
of our previous savings narrow indicator + bank savings + Equb + Iddir (column (4)). All
variables are winsorized at the 95% percentile. The respective baseline variables are the average
value between baseline and treatment implementation. The last row gives the mean value of
the outcome variable in the control group (no recommendation). Robust standard errors in
parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B.1 Institutional Details
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Figure B.1 – Tax Declaration Form F107 for Wage Earners
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3.- La deducción total por gastos personales no deberá superar el 50% del total de ingresos gravados, y en ningún caso será mayor al equivalente a 1.3 veces la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a 
la Renta de personas naturales.
4.- A partir del año 2011 debe considerarse como cuantía máxima para cada tipo de gasto, el monto equivalente a la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta en:
vivienda 0.325 veces, educación 0.325 veces, alimentación 0.325 veces, vestimenta 0.325, salud 1.3 veces.
6.- De conformidad con la Resolución No. NAC-DGER2008-0566 publicada en el Registro Oficial No. 342 el 21 de mayo del 2008, el beneficio de la exoneración por tercera edad se configura a partir
del ejercicio en el cual el beneficiario cumpla los 65 años de edad. El monto de la exoneración será el equivalente al doble de la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta.
7.- A partir del año 2013, conforme lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica de Discapacidades el monto de la exoneración por discapacidad será el equivalente al doble de la fracción básica exenta de
Impuesto a la Renta.
1.- El trabajador que, en el mismo período fiscal haya reiniciado su actividad con otro empleador, estará en la obligación de entregar el formulario 107 entregado por su anterior empleador a su nuevo
empleador, para que aquel, efectúe el cálculo de las retenciones a realizarse en lo que resta del año.
DECLARO QUE LOS DATOS PROPORCIONADOS EN ESTE DOCUMENTO SON EXACTOS Y VERDADEROS, POR LO QUE ASUMO LA RESPONSABILIDAD LEGAL QUE DE ELLA SE 
DERIVEN (Art. 101 de la L.R.T.I.)
8.- El presente formulario constituye la declaración de Impuesto a la Renta del trabajador, siempre que durante el período declarado la persona únicamente haya prestado sus servicios en relación de
dependencia con el empleador que entrega este formulario, y no existan valores de gastos personales que deban ser reliquidados. En caso de pérdida de este documento el trabajador deberá solicitar
una copia a su empleador.
Por el contrario, el trabajador deberá presentar obligatoriamente su declaración de Impuesto a la Renta cuando haya obtenido rentas en relación de dependencia con dos o más empleadores o haya
recibido además de su remuneración ingresos de otras fuentes como por ejemplo: rendimientos financieros, arrendamientos, ingresos por el libre ejercicio profesional, u otros ingresos, los cuales en
conjunto superen la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta de personas naturales, o cuando tenga que reliquidar gastos personales con aquellos efectivamente incurridos, teniendo presente los
límites referidos en las notas 3 y 4 de este documento.
5.- El trabajador deberá presentar el Anexo de Gastos Personales que deduzca, de cumplir las condiciones establecidas por el Servicio de Rentas Internas.
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO ASUMIDO POR ESTE EMPLEADOR                                                     
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO RETENIDO AL TRABAJADOR POR ESTE EMPLEADOR
INGRESOS GRAVADOS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (informativo)                                                                                                  
301+303+305+381
IMPORTANTE: Sírvase leer cada una de las siguientes instrucciones.
2.- El campo 307 deberá ser llenado con la información registrada en el campo 349 del Formulario 107 entregado por el anterior empleador, y/o con la proyección de ingresos de otros empleadores
actuales, en caso de que el empleador que registra y entrega el presente formulario haya efectuado la retención por los ingresos percibidos con éstos últimos.
BASE IMPONIBLE GRAVADA
301+303+305+307-351-353-361-363-365-367-369-371-373+381 ≥ 0 
IMPUESTO A LA RENTA CAUSADO                                                                                           
VALOR DEL IMPUESTO RETENIDO Y ASUMIDO POR OTROS EMPLEADORES DURANTE EL PERÍODO 
DECLARADO
(-) EXONERACIÓN POR DISCAPACIDAD
(-) EXONERACIÓN POR TERCERA EDAD
IMPUESTO A LA RENTA ASUMIDO POR ESTE EMPLEADOR
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - EDUCACIÓN
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - ALIMENTACIÓN
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - VESTIMENTA
(-) APORTE PERSONAL IESS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES (únicamente pagado por el trabajador)
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - VIVIENDA
(-) DEDUCCIÓN GASTOS PERSONALES - SALUD
FONDO DE RESERVA
OTROS INGRESOS EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA QUE NO CONSTITUYEN RENTA GRAVADA 
(-) APORTE PERSONAL IESS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (únicamente pagado por el trabajador)
INGRESOS GRAVADOS GENERADOS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES
DÉCIMO TERCER SUELDO
DÉCIMO CUARTO SUELDO
Liquidación del Impuesto
SUELDOS Y SALARIOS
SOBRESUELDOS, COMISIONES, BONOS Y OTROS INGRESOS GRAVADOS
PARTICIPACIÓN UTILIDADES
200 Identificación del Trabajador (Contribuyente)
201
CÉDULA O PASAPORTE
202
APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
100 Identificación del Empleador (Agente de Retención)
105
 RUC
106
 RAZÓN SOCIAL O APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
FECHA DE ENTREGA 103
AÑO MES DIA
COMPROBANTE DE RETENCIONES EN LA FUENTE DEL IMPUESTO A LA RENTA 
POR INGRESOS DEL TRABAJO EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA 
   No.
FORMULARIO 107
RESOLUCIÓN No. NAC-DGERCGC12-00829 EJERCICIO FISCAL 102
105
Figure B.2 – Tax Declaration Form for Projecting Decuctions
103
104
105 10800 0,325 3510
10800 1,3 14040
106
107
108
109
110
111
1 7 6 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 1
02
QUITO
USD$
Información / Identificación del empleado contribuyente (a ser llenado por el empleado)
(=) TOTAL INGRESOS PROYECTADOS
GASTOS PROYECTADOS
(+) GASTOS DE VIVIENDA
101
CEDULA O PASAPORTE
102
APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
DECLARACIÓN DE GASTOS PERSONALES A SER UTILIZADOS POR EL EMPLEADOR EN EL 
CASO DE INGRESOS EN RELACION DE DEPENDENCIA 
FORMULARIO SRI-GP
EJERCICIO FISCAL
CIUDAD Y FECHA DE 
ENTREGA/RECEPCION
CIUDAD AÑO MES DIA
51
USD$
USD$
USD$
INGRESOS GRAVADOS PROYECTADOS (sin decimotercera y decimocuarta remuneración) (ver Nota 1)
(+) TOTAL INGRESOS GRAVADOS CON ESTE EMPLEADOR (con el empleador que más ingresos perciba)
(+) TOTAL INGRESOS CON OTROS EMPLEADORES (en caso de haberlos)
USD$
USD$
USD$
USD$
Firmas 
EMPLEADOR / AGENTE DE RETENCION EMPLEADO CONTRIBUYENTE
(+) GASTOS DE EDUCACION
(+) GASTOS DE SALUD USD$
 Identificación del Agente de Retención (a ser llenado por el empleador)
(=) TOTAL GASTOS PROYECTADOS (ver Nota 2)
(+) GASTOS DE VESTIMENTA
(+) GASTOS DE ALIMENTACION
FIRMA DEL SERVIDOR
112
 RUC
113
 RAZON SOCIAL, DENOMINACION O APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS
SERVICIO DE RENTAS INTERNAS
NOTAS: 
1.- Cuando un contribuyente trabaje con DOS O MÁS empleadores, presentará este informe al empleador con el que perciba mayores in gresos, el que efectuará la retención considerando los ingresos gravados y 
deducciones (aportes personales al IESS) con todos los empleadores.  Una copia certificada, con la respectiva firma y sello del empleador, será presentada a los demás empleadores para que se abstengan de 
efectuar retenciones sobre los pagos efectuados por concepto de remuneración del trabajo en relación de dependencia. 
2. La deducción total por gastos personales no podrá superar el 50% del total de sus ingresos gravados (casillero 105), y en ningún caso  será mayor al equivalente a 1.3 veces la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto 
a la Renta de personas naturales. A partir del año 2011 debe considerarse como cuantía máxima para cada tipo de gasto, el monto equivalente a la fracción básica exenta de Impuesto a la Renta en: vivienda 0.325 
veces, educación 0.325  veces, alimentación 0.325 veces, vestimenta 0.325, salud 1.3 veces.
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B.2 Subgroup Analyses
Further evidence for the fact that bunching is driven by reporting behavior can be found
in Figure B.3. Individuals who do not file deductions for personal expenses do not display
high levels of bunching (Figure B.3a). In contrast, individuals who file deductions (Figure
B.3b) form a substantial excess mass to the left of the exemption threshold. The estimate
here is extremely high (ten times as many individuals) and significant. Moreover, when
only looking at gross income pooled in our sample period, our estimate of the bunching
estimator is extremely small and insignificant (Figure B.5). Summing up, we find that in
line with large parts of the literature, the reactions to tax incentives are mostly driven by
reporting behavior rather than real labor supply responses. Furthermore, deductions for
personal expenses are the primary tool used to avoid taxes.
In the job switcher analysis in Section 2.4.1, the asymmetry of the response is further
emphasized by the evidence in Figure B.4. The left panel shows bunching shares among
workers who start from a firm in the lower quintile of the bunching distribution while the
right panel refers to movers who start in the upper quintile. Among workers starting in the
lower bunching quintile we see very similar patterns as before: individuals who move to the
high quintile experience strong and sustained increases in bunching, whereas individuals
moving to the low or mid quintile exhibit much smaller increases. Considering workers
starting in the high bunching quintile we see some small additional increases among those
going back to the high quintile, whereas taxpayers moving to the mid or low quintile have a
temporary decrease in their probability to adjust their taxable income.
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Figure B.3 – The impact of filing deductions
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Figure B.4 – Event Study Job Switchers
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Figure B.5 – Bunching Estimates Gross Income
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Figure B.6 – Peer Learning Event Study - Firm Size
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B.3 Robustness Checks: Outcomes
In this section, we perform the entire analyses of the main part for two different measures
of tax avoidance. Our base measure of tax avoidance, bunching at the first kink in the tax
schedule, is subject to an ad hoc choice of the bunching window around the kink (in our
choice $1000 to the left of the kink). To check robustness with respect to this measure, we
perform the different analyses using a more general indicator for avoiding tax payments that
turns on if taxable income is below the first kink while gross income is above the first kink.
Our second robustness check employs an even more general measure of tax avoidance,
the filing of deductions. Hence, we perform the analysis using an indicator whether an
individual files any deduction.
B.3.1 Taxable Income below Kink
111
Table B.2 – Bunching Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience exper 0.0086 0.055 0.082 0.089 0.031 0.029 0.028
(.) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.011)
Experience2 -0.0053 -0.012 -0.014 -0.0042 -0.0037 0.0014
(0.00027) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0025)
Experience3 0.00050 0.00061 0.00010 0.000070 -0.00023
(0.000097) (0.000091) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00016)
Married 0.015 0.012 0.010
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0034)
Age 0.0073 0.0030 0.0039
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0015)
Age2 -0.000084 -0.000040 -0.000050
(0.000014) (0.000022) (0.000015)
Female 0.020 0.024 0.016
(0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0052)
Secondary Education 0.087 0.071 0.047
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Tertiary Education 0.11 0.080 0.053
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Foreign 0.0028 -0.011 -0.016
(0.0065) (0.0081) (0.0074)
Number of Jobs -0.091 -0.094 -0.092 -0.074
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0023)
Log Gross Income 0.084 0.085 0.11
(0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0072)
Gross Income Growth -0.0094 -0.0096 -0.019
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0050)
Corporate Firm 0.0016 0.017
(0.0065) (0.0046)
Firm Age 0.000022 -0.00015
(0.00041) (0.00012)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.067 0.071 0.071 0.093 0.089 0.095 0.423
Observations 618,356 618,356 618,356 618,356 508,417 508,417 508,417
The table shows results from linear regressions with a binary indicator for taxable income below
the first kink (while gross income above the first kink) as dependent variable. The sample is
restricted to potential bunchers in 2008 to 2015. Further (unreported) control variables include
firmsize, firm age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.
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B
.4
–
Job
Sw
itchers
M
id
to
L
ow
M
id
to
H
igh
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
FullSam
ple
M
atching
D
isplaced
FullSam
ple
M
atching
D
isplaced
A
.O
verallE
ffect
A
ftereventyear
-0.007
-0.004
-0.004
-0.023
0.110
0.104
0.094
0.101
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.012)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.018)
B
.E
ffectsby
R
elative
Year
A
nticipatory
E
ffects
E
ventyear-3
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.005
-0.012
-0.012
-0.021
-0.008
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.016)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.012)
(0.015)
E
ventyear-2
0.000
-0.001
0.001
0.013
-0.007
-0.006
-0.014
-0.002
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.010)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.010)
PostTreatm
entE
ffects
E
ventyear
-0.007
-0.005
-0.004
-0.008
0.047
0.044
0.034
0.042
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.013)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.014)
E
ventyear+
1
-0.008
-0.005
-0.003
-0.026
0.119
0.113
0.096
0.131
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.013)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.023)
E
ventyear+
2
-0.001
0.001
-0.002
-0.020
0.187
0.179
0.161
0.143
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.018)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.034)
C
ontrols
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
70,292
70,292
68,988
8,084
59,294
59,294
47,089
8,278
C
.Tim
ing
E
ventyear-2
0.005
-0.002
-0.005
0.006
0.001
-0.091
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.015)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.028)
E
ventyear
-0.000
0.005
0.001
0.026
0.022
0.120
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.017)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.025)
E
ventyear+
1
0.015
0.016
0.017
0.071
0.059
0.281
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.027)
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.047)
C
ontrols
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
25,048
25,048
1,499
23,947
23,947
1,559
T
he
panels
ofthis
table
denote
the
results
from
regression
equations
(2.1),(2.2)and
(2.3)respectively
w
ith
an
indicatorfortaxable
incom
e
below
the
firstkink
(and
gross
incom
e
above
the
firstkink).
Standard
errors
(in
parentheses)
are
clustered
atthe
destination
firm
by
year
level.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.5 – Extensive Margin of Firms with Taxable Income below Kink over
time by cohort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Obs
Cohort
2008 0.33 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.81 489
2008 (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39)
2009 0.43 0.54 0.59 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.83 528
2009 (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46) (0.42) (0.40) (0.38)
2010 0.38 0.51 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.79 555
2010 (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
2011 0.44 0.61 0.69 0.73 0.76 1100
2011 (0.50) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43)
2012 0.50 0.65 0.71 0.74 1657
2012 (0.50) (0.48) (0.45) (0.44)
2013 0.58 0.68 0.72 2203
2013 (0.49) (0.47) (0.45)
2014 0.56 0.66 3280
2014 (0.50) (0.47)
2015 0.55 4847
2015 (0.50)
Note: Share of firms in given cohort with at least one employee with taxable income
below and gross income above the kink. Cohorts conditioned on the firm’s year of
entry into the formal sector. Further conditioned on employing potential bunchers in
all subsequent years. Standard deviations given in parentheses.
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Table B.6 – Intensive Margin of Firms with Taxable Income below Kink over time by firm
cohort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cohort
2008 Share 0.39 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.62
2008 SD (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
2008 Obs 36 83 104 130 173 201 219 208
2009 Share 0.49 0.57 0.48 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57
2009 SD (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26)
2009 Obs 41 79 113 134 159 181 179
2010 Share 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.64
2010 SD (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) )0.27) (0.26) (0.25)
2010 Obs 30 77 101 140 159 160
2011 Share 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.62
2011 SD (0.31) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
2011 Obs 55 122 189 237 242
2012 Share 0.53 0.54 0.58 0.59
2012 SD (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28)
2012 Obs 77 158 247 266
2013 Share 0.57 0.57 0.62
2013 SD (0.28) (0.29) (0.26)
2013 Obs 94 207 240
2014 Share 0.54 0.62
2014 SD (0.29) (0.27)
2014 Obs 133 200
2015 Share 0.61
2015 SD (0.28)
2015 Obs 96
Note: Average share of employees with taxable income below and gross income above the kink
among those with gross income in a range where it is possible to reduce taxable income below
the kink. Average values for the subset of firms with at least one employee with taxable income
below but gross income above the kink. Cohorts conditioned on year of entry into formal sector
and having potential bunchers in all subsequent years. Further conditioned on firms employing
at least 5 potential bunchers in given year. The number of observations varies between year
of observation since the conditioning on having at least 5 potential bunchers leads to a yearly
changing composition of the cohort. Standard deviations given in parentheses.
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B
.8
–
Inform
ation
Transm
ission:Intensive
M
argin
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Incom
ing
B
elow
K
ink
-0.023
-0.013
-0.022
-0.013
-0.012
-0.011
-0.014
-0.011
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.019)
Incom
ing
B
elow
K
ink
above
p90
-0.018
-0.012
-0.019
-0.0015
0.00071
-0.0015
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Incom
ing
B
elow
K
ink
betw
een
p50
and
p90
0.015
0.0070
(0.016)
(0.024)
K
now
ledgeable
A
ccountant
0.0080
0.0090
-0.0031
-0.0030
(0.0089)
(0.0089)
(0.011)
(0.011)
A
vg.A
ge
-0.00033
-0.00036
-0.00036
-0.00013
-0.00030
0.0038
0.0038
0.0039
0.0039
0.0039
(0.0017)
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
Share
Fem
ale
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.043
0.041
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(0.030)
(0.030)
(0.030)
(0.030)
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(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.024)
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ore
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ployees
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.18
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-0.063
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(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
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anufacturing
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(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
C
onstruction
0.0078
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0.0074
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(0.026)
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fixed
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errors
clustered
atfirm
level.
118
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.9 – Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.02 36.36 0.48 -0.31
(6.03) (6.14) (0.24) (0.30)
Share Married 0.52 0.52 0.01 0.00
(0.24) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Female 0.37 0.39 0.03 -0.03
(0.27) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Tertiary Education 0.32 0.34 0.02 0.01
(0.26) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 50.74 50.82 0.10 -2.73
(120.13) (96.22) (4.84) (6.30)
Corporate Firm 0.85 0.87 0.03 -0.00
(0.36) (0.34) (0.01) (0.02)
Avg Gross Income 6903.01 7528.15 888.66 252.44
(4052.51) (4359.96) (162.46) (209.82)
Avg Taxable Income 6231.00 6658.35 607.49 148.79
(3177.46) (3310.22) (127.53) (160.47)
Share with Avoiders 0.33 0.39 0.09 0.05
(0.47) (0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 7761.76 8193.82 614.19 178.71
(3949.91) (4171.53) (158.74) (198.53)
Avg Taxable Income 6925.06 7135.82 299.60 45.20
(3073.59) (3062.69) (123.71) (149.11)
Share with Avoiders 0.41 0.49 0.12 0.07
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 2,954 876
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the peer learning channel. The sample consists of all firms receiving one incoming
employee between 2010 and 2014 and for which it is possible to observe at least two consec-
utive years before and after the event. Treated refers to firms receiving incoming avoiders
with taxable income below but gross income above the kink prior to joining their new firm.
Column (3) displays the difference between treated and control and column (4) this same dif-
ference for the matched sample. Matching was done on average age, share married, female
and tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate status of firm and average gross income pre and post
event. Pre-event refers to the year before the arrival of new co-workers and post-event to the
first year after the arrival of the new coworkers.
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Table B.10 – Peer Learning - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.036 0.033 0.035
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 0.023 0.025 0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.052 0.049 0.051
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Event year + 1 0.040 0.038 0.040
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027)
Event year + 2 0.038 0.038 0.060
(0.028) (0.027) (0.037)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 15,913 15,913 9,418
Notes: The table reports results from the event-study regression equa-
tion (2.5) at the firm level. Outcome variable is the leave-out firm avoid-
ance decision and event year refers to the year of incoming employees.
Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as the base category. Firm and
year fixed effects are included throughout. Columns (1) and (2) refer
to the full sample, and column (3) uses matching on observables. We
control for average gross income, average age, share married, share fe-
male, share tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate status of firm, as well
as industry and province dummies and dummies for the year of the in-
coming event. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm
level.
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Table B.11 – Experts Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.00 36.07 -0.03 0.06
(7.40) (7.29) (0.15) (0.18)
Share Married 0.47 0.47 -0.00 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Female 0.41 0.41 0.00 -0.00
(0.30) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Tertiary Education 0.28 0.28 -0.00 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 43.99 49.11 7.87 -2.07
(178.40) (224.39) (3.63) (5.25)
Avg Gross Income 5217.38 5801.08 783.54 29.86
(4529.22) (4891.55) (92.75) (122.52)
Avg Taxable Income 4766.13 5215.96 597.02 -12.16
(3671.01) (3929.51) (75.36) (98.88)
Share with below 0.21 0.26 0.07 0.02
(0.41) (0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 5227.81 5882.51 907.73 176.91
(4668.04) (5166.17) (84.52) (120.25)
Avg Taxable Income 4770.90 5267.86 691.88 127.25
(3837.20) (4128.78) (69.57) (95.53)
Share with below 0.21 0.27 0.09 0.03
(0.41) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16,389 4,201
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the experts channel. The sample is based on the universe of accountant switches
between 2010 and 2014 for which it is possible to observe at least two consecutive years be-
fore and after the event and the firms employ potential bunchers throughout. Cases in which
firms simultaneously received knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable accountants were ex-
cluded. Treated refers to firms receiving new accountants previously working at a firm in
which employees were avoiding paying taxes by having taxable income below but gross
income above the kink. Columns (3) displays the difference to a control group consisting
of firms receiving an accountant previously working at a firm with potential bunchers but
with zero tax avoiders. Column (4) displays the difference to the matched sample. Matching
was done on average age, share married, female and tertiary educated, firmsize, and average
gross income pre and post event. Pre-event refers to the year before the arrival of the new
accountants and post-event to the first year after the arrival of the new accountants.
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Table B.12 – Experts Event Study - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.119 0.015 0.014
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 -0.013 -0.000 -0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.078 0.014 0.008
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016)
Event year + 1 0.133 0.015 0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016)
Event year + 2 0.172 0.017 0.023
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 60,483 60,483 28,243
Notes: The table reports results from the event study regressions quanti-
fying the experts channel detailed in Section (2.4.2). Outcome variable
is the firm avoiding decision and event year refers to the year of the
incoming accountant. Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as the base
category. Firm and year fixed effects are included throughout. Columns
(1) and (2) refer to the full sample, and column (3) uses matching on
observables. We control for average gross income, average age, share
married, share female, share tertiary educated, firmsize, as well as in-
dustry and province dummies and dummies for the year of the accoun-
tant switch. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm
level.
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Figure B.7 – Coefficients on experience dummies
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This figure depicts estimated coefficients from a linear regression of an avoiding indicator on dummy
variables for each year of experience in the formal sector. We control for individual fixed effects,
income dynamics and a broad range of firm characteristics.
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Figure B.8 – Event Study Job Switchers
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This figure shows an event study with avoiding shares of job switchers around the time of the job
transition. The vertical line indicates the time of the transition. We observe avoiding among individ-
uals who come from a firm in the medium quintile of the distribution of co-worker bunching shares
and differentiate between those who switch to a firm in the bottom, medium, and top quintile.
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Figure B.9 – Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers
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This figure shows an event study with avoiding shares of job switchers around the time of the job
transition in the subsample of workers who exogenously loose their job due to a firm closure.
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Figure B.10 – Peer Learning Event Study
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This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the share of firms employing avoiders around
the hiring of a new co-worker (leaving out the new worker from the calculation). The vertical line
denotes the arrival of the new worker. The treatment group is formed by firms that receive a new
co-worker who was avoiding in her previous firm while the control group is formed by firms with
a new co-worker who was not avoiding (despite being a potential avoider with gross income in the
range above the kink).
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Figure B.11 – Experts Event Study
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This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the average share of avoiders around the entry
of a new accountant into the firm. The vertical line denotes the arrival of the new accountant. The
treatment group is formed by firms that receive an accountant who was previously working for a firm
with avoiders while the control group is formed by firms with a new accountant who was working
for a firm without any avoiders.
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B.3.2 Filing Deductions
Table B.13 – Bunching Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0.029 0.10 0.15 0.16 -0.099 -0.10 -0.022
(0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.011) (0.0097) (0.0089)
Experience2 -0.0084 -0.021 -0.023 0.020 0.020 0.014
(0.00036) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Experience3 0.00092 0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.00093
(0.000093) (0.000094) (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00012)
Married 0.025 0.012 0.010
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0036)
Age 0.016 -0.0028 -0.0012
(0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0020)
Age2 -0.00019 0.0000039 -0.000010
(0.000022) (0.000030) (0.000021)
Female 0.0077 0.018 0.014
(0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0067)
Secondary Education 0.18 0.10 0.075
(0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Tertiary Education 0.26 0.15 0.12
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Foreign 0.061 0.021 0.018
(0.0090) (0.0087) (0.0080)
Number of Jobs -0.11 -0.093 -0.092 -0.080
(0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0049) (0.0026)
Log Gross Income 0.33 0.33 0.25
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Gross Income Growth -0.075 -0.075 -0.053
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0026)
Corporate Firm 0.014 0.016
(0.0081) (0.0057)
Firm Age -0.000046 -0.000013
(0.00061) (0.00017)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.138 0.145 0.145 0.180 0.305 0.312 0.606
Observations 618,356 618,356 618,356 618,356 508,417 508,417 508,417
The table shows results from linear regressions with a binary indicator for filing any deductions
as dependent variable. The sample is restricted to potential bunchers in 2008 to 2015. Further
(unreported) control variables include firmsize, firm age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the firm level.
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C
ontrols
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
25,048
25,048
2,028
23,947
23,947
1,855
T
he
panels
of
this
table
denote
the
results
from
regression
equations
(2.1),
(2.2)
and
(2.3)
respectively
w
ith
an
indicator
for
filing
any
deductions.Standard
errors
(in
parentheses)are
clustered
atthe
destination
firm
by
yearlevel.
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Table B.16 – Extensive Margin of Firms with Deduction Filers over time by co-
hort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Obs
Cohort
2008 0.45 0.63 0.72 0.75 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.92 645
2008 (0.50) (0.48) (0.45) (0.43) (0.35) (0.32) (0.30) (0.27)
2009 0.57 0.70 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.91 699
2009 (0.50) (0.46) (0.43) (0.38) (0.33) (0.31) (0.28)
2010 0.54 0.67 0.78 0.86 0.89 0.90 775
2010 (0.50) (0.47) (0.41) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29)
2011 0.55 0.75 0.84 0.87 0.88 1425
2011 (0.50) (0.44) (0.37) (0.34) (0.32)
2012 0.65 0.81 0.86 0.86 2105
2012 (0.48) (0.39) (0.34) (0.35)
2013 0.71 0.82 0.83 2724
2013 (0.45) (0.38) (0.37)
2014 0.72 0.80 3802
2014 (0.45) (0.40)
2015 0.68 4996
2015 (0.47)
Note: Share of firms in given cohort with at least one employee filing deductions.
Cohorts conditioned on the firm’s year of entry into the formal sector and having
employees with gross income above the kink in all subsequent years. Standard devi-
ations given in parentheses.
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Table B.17 – Intensive Margin of Firms with Deduction Filers over time by firm cohort
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cohort
2008 Share 0.60 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.81
2008 SD (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22)
2008 Obs 64 129 174 220 258 301 324 327
2009 Share 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.82
2009 SD (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22)
2009 Obs 56 110 167 186 227 259 252
2010 Share 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.84
2010 SD (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21)
2010 Obs 48 126 172 221 271 266
2011 Share 0.68 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.82
2011 SD (0.30) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
2011 Obs 96 198 291 369 391
2012 Share 0.72 0.77 0.80 0.82
2012 SD (0.28) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
2012 Obs 141 288 394 410
2013 Share 0.75 0.78 0.82
2013 SD (0.27) (0.25) (0.22)
2013 Obs 165 343 376
2014 Share 0.71 0.81
2014 SD (0.28) (0.25)
2014 Obs 206 332
2015 Share 0.79
2015 SD (0.23)
2015 Obs 158
Note: Average share of employees filing deductions among those with gross income above the
kink. Values for given cohort, conditional on firm having at least one employee filing deductions.
Cohorts conditioned on year of entry into formal sector and having employees with gross income
above the kink in all subsequent years. Further conditioned on firms employing at least 5 workers
with gross income above the kink in given year. The number of observations varies between year
of observation since the conditioning on having at least 5 workers with gross income above
the kink leads to a yearly changing composition of the cohort. Standard deviations given in
parentheses.
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Table
B
.19
–
Inform
ation
Transm
ission:Intensive
M
argin
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Incom
ing
D
educter
0.018
0.0075
-0.024
0.0075
-0.035
-0.020
-0.050
-0.020
(0.026)
(0.030)
(0.037)
(0.030)
(0.040)
(0.042)
(0.050)
(0.042)
Incom
ing
D
educterabove
p90
0.020
0.039
0.020
-0.033
-0.012
-0.033
(0.038)
(0.039)
(0.038)
(0.067)
(0.070)
(0.067)
Incom
ing
D
educterbetw
een
p50
and
p90
0.056
0.070
(0.039)
(0.060)
K
now
ledgeable
A
ccountant
-0.0052
-0.0060
0.0085
0.0084
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.027)
(0.027)
A
vg.A
ge
-0.015
-0.015
-0.015
-0.015
-0.015
-0.014
-0.014
-0.014
-0.014
-0.014
(0.0034)
(0.0034)
(0.0034)
(0.0035)
(0.0034)
(0.0089)
(0.0090)
(0.0090)
(0.0089)
(0.0090)
Share
Fem
ale
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.022
0.019
0.023
0.028
0.018
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.19)
B
etw
een
25
and
250
E
m
ployees
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.30
0.29
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
M
ore
than
250
E
m
ployees
0.30
0.30
0.29
0.31
0.30
0.26
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.26
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.049)
(0.050)
(0.073)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.071)
(0.072)
M
anufacturing
0.012
0.011
0.012
0.012
0.011
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.072)
C
onstruction
-0.077
-0.076
-0.078
-0.077
-0.076
(0.071)
(0.071)
(0.071)
(0.071)
(0.071)
Trade;R
epairing
-0.032
-0.032
-0.035
-0.033
-0.032
(0.067)
(0.066)
(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.066)
H
oteland
R
estaurant
-0.073
-0.073
-0.072
-0.075
-0.072
(0.080)
(0.080)
(0.080)
(0.080)
(0.080)
Transport,Storage,C
om
m
unication
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
FinancialSector
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
(0.097)
(0.097)
(0.097)
(0.098)
(0.097)
R
ealE
state,B
usiness
and
R
enting
-0.091
-0.090
-0.092
-0.091
-0.090
(0.068)
(0.068)
(0.068)
(0.068)
(0.068)
E
ducation
-0.27
-0.27
-0.27
-0.27
-0.27
(0.083)
(0.083)
(0.083)
(0.084)
(0.083)
H
ealth
and
SocialServices
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
-0.14
(0.087)
(0.088)
(0.087)
(0.087)
(0.088)
O
ther
-0.076
-0.075
-0.077
-0.076
-0.075
(0.077)
(0.077)
(0.077)
(0.077)
(0.077)
Firm
FE
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
7264
T
he
outcom
e
variable
is
the
share
of
deducters
ata
firm
.
Further
controls:
lagged
bunching
behavior,share
m
arried,share
w
ith
tertiary
education,average
gross
incom
e
atfirm
,as
w
ellas
yearand
province
fixed
effects.Standard
errors
clustered
atfirm
level.
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Table B.20 – Peer Learning Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.02 36.11 0.15 0.15
(6.03) (6.04) (0.22) (0.24)
Share Married 0.52 0.52 0.01 0.00
(0.24) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Female 0.37 0.38 0.03 -0.02
(0.27) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Tertiary Education 0.32 0.34 0.03 0.01
(0.26) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 50.74 49.65 -1.93 -2.10
(120.13) (103.84) (4.46) (4.45)
Corporate Firm 0.85 0.87 0.03 0.01
(0.36) (0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Avg Gross Income 6903.01 7489.99 1038.90 81.77
(4052.51) (4499.99) (149.21) (172.22)
Avg Taxable Income 6231.00 6626.24 699.54 -56.25
(3177.46) (3482.79) (117.24) (136.95)
Share with Deducters 0.39 0.45 0.10 0.03
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 7761.76 8205.73 785.80 61.69
(3949.91) (4199.75) (145.90) (164.29)
Avg Taxable Income 6925.06 7167.07 428.33 -99.44
(3073.59) (3155.16) (113.82) (126.60)
Share with Deducters 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.06
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 2,954 1,285
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the peer learning channel. The sample consists of all firms receiving one incoming
employee between 2010 and 2014 and for which it is possible to observe at least two consec-
utive years before and after the event. Treated refers to firms receiving incoming co-workers
using deductions prior to joining their new firm. Column (3) displays the difference between
treated and control and column (4) this same difference for the matched sample. Matching
was done on average age, share married, female and tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate
status of firm and average gross income pre and post event. Pre-event refers to the year be-
fore the arrival of new co-workers and post-event to the first year after the arrival of the new
coworkers.
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Table B.21 – Peer Learning - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.022 0.023 0.049
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 0.022 0.028 0.038
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.031 0.035 0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
Event year + 1 0.037 0.040 0.079
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Event year + 2 0.014 0.018 0.069
(0.024) (0.024) (0.032)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 15,913 15,913 13,847
Notes: The table reports results from the event-study regression equa-
tion (2.5) at the firm level. Outcome variable is the leave-out firm de-
duction decision and event year refers to the year of incoming employ-
ees. Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as the base category. Firm
and year fixed effects are included throughout. Columns (1) and (2)
refer to the full sample, and column (3) uses matching on observables.
We control for average gross income, average age, share married, share
female, share tertiary educated, firmsize, corporate status of firm, as
well as industry and province dummies and dummies for the year of
the incoming event. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the firm level.
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Table B.22 – Experts Event Study - Descriptives
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treated Diff Matched Diff
Demographics
Avg Age 36.00 36.10 0.02 -0.15
(7.40( (7.28) (0.15) (0.17)
Share Married 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.00
(0.28) (0.27) (0.0)1 (0.01)
Share Female 0.41 0.41 0.00 -0.00
(0.30) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Tertiary Education 0.28 0.28 -0.01 0.01
(0.28) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-Event
Firmsize 43.99 47.12 5.42 -2.61
(178.40) (211.66) (3.49) (4.80)
Avg Gross Income 5217.38 5813.76 848.54 55.52
(4529.22) (5080.19) (89.15) (115.40)
Avg Taxable Income 4766.13 5232.50 656.64 11.70
(3671.01) (4117.10) (72.43) (93.26)
Share using Deductions 0.27 0.32 0.09 0.02
(0.44) (0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-Event
Avg Gross Income 5227.81 5887.27 968.05 100.96
(4668.04) (5437.23) (81.09) (119.54)
Avg Taxable Income 4770.90 5285.93 758.88 96.06
(3837.20) (4415.80) (66.74) (96.23)
Share using Deductions 0.27 0.33 0.10 0.04
(0.44) (0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 16,389 4,824
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study
quantifying the experts channel. The sample is based on the universe of accountant switches
between 2010 and 2014 for which it is possible to observe at least two consecutive years
before and after the event and the firms employ potential bunchers throughout. Cases in
which firms simultaneously received knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable accountants
were excluded. Treated refers to firms receiving new accountants previously working at a
firm in which employees were using deductions. Columns (3) displays the difference to a
control group consisting of firms receiving an accountant previously working at a firm with
potential bunchers but zero employees using deductions. Column (4) displays the difference
to the matched sample. Matching was done on average age, share married, female and
tertiary educated, firmsize, and average gross income pre and post event. Pre-event refers to
the year before the arrival of the new accountants and post-event to the first year after the
arrival of the new accountants.
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Table B.23 – Experts Event Study - Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Matching
A. Overall Effect
DiD estimate 0.130 0.015 0.031
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
B. Effects by Relative Year
Anticipatory Effects
Event year - 2 -0.010 0.005 -0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Post Treatment Effects
Event year 0.083 0.005 0.017
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Event year + 1 0.147 0.018 0.022
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Event year + 2 0.192 0.034 0.054
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 60,483 60,483 32,075
Notes: The table reports results from the event study regressions quan-
tifying the experts channel detailed in Section (2.4.2). Outcome vari-
able is the firm deduction decision and event year refers to the year
of the incoming accountant. Event year - 1 is excluded and serves as
the base category. Firm and year fixed effects are included through-
out. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the full sample, and column (3) uses
matching on observables. We control for average gross income, aver-
age age, share married, share female, share tertiary educated, firmsize,
as well as industry and province dummies and dummies for the year of
the accountant switch. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the firm level.b
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Figure B.12 – Coefficients on experience dummies
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This figure depicts estimated coefficients from a linear regression of a deducting indicator on dummy
variables for each year of experience in the formal sector. We control for individual fixed effects,
income dynamics and a broad range of firm characteristics.
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Figure B.13 – Event Study Job Switchers
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This figure shows an event study with deducting shares of job switchers around the time of the
job transition. The vertical line indicates the time of the transition. We observe deducting among
individuals who come from a firm in the medium quintile of the distribution of co-worker deducting
shares and differentiate between those who switch to a firm in the bottom, medium, and top quintile.
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Figure B.14 – Event Study Job Switchers – Sample of Displaced Workers
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This figure shows an event study with deducting shares of job switchers around the time of the job
transition in the subsample of workers who exogenously loose their job due to a firm closure.
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Figure B.15 – Peer Learning Event Study
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This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the share of firms employing deducters around
the hiring of a new co-worker (leaving out the new worker from the calculation). The vertical line
denotes the arrival of the new worker. The treatment group is formed by firms that receive a new
co-worker who was deducting in her previous firm while the control group is formed by firms with a
new co-worker who was not deducting (despite being a potential deducter with gross income in the
range above the kink).
142
Appendix to Chapter 2
Figure B.16 – Experts Event Study
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This figure shows an event study on the firm level with the average share of deducters around the
entry of a new accountant into the firm. The vertical line denotes the arrival of the new accountant.
The treatment group is formed by firms that receive an accountant who was previously working for
a firm with deducters while the control group is formed by firms with a new accountant who was
working for a firm without any deducters.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.1 – Comparison Availability of Professions Data
With Data on Without Data on
Clearly Defined Profession Clearly Defined Profession
Self-employment Profit 8,193.69 8,045.50
(34,956.80) (34,471.54)
Age 46.27 43.18
(12.27) (12.97)
Female 0.33 0.38
(0.47) (0.49)
Married 0.70 0.61
(0.46) (0.49)
Tertiary 0.75 0.27
(0.43) (0.44)
Observations 1,880,649 3,479,112
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics on the universe of individuals with self-employed
tax declarations. Individuals are divided into subgroups as to whether or not they belong to one of
the clearly defined professions presented in Section 3.3. The table reports means for each subgroup
and standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table C.2 – Effects Individual Tax Returns - Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Double Differences
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DD (mean × post) 3890.7*** 0.496***
(166.7) (0.0356)
DD (p90 × post) 5885.8*** 0.781***
(141.0) (0.0277)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 519,730 519,730 519,730 519,730
R2 0.1914 0.1960 0.4951 0.4962
Panel B: Triple Differences
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × doc) 6343.2*** 0.799***
(468.4) (0.112)
DDD (p90 × post × doc) 6611.3*** 0.820***
(382.9) (0.0807)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 519,730 519,730 519,730 519,730
R2 0.1927 0.1975 0.4961 0.4971
Notes: This table depicts results using the individual self-employed tax return data for the subsample
of individuals observed without interruption throughout the whole sample period 2006-2015. Outcome
variables are overall self-employment profits and log(self-employment profits + 1). Panel A depicts
the results from the interaction term in the double difference regression equation (3.1). Panel B depicts
the results for the triple interaction term in regression equation (3.3). The second treatment layer is
given by an indicator for a self-employed individual with registered profession of either medical doctor
or dentist. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
146
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.3 – Placebo Differences - Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Vet
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × vet) -2688.2** -0.0468
(1248.8) (0.269)
DDD (p90 × post × vet) -3825.7*** -0.405*
(1209.3) (0.246)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 519,730 519,730 519,730 519,730
R2 0.1915 0.1961 0.4951 0.4962
Panel B: Unaffected Professionals
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × unaffected) 141.7 0.0129
(763.9) (0.166)
DDD (p90 × post × unaffected) -1281.8** -0.0820
(628.7) (0.123)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 519,730 519,730 519,730 519,730
R2 0.1914 0.1961 0.4952 0.4963
Notes: This table depicts results using the individual self-employed tax return data for the subsample of indi-
viduals observed without interruption throughout the whole sample period 2006-2015. It presents the results
of triple difference regressions as in equation (3.3) for two sets of placebo professional groups: Veterinary
physicians (Panel A) and a further group of unaffected professionals (Panel B) consisting of economists, busi-
ness administrators and journalists. Reported coefficients correspond to the triple interaction between being in
an above mean (p90) region, belonging to the specific group of professionals and the observations being in a
time period after the introduction of the reform. Outcome variable is individual total self-employment profits
in columns (1)-(2) and log(self-employment profits + 1) in columns (3)-(4). Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.4 – Triple Differences Health Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-employment Profits Log Self-employment Profits
DDD (mean × post × health) -1031.9*** 0.139
(315.6) (0.147)
DDD (p90 × post × health) -1499.1*** 0.164
(243.7) (0.108)
Individual & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549 1,880,549
R2 0.1192 0.1216 0.2848 0.2852
Notes: This table presents results of a triple difference regression as in equation (3.3). The second treat-
ment layer is given by a broader group of health professionals excluding doctors and dentists but including
nurses, medical technicians, psychologists, pharmacists, midwifes, physical therapists, optometrists, and
nutritionists. Reported coefficients correspond to the triple interaction between being in an above mean
(p90) region, belonging to the specific group of health professionals and the observations being in a time
period after the introduction of the reform. Outcome variable is individual total overall self-employment
profits in columns (1)-(2) and log(self-employment profits + 1) in columns (3)-(4). Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.1 – Tax Declaration Form F102A for Self-Employed
 FORMULARIO 102A
RESOLUCIÓN N° NAC-DGERCGC13-00881
 100 IDENTIFICACIÓN DE LA DECLARACIÓN
102 AÑO 104
105
 200 IDENTIFICACIÓN DEL SUJETO PASIVO 
 RUC 202 APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES COMPLETOS / RAZÓN O DENOMINACIÓN SOCIAL DE LA SUCESIÓN INDIVISA
0 0 1
RENTAS GRAVADAS DE TRABAJO Y CAPITAL
ACTIVIDADES EMPRESARIALES CON REGISTRO DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS 481 + 491 (-)
INGRESOS SUJETOS A IMPUESTO A LA RENTA ÚNICO 510
LIBRE EJERCICIO PROFESIONAL 511 + 521 (-)
512 + 522 (-)
ARRIENDO DE BIENES INMUEBLES 503 513 + 523 (-)
ARRIENDO DE OTROS ACTIVOS 504 514 + 524 (-)
505 515 + 525 (-)
INGRESO POR REGALÍAS 516 +
INGRESOS PROVENIENTES DEL EXTERIOR 517 +
RENDIMIENTOS FINANCIEROS 518 +
DIVIDENDOS 519 +
OTRAS RENTAS GRAVADAS 520 + 530 (-)
529 = 539 =
 529-539 549 =
541 + 551 (-) 559 +
SUBTOTAL BASE GRAVADA   569 =
GASTOS PERSONALES - EDUCACIÓN 571 (-)
GASTOS PERSONALES - SALUD 572 (-)
GASTOS PERSONALES - ALIMENTACIÓN 573 (-)
GASTOS PERSONALES - VIVIENDA 574 (-)
GASTOS PERSONALES - VESTIMENTA 575 (-) 580 (=)
EXONERACIÓN POR TERCERA EDAD 576 (-)
560 577 (-)
570 578 (-)
SUBTOTAL OTRAS DEDUCCIONES Y EXONERACIONES SUMAR DEL 571 AL 578 579 =
OTRAS RENTAS EXENTAS
INGRESOS POR LOTERÍAS, RIFAS Y APUESTAS 581  583 +
HERENCIAS, LEGADOS Y DONACIONES 582  584 +
PENSIONES JUBILARES 586 +
OTROS INGRESOS EXENTOS 587 +
SUBTOTAL OTRAS RENTAS EXENTAS  589 =
RESUMEN IMPOSITIVO
832 =
839 =
840 (-)
842 =
843 =
845 (-)
846 (-)
847 (-)
848 (-)
849 (-)
850 (-)
851 (-)
852 (-)
SUBTOTAL IMPUESTO A PAGAR 855 =
SUBTOTAL SALDO A FAVOR 856 =
(+) IMPUESTO A LA RENTA ÚNICO 857 (+)
(-)  CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO PARA LA LIQUIDACIÓN DEL IMPUESTO A LA RENTA ÚNICO 858 (-)
IMPUESTO A LA RENTA A PAGAR 859
SALDO A FAVOR CONTRIBUYENTE 869
ANTICIPO DETERMINADO PRÓXIMO AÑO 879 =
871 (+)
872 (+)
PAGO PREVIO  (Informativo) 890
897 USD 898 USD 899 USD
VALORES A PAGAR Y FORMA DE PAGO (luego de imputación al pago en declaraciones sustitutivas)
TOTAL IMPUESTO A PAGAR 902 +
INTERÉS POR MORA 903 +
MULTA 904 +
TOTAL PAGADO 999 =
MEDIANTE CHEQUE, DÉBITO BANCARIO, EFECTIVO U OTRAS FORMAS DE PAGO 905 USD
MEDIANTE COMPENSACIONES                                                                     906 USD
MEDIANTE NOTAS DE CRÉDITO 907 USD
         DETALLE DE COMPENSACIONES
908 N/C No 910 N/C No 912 N/C No 916 Resol No. 918 Resol No. 
909 USD 911 USD 913 USD 915 USD 917 USD 919 USD
 
NOMBRE :  198 Cédula de Identidad o No. de Pasaporte  
IMPORTANTE: POSICIONE EL CURSOR SOBRE EL CASILLERO PARA OBTENER 
AYUDA SOBRE SU LLENADO
DETALLE DE NOTAS DE CRÉDITO CARTULARES
DETALLE DE NOTAS DE CRÉDITO 
DESMATERIALIZADAS
50% Impuesto a la Renta Causado Menos Retenciones  871+872
GASTOS DEDUCIBLES
201
RENTAS AGRÍCOLAS
    RENTA IMPONIBLE
(INGRESOS - GASTOS DED.)
549+559 
DECLARACIÓN DEL IMPUESTO A LA RENTA PERSONAS NATURALES Y SUCESIONES INDIVISAS 
NO OBLIGADAS A LLEVAR CONTABILIDAD 
   No.
 Nº. DE FORMULARIO QUE SUSTITUYE
 Nº. DE EMPLEADOS EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA
OCUPACIÓN LIBERAL (INCLUYE COMISIONISTAS, ARTESANOS, AGENTES, REPRESENTANTES Y DEMÁS 
TRABAJADORES AUTÓNOMOS)
INGRESOSAVALÚO
OTRAS DEDUCCIONES Y EXONERACIONES APLICABLE AL PERÍODO
SUBTOTAL 
RENTA IMPONIBLE ANTES DE INGRESOS POR TRABAJO EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA
SUELDOS, SALARIOS, INDEMNIZACIONES Y OTROS INGRESOS LÍQUIDOS DEL TRABAJO EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA
VALOR IMPUESTO PAGADO INGRESOS
TOTAL GASTOS PERSONALES
SUMAR DEL 571 AL 575
859-898
(=) CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO GENERADO POR ANTICIPO 
TOTAL IMPUESTO CAUSADO
842-843-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852>0
842-843-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852<0
(-) EXONERACIÓN Y CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO POR LEYES ESPECIALES
DECLARO QUE LOS DATOS PROPORCIONADOS EN ESTE DOCUMENTO SON EXACTOS Y VERDADEROS, POR LO QUE ASUMO LA RESPONSABILIDAD LEGAL QUE DE ELLA SE DERIVEN (Art. 101 de la L.R.T.I.)
FIRMA SUJETO PASIVO
569-579
DETALLE DE IMPUTACIÓN AL PAGO (Para declaraciones sustitutivas)
INTERÉS IMPUESTO MULTA
BASE IMPONIBLE GRAVADA
(-) ANTICIPO PAGADO
(=) IMPUESTO A LA RENTA CAUSADO MAYOR AL ANTICIPO DETERMINADO
839-840<0
(-) CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO GENERADO POR IMPUESTO A LA SALIDA DE DIVISAS
839-840>0
(-) RETENCIONES EN LA FUENTE QUE LE REALIZARON EN EL EJERCICIO FISCAL EN RELACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIA
(-) CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO POR DIVIDENDOS
(-) RETENCIONES POR INGRESOS PROVENIENTES DEL EXTERIOR CON DERECHO A CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO
(-) ANTICIPO DE IMPUESTO A LA RENTA PAGADO POR ESPECTÁCULOS PÚBLICOS
(-) CRÉDITO TRIBUTARIO DE AÑOS ANTERIORES
(-) RETENCIONES EN LA FUENTE QUE LE REALIZARON EN EL EJERCICIO FISCAL
ANTICIPO A PAGAR
PRIMERA CUOTA
SEGUNDA CUOTA
EXONERACIÓN POR DISCAPACIDAD
50% UTILIDAD ATRIBUIBLE A LA SOCIEDAD CONYUGAL POR LAS RENTAS QUE LE 
CORRESPONDA
PORCENTAJE DE DISCAPACIDAD 
IDENTIFICACIÓN DEL CÓNYUGE (C.I. O PASAPORTE)
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